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Abstract
We present three approaches to representing families of preference relations
indexed by context over a set of alternatives. Our main motivation is that
existing models of preferences typically assume that there is a unique order
that ranks alternatives and contexts alike, that is preferences are context-free.
We argue that this is often an unnecessary and unrealistic burden on the
decision-maker’s capacity to decide. The first chapter is a geometric approach
that improves upon the model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) and case-
based decision theory. The second is a general, topological approach with
applications to choice under uncertainty; for context preferences it emulates
the classical representation of Debreu (1954) and (1964). Finally, as a practical
alternative the previous two models we extend the model of Herstein and
Milnor (1953) and hence von Neumann and Morgernstern (1944) to obtain a
representation for unions of mixture spaces.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context and decision: the general case
1.1.1 The role of context
It is hard to imagine a decision problem that is completely absent of context.
Context may be either implicit and in the background, or explicit and cen-
tral to the problem. Examples of explicit contexts that fill the literature are
decision making under risk or uncertainty, where a decision-maker has cer-
tain beliefs, conjectures or simply information about what will happen in the
future, and given this knowledge she wishes to make a decision. Examples
of background contexts include the observable socio-economic and biological
characteristics of the decision-maker which are the focus of models in econo-
metrics. Such “background variables” are often slow to change and for a given
decision-maker are taken as given for a particular decision problem. Yet other
examples that may rapidly change include those where the decision-maker may
be completely unaware of the context in which she finds herself, such as when
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there are subconscious psychological states of mind or physically observable
(via magnetic resonance imaging say) neuronal configurations that have a di-
rect impact upon the decision-making at hand.
A broad definition of context would therefore include all sorts of context:
conscious and subconscious, observable and otherwise, as well as both central
and ancillary. Indeed at first glance, there is no reason why context might not
simply refer to a complete description of the universe including its quantum
states. Of course a modeler and indeed a decision-maker will tend to exclude
from the decision problem matters that are either superfluous or beyond the
control of the decision maker. However, as with the analysis of markets, hold-
ing the prices of all other markets fixed is only a partial analysis of equilibrium,
we believe that the equivalent of a “general equilibrium” analysis of a decision
problem requires identifying the space of contexts that may vary within the
decision problem and impact upon the outcome.
This leads to the fundamental question of whether there are any limitations
to what we may call a space of contexts for the purposes of a decision prob-
lem. For the benefit of those that are familiar with the subject matter, an
affirmative answer is provided in chapter 3 in so far as we wish to consider
preferences that are represented by a utility function that is continuous on the
context space. These concepts will of course be defined below.
As with other fields, it serves well to first gain a good understanding of how
the present model works by considering a straightforward, canonical context
space. That is, consider the set of all possible probability distributions on a
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given set of states of the world. A particularly simple yet fruitful example of
which is the following.
Example 1.1 (Based on exercise 6.B.4 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(1995) [MWG). p208] Consider a decision maker, Val, who faces the future
threat of a flood. At the time when the threat becomes imminent, two states
of nature are anticipated to be of concern: “flood” and “no-flood”. Suppose
that at such a time, Val will know the chances of each state obtaining. The
response will be one of the following two courses of action: “evacuate” or
“do nothing”. At present, Val seeks to define a complete, contingent plan
of action. Crucially, the contingencies she considers are the set of possible
probability distributions over states that she may face when the threat becomes
imminent, not the states that may subsequently obtain. In particular, given
there are two states, the present context space may be identified with the one
dimensional simplex tp P R : 0 ď p ď 1u where p is the probability of a flood.
This canonical class of context spaces is the one that is considered in the paper
“A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game” by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) [GS03]; a paper we will frequently refer to below.
Indeed, the majority of the results in this thesis are most readily understood
by considering a context space that is either a one or two dimensional simplex
of probability measures: respectively the case when there are either 2 or 3
states. (We formally define a simplex of probability distributions and state
some useful results concerning the ambient space in which we can consider
them in the appendix of this chapter.)
Another kind of context space that has been studied in the literature is a
3
(Cartesian) product of the non-negative integers, where a context is given the
interpretation of a database or memory (the integers signify the frequency
with which a case has been observed. This is the setting for the model of case-
based decision-making by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2002), a model that
is mathematically and methodologically close to both [GS03] and the present
exposition. Indeed, the present work is intended to provide further motivation
for and some substantive generalizations of the existing work of Gilboa and
Schmeidler amongst others on role of context in decision theory.
Before discussing the directly relevant literature further we will introduce the
essential concepts of preferences and utility in the form that is most commonly
found in the literature and motivate the concept of context preferences.
1.1.2 Preferences and utility: the classical approach
It is standard in decision theory to characterize preferences with a relation
ą (or Á) on some set, which is here denoted by D. The preference relation
has the property that for all a and b in D, a ą b if and only if the decision-
maker is willing to make the following statement: “a is strictly preferred to
b”. Mathematically ą is simply subset of DˆD. The alternative approach is
to define a choice function on the set of subsets of D. The advantage of this
approach is that the choice function is, in principle at least, observable from
the choice behaviour of the agent. The advantage of the latter, is that it can
be understood as the psychological preference of the individual and is perhaps
because in general, the set D need not be actual alternatives available to the
decision-maker.
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For instance, a decision-maker may be willing to state “I would strictly prefer
that candidate x beats candidate y in the next elections.” Such statements
may be represented by a preference relation in the following way: define a to
be the statement “candidate x beats candidate y in the next elections”, and b
to be the statement with x and y interchanged. Of course the decision-maker
can “choose” a over b, but it seems more natural to say that a is strictly pre-
ferred to b. We adopt the view that the model should allow for this possibility
whilst simultaneously striving not to extend the domain of preferences beyond
what is absolutely necessary, for doing so may fundamentally alter the nature
of the decision problem. We return to this point below.
In our common use of language, it is understood that by making the statement
that a is strictly preferred to b, the decision-maker also means b is not strictly
preferred to a. A condition on the preference relation ą called asymmetry
that captures this idea is found either implicitly or explicitly–see for instance
Fishburn (1979) and Kreps (1988))–in almost all models of preferences. When
we impose such conditions (more often referred to as axioms) on preferences,
we inevitably exclude entire classes of preferences from the subsequent analysis
in the hope that we may say more about the smaller class that remains.
Whilst preference relations and the conditions we impose upon them are useful
in their own right as we can evaluate and test them directly, they also provide
a stepping stone to a myriad of mathematical tool-kits. In particular, it is
common to characterize preferences by a real-valued function, f mapping D
intoR such that a ą b if and only if fpaq ą fpbq, and call this a utility function
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or utility representation. This characterization then allows us to model and
analyze our decision-maker using tools from calculus and probability theory,
to derive other functions (eg. demand functions), to aggregate and look at
the economic behaviour of markets and economies in ways that are otherwise
impossible or the very least less tractable. Importantly, it is the conditions
we impose on preferences that determine the kind of function we can use to
represent an agent.
It is worthwhile bearing in mind that long before preferences explicitly mod-
eled in decision theory, utility and the tools of calculus and probability were
used to study one of the oldest challenges in decision theory: a resolution to
the famous St. Petersburg paradox. Indeed, Daniel Bernoulli’s solution us-
ing an expected utility function (with diminishing utility of wealth) preceded
the axiomatic foundations obtained by von Neumann and Morgernstern (1944)
[vNM] by over two hundred years. Thus it is often the case that the conditions
we impose on preferences are driven by the desire to give an already successful
utility model an appropriate decision theoretic foundation.
This especially popular model of expected utility identifies the utility func-
tion up to a positive affine transformation (also known as a “cardinal scale”).
That is two utility functions u, v characterize the same preferences provided
v “ κ`λu for κ P R and λ ą 0. This scale is the same as that with which tem-
perature was measured before knowledge of the existence of an absolute zero
. Indeed [vNM] provides a detailed and convincing discussion of the historical
and physical parallels between attempts to accurately measure temperature
and attempts to measure utility.
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They propose that if an individual strictly prefers “a glass of tea” to “no
drink” and “a cup of coffee” to “a glass of tea”,
up“no drink”q ă up“glass of tea”q ă up“cup of coffee”q,
then, letting up“no drink”q “ κ, there should exist a number 0 ă p ă 1, such
that
p up“cup of coffee”q ` p1´ pqκ “ up“glass of tea”q
or equivalently p pup“cup of coffee”q ´ κq “ up“glass of tea”q ´ κ. From this
they conclude that the ratio of these two differences is equal to p and utility
may thus be measured provided we define preferences on lotteries rather than
the underlying objects and use the convexity properties of the space of lotter-
ies as a yard stick.1
Whilst it is easy to see how this approach might fail (for instance there will
presumably be a range of p where the individual has no strict preference in ei-
ther direction between the lottery and the sure thing), there is a basic message
that was novel in the 1940s: it is possible to make more precise measurements
of preference than is the case if preferences only satisfy the conditions for an
ordinal utility representation. For such preferences, v and u are equivalent
representations whenever v “ f ˝ u for some f : R Ñ R strictly increasing
(s ă t implies fpsq ă fptq), and in this case the sum that forms the above ex-
pected utility is completely arbitrary and meaningless. Indeed, even strength
1In this sense the above tea and coffee example is a slight abuse of notation: upxq should
really be upδxq, where δx is the probability distribution that assigns mass one to outcome
x.
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of preference measurements are implied by the [vNM] model–for if p ą 1
2
in
the tea-coffee example, this indicates a stronger preference for tea over nothing
than coffee over tea, whilst the converse is true if p ă 1
2
.
Herstein and Milnor (1953) [HM] observed that to measure utility up to a
cardinal scale, it is not necessary to define preferences on a simplex of proba-
bility distributions. Rather, one needs preferences to be defined on a “mixture
space”. (We define this space and work with it in chapter 4, whilst a more
detailed discussion of expected utility is provided in section (1.3.2).) In seek-
ing a foundation for measurement theory Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky
(1971) [KLST] obtained alternative foundations for expected utility amongst
a variety of other models. This approach places specific conditions on the set
on which preferences are defined that generalize the convexity property that
sets such as a simplex of probability measures satisfy. Instead, they require
richness (also known as solvability) conditions. The weakest of these implies
amongst other things that for a finite set the elements must be equally spaced.
A set that satisfies these conditions is for instance the numbers 1, 2, . . . , 10.
The plethora of criticisms of expected utility theory that flourished in the
literature on decision theory and eventually beyond started with the paradox
of Allais (1953). (We discuss this paradox in more detail in chapter 4 where
a possible resolution is offered.) Inspired by the apparent shortcomings of
expected utility, mathematical psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) [KT] introduced concepts from empirical literature on the psychology
of behaviour to decision theory, thereby unifying hitherto largely separate and
distinct literatures.
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Prospect theory [KT] and its later version, cumulative prospect theory, by
the same authors (1992) is perhaps the first model of decision-making to give
a central role to context. They seek to explain, for instance, how an investor
who has made losses and who has yet to come to terms with this fact will be-
have in a different way to one who is investing for the first time. The concept
that plays the role of context in their model is the reference point which is
usually taken to be some value of wealth. The idea is that preferences over
changes in wealth give rise to a representation that amongst other things be-
haves differently either side of the reference point. Thus, relative to the new
investor, the investor who has incurred a loss will behave in a risk seeking
manner in order to recoup the losses simply because she is far below her ref-
erence point.
However, the preference model that underpins the function [KT] proposed
to represent the agent entails minor changes to a result from [KLST] and must
therefore hold for a fixed reference point. This is also pointed out by Schmidt
(2003) and Bleichrodt (2007) en route to addressing this particular drawback.
That is to say their model is silent on how the preference relation, and hence
utility, varies with the reference point. Note that the authors are clearly aware
of the importance of this question; as is apparent in the following quote from
[KT] p.277, which also appears in Schmidt (2003):
The emphasis on changes as the carriers of value should not be
taken to imply that the value of a particular change is independent
of initial position. Strictly speaking, value should be treated as a
9
function in two arguments: the asset position that serves as refer-
ence point, and the magnitude of the change (positive or negative)
from that reference point. An individuals attitude towards money,
say, could be described by a book, where each page presents the
value function for changes at a particular asset position. Clearly,
the value functions described on different pages are not identical:
they are likely to become more linear with increases in assets.
In the above models, and the vast majority of others, a single preference re-
lation is defined over alternatives and treated as the primitive of the model.
The situation is less clearcut for dynamic choice where preferences are often
modeled as evolving with time, but nonetheless, the primacy of the initial
(single) preference relation is still standard (see Hammond (1976) for a just
such a model of changing tastes).
We will refer to such models as context-free even though it is clear that, for
any given model, this property must attributed to one of the following two
underlying assumptions. The first is that preferences are defined on a much
larger set of statements than the set of alternatives (or mixtures thereof). That
is, preferences consist of all possible statements concerning context, context-
alternative pairs, mixtures thereof etc, etc. The second is that the context is
simply suppressed, and we then understand the preference relation in terms
of the decision-maker defining preferences over a subset of the objects of the
universe whilst holding the remainder fixed on the grounds that they will not
change during the course of the decision at hand. It seems natural to call these
two classes of context-free preferences global preferences and local preferences
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respectively.
Depending on the application, models like [vNM] may fall into either of the
two categories. If, as in example (1.1), the agent is making a plan for a future
set of contingencies then there are clearly a whole host of possible present con-
texts that, depending on which one holds at the time the plan is made, may
give rise to a whole host of different plans. In this case [vNM] relies on the sec-
ond assumption. On the other hand, if we assume the agent’s present context
is identified with an element of the set on which preferences are defined, then
provided the domain of preferences is suitably large, preferences are globally
defined. The agent’s actual decision will still depend on the present context,
but preferences do not. Indeed, a special case of this situation is typical in
game theory. (The discussion of the [vNM] model section (1.3.2) in section
below is related to this point.)
This plurality of possibilities is not possible for instance with the Savage (1972;
original edition 1954) model of subjective expected utility.2 This is because
the present context is identified (implicitly) to be the subjective knowledge
that gives rise, through the structure of the domain of preferences and the
conditions thereon, to the probability distribution on the set of future states
that appears in the utility representation. For a different context, a different
probability distribution would appear in the representation, for in this model
utility itself is dependent only on the outcomes. To us it seems that this is the
reason Savage (and for different reasons Binmore (2009)) suggests his model
2We do not provide an exposition of this model here. The reader is referred to either
Fishburn (1979) or Kreps (1988).
11
only applies to “small worlds”. Since there is only a single preference relation
to which the conditions apply, the model is silent on how preferences might
vary with subjective knowledge, even though the representation suggests that
the subjective probability distribution might fully capture this variation in
context. Indeed, even if the current subjective knowledge was somehow in-
cluded in the domain of preferences, the latter would still be defined from
that vantage point. Thus the Savage model of expected utility employs local
preferences.
The question of why Savage chose to suppress context is important for the
present discussion. Indeed, in the model of Savage, there is a another form of
context that is modeled, but only indirectly. Being a model of choice under
uncertainty about future states, with a single preference relation defined on
the set of “acts” (the set of all functions from states to consequences), Savage
isolates functions that differ only at a given state or event and is hence able to
impose conditions on state-preferences. The rationale for doing so is to relate
current preferences to what preferences would be given the knowledge that a
future state or event will obtain. By taking this approach, Savage chose to
substantially extend the domain of preferences rather than work with context
preferences. As we will now argue, this choice is typical in the classical deci-
sion theory literature.
Although the following passage from Mertens (2003; first version 1987) does
not address the literature on decision theory per se, it provides one of the
most candid articulations of a key motivation of classical decision theory. In
this paper, Mertens, driven by the proliferation of new equilibrium solutions
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in game theory that had come about through “pressure from applications”,
has resolved to put game theory back on normatively solid ground.
It is a challenging task to put those new developments on as solid a
foundation as classical theory, and to show that all those intuitive
and context-dependent arguments can be rationalised in a purely
decision theoretic, context independent way. . .
Then, in referring to a proposal to address this challenge, Mertens continues:
This concept has a number of satisfactory properties, and yields
typically in the above mentioned applications the same equilibria
we would have selected by the intuitive, context depending argu-
ments.. . . It follows that all those new developments in economic
theory are at least mutually consistent, and based on essential de-
cision theoretic aspects i.e., not only is it true that we did not
select different solutions in different contexts for games that were
ordinally identical, but there is a single, fully ordinal theory, that
has reasonable properties over the space of all games, and that
underpins all those developments.
This quote epitomizes the normative motivation for the classical approach to
modeling decision-makers and the apparent aversion to “non-ordinal” foun-
dations and context-dependence. This aversion is perhaps due to Samuel-
son (1938) and the revealed preference approach to decision theory he helped
found. The idea that preferences may be revealed through actual choices is ex-
tremely appealing, and the difficulty with what Mertens might call non-ordinal
features of a decision model is that they can surely never be revealed or ver-
ified by observing the choices of an individual. By contrast, the context rich
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empirical data and tools available today are very different to those available at
the time when the revealed preference approach was initiated, and they ensure
that observations on choice are only one part of the set of observations.
For instance, today econometricians have an abundance of data on the indi-
vidual characteristics of decision-makers, and indeed do try to explain choices
conditional upon observable background data. Indeed in models of discrete
choice, the objective is to try and obtain estimates of the parameters that
determine how preferences change across a population that is sampled from
a range of contexts. One interpretation of this methodology is that, up to
the unobservable context (which is modeled as noise) it is the observable con-
text that is determining decisions. Indeed the approach suggests that, noise
aside, this is what we would all do if we were in the same (observable) context.3
Today it is common for empirical psychologists and experimental economists
to aggregate data across individuals and seek to measure the typical response
to a given stimulus. Often, the agent will be unaware of the stimulus, and in
such circumstances it is difficult to imagine that the decision-maker is rank-
ing not only the alternatives before her, but also the stimuli. Thus the fact
that there is a behavioural response to stimulus will, in general, tell us noth-
ing about whether a given agent has preferences for one kind of stimulus or
another. Similarly, neuroscientists have the possibility of scanning neural ac-
3This interpretation adheres to the view attributed to Hume (1739). In his essay on the
philosophical question of liberty versus necessity (also known as determinism versus free-
will) Hume convincingly argues that free will is the illusion the decision-maker experiences
by living the decision, that in practice, any other decision-maker in precisely the same
situation or context (molecules, atoms and all) would have reached the same decision, by
the same means. He concludes from this that determinism and free-will may co-exist, with
free-will being a purely subjective notion and the determinism a purely objective notion.
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tivity, thereby gathering information that may be non-ordinal (and thus con-
textual) by its very nature.
Similar to the way expected utility was used long before [vNM], it appears as
if the preference foundations are lagging behind the applications. We believe
that there is therefore much room for modern decision theory to cautiously
embrace context-dependence, and moreover to do so on a firm theoretical ba-
sis. One of the objectives of the present thesis is to help lay the foundations
for such a transition.
1.1.3 Context preferences
With the arguable exception of the literature on dynamic choice, models in
decision theory that take as primitive a family of preference relations on some
set and indexed by another rare. Such models are more commonly associated
with the literature on social choice, where a collection of agents are modeled
as a collection of preference relations. Indeed, the decision theory model of
[GS03] which is closest to the present work and in particular to the model
of chapter 2 is mathematically similar to the work of Young (1975), Myerson
(1995), Ashkenazy and Lehrer (2001) and Azrieli (2011) all of which form part
of the literature on social choice.
In general context preferences are defined in the following way.4 For a given
set of contexts X , upon which preferences are not defined and another set D,
4Our use of the term “context preferences” as opposed to “context-dependent pref-
erences” stems from the more common use in language of similar abbreviations such as
“university students” for the more accurate but tedious “university-attending students”.
Indeed at times, following Schmidt, we will abbreviate further still to just “preferences”.
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we define context preferences to be
tąx Ă D ˆD : x P Xu. (1.1)
For a particular context x we will refer to ąx as the preference relation at
x. Note that at this stage, prior to imposing any conditions on preferences,
this notation is general enough to include the case where for some x and y
in X , the relations ąx and ąy are defined on Dx and Dy respectively where
Dx ‰ Dy. This is because we may define D :“
Ť
zPX Dz, and both ąx and ąy
are subsets of D ˆD.
In the above definition, the set D is not identified with the set of alternatives
A, for in general, a context preference relation ą¨ (this notation is intended
to denote a general ąx for some x P X) may contain not only certain pairs of
alternatives but also pairs of contexts, pairs of alternative-context pairs, and
even higher order concepts. Reconsider the flood example, where the context
space is the set possible chances of a flood. We would surely agree that the
statement “I strictly prefer the situation where there the chances of a flood are
roughly 1
4
to that where it is roughly 3
4
” will be a part of the typical agent’s
preferences.
Should statements of the form “I would prefer to evacuate when the chances
of a flood are 1
50
over staying at home when the chances of a flood are 1
10
”
be assumed to be a part of the agent’s preferences? If the agent is willing
to make such statements, then the domain of preferences, D, should perhaps
be extended from the set A of alternatives to the set A ˆ r0, 1s of alternative
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context pairs. What the set X will then be is dependent upon the problem at
hand. We consider this kind of extension in chapter 4.
The case of prospect theory, where a level of wealth is often taken to be
the context, the situation is similar to the one just described: it seems some-
what unnatural to altogether exclude statements such as “I strictly prefer more
wealth to less” from the set of preference statements of an agent. This seems
a fair criticism of Schmidt (2003). He defines context preferences as follows:
the set D is taken to be the set of probability distributions on R that have
finite support (assign positive measure to a finite number of points); the el-
ements in the support of the probability distributions are understood to be
changes in wealth; finally, the set of contexts is composed of the possible levels
of wealth the agent might treat as her reference point and this too is equated
with set of real numbers. The context preferences are of the same form as (1.1).
Indeed the same criticism may be leveled at [GS03], where the context space
is probability distributions as well as the theory of case-based decisions where
it is memories, for surely there are memories that the agent likes more than
others. On the other hand, it is also likely that an agent’s preferences will
be incomplete over the set of memories. (Incomplete context-free preferences
arise when the weak preference relation Á is not complete. That is, there
exists a and b in D such that neither a Á b nor b Á a.) Indeed, the context
preferences approach can be seen as a constructive and structured approach
(“bottom up”) to dealing with incomplete context-free preferences.
Although we will not pursue the next issue any further in this thesis, it is
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an obvious direction for future research on context preferences. Suppose a
modeler is seeking a comprehensive representation of the agent’s preferences
(for the purposes of a general equilibrium type analysis say). One approach
is to identify a set Xc of statements about the world for which, the agent
is able to say that “conditional upon the truth of [any such statement], my
preferences are . . . ”. Call this the set of contexts about which the agent is
conscious.5 The remaining contexts, of which the agent is either unaware or
unable to distinguish as a context in its own right, but which the modeler
deems to be relevant to the decision, might be denoted as Xu.
6 The Cartesian
product of these two sets would then define the context space X .
Due to time constraints and in order to facilitate easy comparison with the
existing literature, the present thesis will work in the same setting as, Schmidt
(2003), Bleichrodt (2006), and in particular [GS03]. Indeed as they do we will
identify the set D with the set of alternatives, and with the exception of the
first part of chapter 3 and chapter 4, we will let X be the set of probability
distributions over a given set of states. We discuss the notation in the next
section.
Utility representation of context preferences
A utility representation of context preferences is a family of classical utility
functions, one for each context. Thus, a utility representation or characteriza-
tion of context preferences is a function f : X ˆD Ñ R such that for any a, b
5This approach appears to fit well with the literature on epistemic logic–see Kaneko
(2002) for an introduction to this literature and its use in game theory.
6As we have discussed above, examples of this consist of psychological states or neuronal
configurations about which the agent is completely unaware.
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in D and x in X we have
a ąx b iff fpa, xq ą fpb, xq (1.2)
If for a given representation f , fp¨, xq ą fp¨, yq for some x and y in X , this
ought to be incidental and particular to f . That is, we should be able to find
another function g satisfying (1.2) such that gp¨, yq ą gp¨, xq. So whilst the
main preoccupation will concern the existence of a utility representation, the
extent to which the representation is unique is still central to the discussion,
just as it is in the setting of [vNM] and [HM].
Without extending preferences to include contexts, utility representations of
context preferences contain less information and are therefore unique up to
a larger class of transformations than the single positive affine one that dis-
tinguishes the [vNM] and [HM] models. In the general model we present in
chapter 3, far less may be said. But if as in chapter 2, heuristically speaking,
the following two properties hold (i) the information that context preferences
provide is rich enough, and (ii) the representation preserves the natural math-
ematical operation for the given space of contexts (eg. mixtures on convex
set; positive combinations on the positive integers), then utility will be cardi-
nally measurable and unit comparable (CUC)–see the appendix of the present
chapter for a detailed discussion of measurability and comparability.
Conditions across contexts
Once the context space and domain of preferences has been identified, the next
task is to identify suitable conditions that may be imposed on the resulting
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family of preference relations. Conditions such as asymmetry (discussed above
for the case of context-free preferences), may of course be imposed upon any
given preference relation ąx , for any context x. In contrast to the context-free
case, conditions may also be imposed that restrict how preferences vary across
contexts. We may refer to this as an inter-context condition.
An important example of such a condition is the “combination” condition
of [GS03]. The more natural part of this condition states that for any a, b
in D, if a Áx b and a Áy b, then for every context z that is a strict convex
combination of x and y, a Áz b. This condition is clearly enough to ensure
that the set of contexts x for which a Áx b is convex. In turn, this is necessary
for the existence of a utility function that is mixture preserving across the
context space that [GS03] work with.7
It is worth mentioning that the sure-thing principle of Savage (1954) is, in
essence, an inter-context condition. As we have discussed above, Savage, us-
ing context-free preferences defined on the set of all functions from states
to outcomes, is able to indirectly impose consistency conditions that relate
preferences given current knowledge to preferences conditional upon events
obtaining. He introduces the condition as follows:
If the person would not prefer f to g, either knowing that the event
B obtained, or knowing that „B [interpreted as “not B”] obtained,
then he does not prefer f to g. Moreover, (provided he does not
regard B as virtually impossible) if he would definitely prefer g to
7That space is the convex set of (finitely additive) probability measures on a measurable
state-space.
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f , knowing that B obtained, and, if he would not prefer f to g,
knowing B did not obtain, then he definitely prefers g to f .
In other words, this condition implies firstly that if, given any event has ob-
tained, g is weakly preferred to f , then it is also weakly preferred given the
current information. Secondly, if this is true for all events and for some event
preference is strict, then the first act is strictly preferred given the current in-
formation. Skiadas (1997) adopting the context preferences approach, holding
the current information fixed throughout, formulates the condition in this way.
Note that the first part of Savage’s sure-thing principle is similar to what we
called the more natural part of the [GS03] convexity condition above. What
is not often appreciated is the strength of the second part. A similarly strong
form of “breaking the tie” constitutes the second part of [GS03]. We will look
at the implications of relaxing this condition in the second part of chapter 3.
1.2 Context and decision under uncertainty
1.2.1 Notation for the canonical setting
As we have already mentioned, in what follows, with the exception of the first
part of chapter 3 and chapter 4, we will work with a canonical context space
that is the set of probability distributions over a set of states and for each
context, define a preference relation over the set of alternatives. Thus the
canonical model applies to decisions under risk or uncertainty.
Let S :“ ts, t, u, . . . u, 1 ă |S| “ n, denote an abstract set of future states
of nature, and ∆ ” ∆pSq the set of probability distributions over S with ele-
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ments denoted by p, q, and r. For all p P ∆, let A :“ ta, b, c, . . . u, 1 ă |A| “ m,
be the set of alternatives on which the agent’s strict preference relation, ąp, is
defined.8 For a given p, ąp is a binary relation over A. The following notation
for a family of preference relations
tąpĂ A ˆ A : p P ∆u, tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u, and pA,ąpqpP∆,
will refer to the same object: the context preferences or, simply, preferences
of the individual agent.
Each strict preference relation is therefore a subset of the collection ordered
pairs of elements of A satisfying: at context p, for any alternatives a and b in
A, a is strictly preferred to b if and only if a ąp b. When no strict preference
holds in either direction for some pair pa, bq (that is neither a ąp b nor b ąp a),
we write a „p b. Note that by definition, „p is reflexive and symmetric, but
not necessarily an equivalence relation as transitivity (a „p b and b „p c to-
gether imply a „p c )may fail to hold.
This notation (for context-free preferences) is used by both Fishburn (1970)
and Kreps (1988) in their classic textbooks on decision theory. Our choice of
strict as opposed to weak preference as primitive is partly due the appeal of
the asymmetry condition discussed in section (1.1.2) and partly due to the fact
that a statement of strict preference by an agent is more concrete and readily
observable than its weak counterpart.
8Unless otherwise stated, the sets A and S will be understood to be countable. Also,
note that the set of alternatives are not state-dependent because they are available to the
decision-maker prior to any particular state obtaining.
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This approach also allows us to distinguish transitivity of ą. from that of
„. . The latter is widely recognized as failing to hold in simple examples: con-
sider an agent who strictly prefers no sugar at all to a single sugar cube in her
glass of tea, but who is unable to distinguish between two glasses of tea, one
of which contains a single granule more than the other. Transitivity of strict
preference appears much more natural and mathematically useful than than
that of „. which may also capture more general kinds of incomparability as
the following example shows.
Example 1.2. Let A be a collection of points in R2 and let ą. denote a
preference relation over A corresponding to some context for which we sup-
press notation. If ą. coincides with the strict order on R2, then x ą. y iff
both x1 ą y1 and x2 ą y2 are true (where ą is the standard order on R and
the subscripts on x and y denote the first and second axes).That is to say, c
is strictly preferred to a if and only if it lies strictly to the north-east of a.
Clearly, by transitivity of ą on R, ą. is transitive.
✻
✲
x2
x1
r
c
r
a
r
b
Any pair of points that lie to the south-east or north-west of one another are
incomparable under this order. Thus in the above diagram, a and b are incom-
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parable under ą., as are b and c. In such cases, as no strict preference holds
in either direction, and we may write a „. b „. c. However since c ą. a, we
see that „. fails to be transitive.
Although we do not relax the condition that „. be transitive in the present
thesis, our approach is the natural starting point from which to do so.
Set notation for context space
For any subset E of A, the set of p in ∆ satisfying a ąp b for every b P E is
denoted by BapEq, thus a is (strictly) better than every element of E for all
p P BapEq. Similarly, for any subset E of A, the set of p in ∆ for which b is
strictly preferred to a for all b P E is denoted WapEq, so that a is (strictly)
worse than every element of E for each p PWpEq. We will make extensive use
of the shorthand Bab for Baptbuq and similarly Wab :“ Waptbuq ” Bbptauq “:
Bba. Finally, the set of p P ∆ for which a „p b will be called Nab, and the set
Nabc is defined as tp P ∆ : a „p b „p c „p au.
We make use of the fact that S has n elements to identify ∆ with the n ´ 1
dimensional simplex in Rn, tp P Rn` : p1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` pn “ 1u, where R
n
` is the set
of vectors in Rn for which every element of the vector is strictly positive, and
sRn` will denote the closure of this set in Rn, that is
sRn` :“ tp P Rn : pi ě 0 for all i “ 1, . . . , nu.9
9We prefer this notation on the grounds that it is more in line with modern notation used
in the mathematical community outside economics. The standard notation in economics
being Rn
``
for the strictly positive vectors and Rn
`
for the non-negative vectors.
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Where useful, we will consider ∆ as a subset of sRn´1` , that is we will identify
each probability distribution in ∆ with a point in the set tp P sRn´1` : p1 `
¨ ¨ ¨ ` pn´1 ď 1u. In appendix (1.B) of this chapter, we provide some essential
results that justify the relationships between these spaces.
1.2.2 Motivation for the canonical setting
In this thesis we will look at how and when it is possible to use a real-valued
function to characterize and represent the preferences over a set of alternatives
of a decision-maker facing variety of contexts in which the decision problem
may arise. In the canonical decision problems upon which the following expo-
sition predominantly focuses, one way to view the decision problem is in terms
of a decision-maker with the following knowledge:
i. she knows she will face a decision in the presence of uncertainty about
the future state of nature;
ii. she knows, that when the situation arises, she will have sufficient infor-
mation to be able to identify the likelihood of any given state of nature;
iii. given any probability distribution over states, she knows whether or not
she has a strict preference for one course of action, in response to the
uncertainty, over another.
The flood example we have discussed above is an instance of this situation.
We also introduce the next example where there are three states and three
alternatives.
Example 1.3 (Getting to and from University). Val lives near her university
campus and each day she decides whether to walk, catch the bus or cycle to
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university. Thus A :“ ta, b, cu with a:=“walk”, b:=“bus” and c:=“cycle”.
Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(i) bicycles are not allowed on the bus;
(ii) the bike may be stolen if it is left on campus overnight; and
(iii) the cost of return bus ticket is significantly cheaper than two singles.
These conditions contribute to Val’s strict preference for traveling by the same
means to and from university on any given day. This means that her decision
to buy a bus ticket or ride the bicycle to university in the morning amounts to
a commitment to a single means of travel for the whole day. Of course if she
walks to university, she can catch the bus back, but if she knows that conditions
will be such that in the afternoon she would certainly not want to be walking
home, then she would always buy the ticket, say, in the morning.
As is typical in Autumn, the weather may vary substantially during the day,
and Val knows that it may be raining, sunny or snowing/icey when she returns
that day: so S :“ tr, s, tu with r:=“raining”, s:=“sunny” and t:=snowing/icy.
Before setting off each morning, the radio weather forecast gives her the chances,
p “ ppsqsPS, of each of the states obtaining.
Fed up with deciding each day, Val decides, once and for all, to devise a com-
plete, contingent plan of what to do. At the time she makes her plan, the set of
contingencies is the set ∆. (Here ∆ is isomorphic to the 2-dimensional, unit
simplex in R3.)
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Suppose that if she were certain it would be sunny in the evening, Val would
strictly prefer walking to cycling to going by bus, ie. a ąs c ąs b.
10 When it
will rain for sure, her preferences are c ąr b ąr a and when it will snow or be
icey for sure, her preferences are b ąt a ąt c.
It seems plausible that Val’s preferences conditional upon p, tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u,
will vary with the probability she face on any given day: the question is how.
Suppose that at the probability p “ p1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
q, Val’s strict preferences are the
same as they are when state t occurs for sure. Is it then plausible for instance
that, for all probabilities qpλq such that qpλq “ λδt ` p1 ´ λqp and 0 ă λ ă 1,
Val’s strict preferences are unchanged? That is, if we start at a given context
qp0q ” p and increase the probability of state t in such a way that the ratio
of the probabilities of state r and s remain unchanged, does strict preference
remain the same? If so then we conclude that the set convpδt, pq is a subset of
tp P ∆ : b ąt a ąt cu ” Bba X Bac.
Whilst context preferences of the canonical form presented above are well
suited to modeling the above example, which might be viewed as a game
against nature where nature presumably does not respond to Val’s choices:
they are arguably inadequate for the analysis of strategic game rock-paper-
scissors, where a player is penalized for being predictable or where preferences
may be defined over correlated strategies. We discuss this matter further in
chapter 4.
10This involves a slight abuse of notation as s is used instead of the probability measure
assigning probability one to state s, δs.
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Remark 1.1. The time-line of the example above has three obvious stages: the
final stage, after both the action has been taken and the uncertainty is resolved;
the penultimate stage, when the agent must act; and the first stage, when the
problem is contemplated and a complete, contingent plan of which action is to
be taken in the penultimate stage is laid out by the decision-maker.
Our focus is on behaviour in the first stage. In the language of Hammond
(1981) we are taking the “ex-ante” approach to choice under uncertainty /
risk. In this thesis no considerations will be given to the optimal time to act.
Similarly, the related question of what constitutes “sufficient information to be
able to identify the likelihood of any given state of nature”, as stipulated in (ii.)
above, is also avoided. That is to say, we model neither the process, nor the
assumptions on behaviour that are involved in the decision-maker converting
information about the uncertainty into beliefs and deciding whether or not to
act.
Of the three basic assumptions on the knowledge held by the decision-maker
(iii.) is the strongest and most questionable; although it is not as strong as
it may at first seem. This is because the decision-maker is free to have no-
strict-preference for one action over another: for every possible probability
distribution over states, and such preferences would not necessarily indicate
indifference.
It is a central tenet of this thesis that even when precise information regarding
the uncertainty is available, choosing between courses of action may still be the
most difficult part of the decision-making process. The agent must still strive
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to understand and weigh-up the differences between the alternatives available
to her. So all other things being equal, a model in which the domain of pref-
erences is minimal and observable to the modeler ought to dominate others.
Not enlarging the domain of preferences comes at the price of requiring that
the agent is able to imagine, or recall from past experience, what her prefer-
ences are in situations different from the present context. That is, we place
greater demands on her ability to imagine variations in the circumstances she
may face in the second stage. Whilst there is no denying that this is the main
drawback of this approach, it is a weaker assumption than to assume prefer-
ences over contexts and alternative-context pairs.
Finally, defining preferences on an observable domain such as actions rather
than the much more abstract concept of outcomes or consequences, that may
or may not be dependent upon states or other factors, brings the model closer
to those that deal with choice functions and observed behaviour. As is the case
in that literature, it may well turn out that the decision-maker behaves as if
she were contemplating all the outcomes and/or consequences of her actions.
If so, this will be an output of the model rather than a starting point.
1.3 Expected utility for context preferences
Given that our canonical example is a model of decision-making under risk or
uncertainty, it is necessary to discuss in more detail the variety of approaches
that already exist. This section provides an exposition of the different models
of expected utility that may be found in the literature and shows how there is
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really only one candidate for context preferences.
1.3.1 The function-space approach to expected utility
A initial demonstration of why the standard approaches will not work and
why new inter-context conditions are necessary is provided by the following
discussion. We consider a theorem for finite alternative and state spaces by
Adams (1965) and Fishburn (1979). It will show that in our setting, where
a complete contingent plan for each p is the objective, the theorem of Fish-
burn gives a family of additive representations, one for each p. However, as
the condition has nothing to say about how preferences vary with p, it is not
sufficient to ensure linearity in p.
Let As denote the set of outcomes in state s of each of actions in A. The
next theorem defines preferences on ˆns“1As.
Example 1.4. In example 1.3 recall that
A :“ twalk, bike, busu ” ta, b, cu, and
S :“ train, sun, snow{iceu ” tr, s, tu.
It is not only arrays of outcomes such as par, as, atq (which may be identified
with the alternative “walk” lie in Ar ˆ As ˆ At) that lie in the domain of
preferences; the idealistic but unfeasible array pcr, as, btq is also there. As a
result even in a simple problem such as this the cardinality of the space Ar ˆ
As ˆ At is 27, whereas Aˆ S “ 9.
Definition 1.1 (Fishburn (1979): Equivalence relation on ˆns“1As).
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pα1, . . . , αJqEJ pβ
1 . . . βJq if and only if J ą 1, αj, βj P ˆns“1As for j “
1 . . . , J , and it is true for each s that α1s, . . . , α
J
s is a permutation of β
1
s , . . . β
J
s .
For a fixed, suppressed context we have the following result.
Theorem 1.1 (Scott and Suppes (1958), Fishburn (1979)). The relation ą.
on ˆns“1As satisfies the following condition: for all J-sequences, tα
ju and tβju
in ˆns“1As, and all J “ 2, 3, . . .
(F) if pα1, . . . , αJqEJ pβ
1, . . . , βJq and  pβj ą. α
jq for j “ 1, . . . , J ´ 1,
then  pαJ ą. β
Jq,
if and only if there exist real valued functions u1, . . . , un on A1, . . . , An respec-
tively such that, for all α, β P ˆns“1As,
p4q α ą. β ô
ÿ
sPS
`
uspαsq ´ uspβsq
˘
ą 0.
One problem with the condition (F) in the above theorem is that it is somewhat
difficult to evaluate without case by case verification. Moreover verification is
by no means an easy task: in example (1.3) where there are three alternatives
and three states, in order to verify the condition, we have to make
`
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2
˘
“ 351
comparisons.
Another problem with the above representation is that it gives us no informa-
tion about how preferences vary with the context that is the current belief.
Presumably, for context preferences pąp, p P ∆pSqq, the theorem holds for any
given p, and the representation is as follows:
p5q α ąp β ô
ÿ
sPS
`
uspαs, pq ´ uspβs, pq
˘
ą 0.
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If we seek a representation that has more structure, and thereby resembles a
plan of action we need more conditions on how preferences vary with context.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide two approaches to dealing with this problem.
By contrast, the classical approach to adding more structure has been to sup-
press reference to p and focus on state-preferences. In the Anscombe-Aumann
(1963) approach, the first step is to restrict the space of outcomes to be the
same in each state and define lotteries over these outcomes.11 The second step
is to impose that the ordering of the set of outcomes in each state is the same
across states. This state-independence allows us to identify the actual proba-
bility measure p that represents the information context (beliefs) of the agent
at decision time. Thus the Anscombe-Aumann approach says nothing about
how preferences vary with the information context, and hence p. Perhaps it is
best to view this model as capturing behaviour at stage two in the time-line
we describe in remark (1.1) above.
The same may be said of the models of Savage (1954), Scott and Suppes
(1958), and Debreu (1959). They seem to be more appropriate for addressing
the problem of an agent making a decision in the heat of the moment and at a
particular information set. By contrast, the present approach is closer in this
sense to [vNM] where a complete, contingent plan of action is outlined in the
first stage.
11Or at least ensure that there exist two outcomes that are common to all states (Fishburn
(1979)).
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1.3.2 EU for context preferences
Let us consider the form of an expected utility (EU) function representing
the preferences of an agent over a set A given the knowledge of a probability
distribution, p, over the state space S.
Definition 1.2 (EU function representation of context preferences).
U : Aˆ∆ is an EU representation of context preferences if both the following
are true:
i) there exists u : AÑ Rn such for all p in ∆ and a in A,
Upa, pq “ Epupaq :“
ż
S
upa, sqdppsq
`
or
ÿ
sPS
psuspaq
˘
;
ii) U is said to represent context preferences, tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u, if, for every
p P ∆ and a, b P A we have
a ąp b ô Upa, pq ą Upa, pq.
From the above definition, it is clear that the vector-valued function u : AÑ
Rn characterizes the representation. Indeed, the set Nab is contained in the
hyperplane perpendicular to this vector. As we describe in appendix (1.A),
the elements of this vector-valued function are called state utility functions.
The rationale is simply that if ps “ 0 for all s ‰ t then the decision maker
would face state t with certainty, so that the expected utility Epu “ ut which
represents state preferences ąt. The essence of this EU representation is that
preferences at p are represented by the weighted average of the state-utilities,
where for each state s, the weight is defined to be ps, the probability of state
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s.
1.3.3 Incomparability across states
Suppose context preferences give rise to a representation that is cardinally
measurable but non-comparable across states (CNC across states). In this
case, as the following discussion shows, it is not clear whether probability
plays any role at all. First we define the support and null-sets of a probability
measure.
Definition 1.3 (Support of p). For countable S, the support of a probability
measure p, denoted suppppq, is the set of elements of S for which p assigns
positive measure. Thus, suppppq :“ ts P S : ps ą 0u.
Definition 1.4 (Null-sets of p). The null sets of a probability measure p, are
these for which p assigns zero probability. That is, if T Ă S and ppT q “ 0,
then T is a null set.
Let preferences be represented by U and fix p P ∆. Let T be set of states such
that pt “ 0. As preferences are CNC, any other function V : Aˆ∆Ñ R that
is also and EU representation satisfies the property that there exists v : AÑ R
such that for each s P S, vs “ λsus ` κs for some λs ą 0 and κs P R. For all
s P T let qs “ 0. Then for all s P SzT , let 0 ă qs ă 1 and let λs :“ qs{ps, then
we have
ÿ
s
psuspaq ą
ÿ
s
psuspbq ô
ÿ
s
ps λs
`
vspaq ´ vspbq
˘
ą 0
ô
ÿ
s
qs
`
vspaq ´ vspbq
˘
ą 0
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so that if the qs sum to 1, the latter is an equivalent representation indexed
by the probability q. In particular this means that for all a and b in A, the
relative interior, ri ∆, of ∆ is a subset of one (and only one) of the sets Bab,
Nab and Wab. This rather extreme property of preferences fact has lead many
authors in the literature to suppress the probability altogether (see Fishburn
(1970) Ch.4 and 5, Debreu (1959)), so that the representation takes the formř
sws, with ws :“ psus for each s. Indeed, it seems reasonable to say that
pws, s P Sq characterizes the representation of preferences ąp. This kind of
representation, contrary to what one might think, is in fact overly restrictive
in that it rules out whole classes of preferences without any clear reason.
1.3.4 vNM representation of context preferences
CNC preferences are in contrast to the class of state independent models of
[vNM] and Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Now suppose the context prefer-
ences give rise to a [vNM] type representation on consequences Y “ AˆS. The
resulting utility function is characterized by a single utility function u : Y Ñ R
and for every π and ρ in ∆Y we have
π ą ρ ô
ÿ
xPY
πxupxq ą
ÿ
xPY
ρxupxq. (1.3)
Recall that if v also satisfies the above equivalence then we should have
v “ k ` lu for some k P R and l ą 0.That is, preferences are cardinally
measurable and fully comparable (CFC–again see the appendix to this chap-
ter for more on these concepts). As k and l do not vary with s, for given
preferences, the vNM axioms define a much smaller invariance class of func-
tions that represent preferences than is the case for CNC preferences.
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In seeking to retrieve “response” or context preferences from a vNM repre-
sentation,12 we restrict attention to elements π of ∆Y such that π “ pˆ µ for
some p P ∆S and µ P ∆A that is elements of ∆S ˆ∆A (where ∆A is the set of
probability distributions on A). Preferences over ∆Y restricted to p ˆ µ and
p ˆ ν in ∆S ˆ∆A, lead to the representation characterized by u : Y Ñ R in
the following way. For each b and c in A:
δb ąp δc ô
ÿ
pa,sqPY
psupa, sq
`
δb ´ δc
˘
ą 0
ô
ÿ
sPS
ps
`
upb, sq ´ upc, sq
˘
ą 0.
In contrast with CNC preferences, there are now far fewer restrictions on the
sets Bab, Nab and Wab. Of course, each of these sets must be convex, and if
either of Bab andWab is nonempty, then Nab is thin (empty interior relative to
∆).
Consider the special case where, for all a and b, either a dominates b for
all s P S or the reverse holds for all s P S, then for every a and b, convexity
implies that ∆ is equal to either Bab orWab. In this case, ∆ lies in a “chamber”
defined as the interior of an intersection of the
`
n
2
˘
open half-spaces defined by
the hyperplanes tIab : a, b P Au.
This in turn implies that we may rotate, by a suitably small amount, the
12See Morris and Ui (2004) for the use of the terminology “best response” and “better
response” equivalence classes of games. They go in the opposite direction, seeking to identify
vNM preferences that “rationalize” the best and better response sets of players in a given
game.
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vectors upaq´ upbq, keeping ∆ in the corresponding chamber, to obtain a new
function v : AˆS Ñ R that characterizes some expected utility representation
V and such that v ‰ l u` k for any l ą 0 and k P R.
Thus a vNM representation, to borrow from the language used in the social
choice literature13, may imply a good deal more information regarding the de-
cision maker’s preferences than can be observed from context preferences alone.
Even in the case where for every a, b in A, the sets Nab of full dimension
and the hyperplanes Iab are fully identified, the appropriate degree of com-
parability for an EU representation of context preferences will turn out to be
“unit comparability” and the resulting representation is referred to as CUC. It
is characterized by an EU function with the property that the state utilities us
in the vector-valued function u : AÑ Rn, are unique up to a common scale l,
but independent origin k. That is, if v corresponds to another representation
of the same preferences, then vs “ l us ` ks. We derive such a representation
in chapter 2.
More generally, there appear to be no conditions one can meaningfully impose
on preferences that ensure the existence of an expected utility representation of
context preferences. This means that by insisting upon such a representation
we are excluding perfectly reasonable preferences from the analysis without
any real justification. This provides motivation for the third and fourth chap-
ters.
13See d’Aspremont and Gevers (2001) or Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984) for
a comprehensive survey and introduction respectively.
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1.4 Synopsis
Chapter 2 presents a model that is closely related to Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2003) (GS03). In this paper, the authors provide a re-interpretation of their
model of case-based decision theory and work in the same context space as we
do in this thesis. That is, where states play the role of cases and probabilities
or beliefs play the role of context. We improve upon their model in two re-
spects.
Firstly, we weaken the diversity condition in an important way. Secondly,
we provide an alternative to the “combination” condition of GS03 that gives
rise the linear form of the representation. The resulting conditions are weaker
and we argue more intuitive.In addition, this chapter also sheds light on the
role of expected preference representations (similar to those of Vind (1991))
for context preferences. Expected preference representations are inseparable
across pairs of alternatives, but still linear in probabilities. They can be used
to model intransitive preferences just as well as transitive preferences. As such
it provides way of axiomatizing of the Loomes and Sugden (1982) model of
intransitive regret. This is in the presence of much simpler axioms than Fish-
burn’s skew-symmetric bilinear model.
Chapter 3 proposes a model that gives rise to a utility representation that
is simply order-preserving over alternatives and continuous over contexts. We
identify the most general type of context space for which we can hope to
guarantee a continuous representation. The mathematics of this approach is
borrowed from topology. Then we apply this model to setting of uncertainty.
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In due course we intent to extend this model to provide a link between decision
theory and the discrete choice models of econometrics on the one hand and
neuroscience on the other.
In the fourth and final chapter we suppose that the decision-maker is will-
ing to extend the domain of preferences to include the space of contexts. That
is, the decision-maker is willing to make statements of the form: “I prefer to
be in context p and choose alternative b than to be in context q and choose
alternative c”. Despite this extension, the domain of preferences is still much
smaller than the [vNM] model of expected utility requires.
As a result, rather than a single mixture space–as defined in Herstein and
Milnor (1953)–we work with a collection of mixture spaces indexed by the al-
ternatives. This leads us to introduce a condition that “bridges” the gaps in
the order between the mixture spaces. The resulting representation resembles
that of [vNM] in that it is both state and context independent, but is distin-
guished by the fact that the uniqueness of the representation depends on the
number of components preferences generate. Methodologically speaking, the
closest models in the literature to the model of this chapter is that of Karni
and Safra (2000) as well as Fishburn’s multilinear utility model.
Our main conclusion is that when preferences vary with context, unless the
decision-maker is willing to extend the domain of preferences to include the
context space, we should only hope for preferences to have a linear utility
representation (as in expected utility) in mathematically interesting but be-
haviourally exceptional circumstances. If instead there is a willingness to
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forego either the linearity property or the utility property of the representation
across context space, then the conditions we need to impose upon preferences
are much more natural and capture a far wider range of reasonable behaviour.
1.A Measurability and comparability
One of the most widely used concepts in economics is that of a function that
represents preferences and allows the analysis of the agent’s behaviour to ex-
tend beyond the realms of set theory and make use of calculus, probability
theory and many other areas of mathematics. Such a function is referred to
as a utility function, and most often denoted by u. It is said to represent
preferences, ą, if the values it assigns to any given element of the choice set is
strictly greater than the value it assigns to any other if and only if the agent
strictly prefers the former to the latter. In other words, if A is the choice set,
and u : A ÝÑ R, a ÞÑ upaq if for every a, b in A:
a ą b ô upaq ą upbq. (1.4)
When such a representation exists it constitutes an order embedding of pA,ąq
into pR,ąq. Alternatively pA,ąq is order isomorphic to pupAq,ąq, where upAq
is the image of u in R. It is one of the main objectives of decision theory to
find conditions on preferences that are appealing in either or both the norma-
tive and positive sense, and such that they are necessary and sufficient for a
representation to exist.
Closely related to the question of existence is of course the question of unique-
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ness. As a representation that arises from conditions on preferences will rarely
be unique, it is natural to seek to identify the equivalence class to which
the representation belongs. The dual to this problem is that of identifying
the largest class of transformations of a utility function such that, for every
transformation in the class, the transformed utility function still represents
preferences. That is to say, if v is another function that represents ą, then
what kind of transformation relates v to u?
The largest class of transformations that preserves the representation is of
course the class of strictly monotone transformations. In particular, if u and
v represent the same preferences then u “ ψ ˝ v for some strictly monotoni-
cally increasing ψ : R ÝÑ R. Preferences that admit a representation which
is unique only upto a strictly monotone transformation are said to be repre-
sented by an ordinal utility function from A to R. Alternatively, preferences
are said to be ordinally measurable.
In choice under risk or uncertainty it seems reasonable to assume that some
concept of likelihood or probability (and as a result integral/summation) plays
a significant role in the decision, and in this setting, as we will see, the category
of ordinal functions may prove too large to be practical. Instead, it is standard
practice to consider the class of cardinal utility functions which are defined to
be those that are unique upto a strictly positive affine transformation. We say
that such preferences are cardinally measurable.
We now define the relevant concepts for understanding the uniqueness prop-
erties of a representation for decisions under uncertainty. Given a particular
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degree of measurability, there are various degrees of comparability. We will
now define the concepts we need to understand the following three: cardinally
measurable, non-comparable; cardinally measurable, fully comparable and car-
dinally measurable, unit-comparable. For a detailed exposition of the these
concepts in the context of social choice see Senn (1973), Roberts (1980), Black-
orby et al. (1984) or d’Aspremont and Gevers (2001); indeed the definitions
we introduce below are based upon Roberts (1980).
Definition 1.5. An invariance transformation is a list of functions ψ “
pψs, s P Sq with the property that for all u, u
1 P U , if for all a P A, s P S,
u1spaq “ ψspuspaqq then u and u
1 represent the same family of preferences,
pąs, s P Sq. The invariance class, Ψ, corresponding to pąs, s P Sq, is the set
of invariance transformations.
Definition 1.6 (CNC). Suppose the family of preferences, pąs, s P Sq is rep-
resented by the family of state-utilities pus, s P Sq. Preferences are said to be
cardinally-measurable and non-comparable across states if ψ P ΨN iff it is a
list of m independent, strictly positive, affine transformations. That is ψ P ΨN
if and only if:
@pa, sq P Aˆ S, ψspuspaqq :“ ks ` lsuspaq for some ks P R and ls ą 0.
Remark 1.2. In the theory of measurement, of which the theory of utility
or welfare measurement is a special case, the terms k. and l. of the affine
transformation have a specific meaning. The “intercept” k. is referred to as
the origin of the scale, whilst the “slope” l. is referred to as the unit of the
scale or as the unit of measurement.
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Remark 1.3. Note that in the definition of (CNC), for each state s, both
the unit ls and the origin ks of the scale is independent of the unit lt and the
origin kt of the scale of every other state t. This means that if preferences
are measurable up to this degree, then the only kind of comparison of wel-
fare/utility across elements of Y that has meaning is the kind where we fix the
state s and take the ratio of one difference of utilities of an act-pair to another.
To see this, suppose u is a family of state-utility functions representing the fam-
ily of preferences pąs, s P Sq, and that preferences are CNC. For r “ s, t P S,
suppose we consider the equivalence class of representations of the preferences
ψr ˝ ur :“ kr ` lrur, for each kr P R and 0 ă lr ă 8.
Then provided c t das ψ varies across the invariance class ΨN , the equality
in the following derivation holds if and only if ls “ lt:
ψs ˝ uspaq ´ ψs ˝ uspbq
ψt ˝ utpcq ´ ψt ˝ utpdq
”
`
pks ` lsuspaqq ´ pks ` lsuspbqq
˘`
pkt ` ltutpcqq ´ pkt ` ltuspdqq
˘
”
ls
`
uspaq ´ uspbq
˘
lt
`
utpcq ´ utpdq
˘
“
uspaq ´ uspbq
utpcq ´ utpdq
,
so that it is infact an identity over ΨN if and only if s “ t, and in this case
the ratio is equal to some unique real number z. If z is greater than 1 we know
that in state s the utility of a less the utility of b is greater than the utility of
c less the utility of d. If s ‰ t, then precisely because the above ratio is not
constant, we can make no such comparison, even when c “ a and d “ b.
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A widely accepted scenario where a single decision-maker’s preferences may be
incomparable across states is when the uncertainty concerns states of health
(Karni 1985 p45, MWG p199). In the literature it is referred to as state-
dependent preferences, this is somewhat misleading as preferences over the set
of alternatives may well be state-dependent yet comparable. We will return
to this point in the next section.
Definition 1.7 (CFC). Suppose the family of preferences, pąs, s P Sq is rep-
resented by the family of state-utilities pus, s P Sq. Preferences are said to be
cardinally-measurable and fully-comparable across states if ψ P ΨF iff it is a
list of m identical, strictly positive, affine transformations. That is ψ P ΨF iff:
@pa, sq P Aˆ S, ψspuspaqq :“ k ` luspaq for some k P R and l ą 0.
Remark 1.4. For this invariance class, comparisons of ratios of differences
in utilities between arbitrary pairs of elements of the space Aˆ S are possible.
Between these two extreme forms of cardinal measurability, we have the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 1.8 (CUC). Suppose the family of preferences, pąs, s P Sq is rep-
resented by the family of state-utilities pus, s P Sq. Preferences are said to be
cardinally-measurable and unit-comparable across states if ψ P ΨU iff it is a list
of m strictly positive, affine transformations such that across states the unit
of measurement is identical and the origin is independent. That is ψ P ΨU iff:
@pa, sq P A ˆ S, ψspuspaqq :“ ks ` luspaq for some ks P R and l ą 0,
44
1.B Embedding ∆ in Rn and Rn´1
The next two results show that given our space of contexts is the set of prob-
ability distributions over the finite state-space S, we may embed ∆ in Rn´1.
Their statement and proof is provided for the sake of clarity and completeness
of the argument.
Theorem 1.2 (Evans (2010)). Suppose that K is a non-empty, metrizable,
compact, convex subset of a locally convex space E. The following assertions
are equivalent
(1) K is a simplex.
(2) For all a1 , a2 ě 0 and b1, b2 P E, either pa1K ` b1q X pa1K ` b1q is empty,
or of the form aK ` b for some a ě 0 and b P E.
(3) For each x P K there is a unique probability measure µ supported on
extK such that µ has barycenter x.
Proposition 1.1. Let
∆1 :“
 
x P Rn` :
nÿ
s“1
xs “ 1
(
and ∆2 :“
 
x P Rn´1` :
n´1ÿ
s“1
xs ď 1
(
.
The set ∆ of probability distributions over the set S ” t1, . . . , nu is homeomor-
phic to both of these sets. Moreover, affp∆1q and affp∆2q are homeomorphic
under the affine transformation
en : R
n´1 ÝÑ Rn, x ÞÝÑ ipxq `
`
1´
n´1ÿ
s“1
xs
˘
δ1n
where i : Rn´1 ÝÑ Rn´1ˆ t0u Ă Rn, x “ px1, . . . , xn´1q˚ ÞÑ px1, . . . , xn´1, 0q˚
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and δ1n “ p0, . . . , 0, 1q
˚ is the element of the standard basis for Rn correspond-
ing to the nth dimension.14
Proof. We state without proof that both ∆1 and ∆2 are convex, n´1-dimensional
with extremal points tδ1susPS and tδ
2
sus‰n Y t0u respectively, and that the
cardinality of each of the latter two sets n. Thus by theorem (1.2), we
know that for each p1 P ∆1, there exists a unique probability distribution
p “ tp1, . . . , pnu P ∆, over S such that
p1 “
ÿ
sPS
psδ
1
s.
Similarly, for each p2 P ∆2, there exists a unique probability distribution
q “ tq1, . . . , qnu P ∆ over S such that
p2 “
ÿ
sPSzn
qsδ
2
s ` qn0,
Therefore, to each of the sets ∆1 and ∆2, there exists a (continuous) bijective
function (with continuous inverse) from ∆.
From the above, we also conclude that ∆1 “ convpδ1
1
, . . . , δ1nq and ∆
2 “
convpδ2
1
, . . . , δ2n´1q, 0q. Similarly, affp∆
1q “ affpδ1
1
, . . . , δ1nq, and tδ
2
sus‰n Y t0u
forms a basis for affp∆2q “ Rn´1. We now prove that en is indeed an affine
transformation which is a bijection from Rn´1 to affp∆1q. This will complete
the proof since an affine transformation is continuous.
14Note that x˚ denotes the transpose of the vector x, and we will denote by δ1s the element
of the standard basis for Rn corresponding to the sth dimension, for s P S. We similarly
define δ2s as a basis vector in R
n´1.
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The fact that en is injective follows immediately from the fact that if x, y P
Rn´1, x ‰ y, then there exists s P t1, . . . , n ´ 1u such that xs ‰ ys. That is,
because the definition of i implies that ipxqs ‰ ipyqs for this value of s, and
because δn is has a zero entries for all but the n
th element, enpxq is not equal
to enpyq.
To see that it is surjective, take x1 P affp∆1q. Then because affp∆1q “
affpδ1, . . . , δnq, we have x
1
1
, . . . , x1n “ 1 and so
x1 “ x11δ
1
1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` x
1
nδ
1
n
“ x1
1
δ1
1
` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` x1n´1δ
1
n´1 `
`
1´
n´1ÿ
s“1
x1s
˘
δ1n.
Now since
řn´1
s“1 x
1
sδ
1
s “ px
1
1
. . . , x1n´1, 0q
˚, we know that this element lies in the
image of i. That is, px1
1
. . . , x1n´1q lies in R
n´1, and moreover, its image under
en is equal to x
1.
We now show that en is indeed affine. For any x “ px1, . . . , xn´1q˚ P Rn´1 we
define xn to be 1 ´ x1 ´ ¨ ¨ ¨ ´ xn´1. Then for all α P R, and y, z P Rn´1, by
the linearity of i and the definition of yn and zn we have
αenpyq ` p1´ αqenpzq “ αipαy ` p1´ αqzq `
`
αynp1´ αqznq
˘
δn
“ αipαy ` p1´ αqzq `
`
1´
n´1ÿ
s“1
pαys ` p1´ αqzsq
˘
δn
“ enpαy ` p1´ αqzq,
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since αy ` p1 ´ αqz P Rn´1 and the sum of the elements of this vector and
1´
řn´1
s“1 pαys` p1´ αqzsq is one. Thus, as required for the definition of affine
transformation, en takes points on a line to points on a line and it preserves
midpoints (simply take α “ 1
2
).
Corollary 1.1. Each probability distribution p in ∆ uniquely identifies ele-
ments p1 P ∆1 and p2 P ∆2 such that enpp2q “ p1.
Proof. This follows immediately from definition of en, the above proposition,
and the fact that probability distributions sum to one, so that the weight pn
assigned to state n is 1´
řn´1
s“1 ps.
Remark 1.5. A consequence of the two results is that we may represent pref-
erences tA,ąp | p P ∆u by either tA,ą
1
p1 | p
1 P ∆1u or tA,ą2p2 | p
2 P ∆2u, where
ą1. and ą
2
. satisfy: for each p P ∆, p
1 P ∆1 and p2 P ∆2 the following is true
for all a, b P ∆
a ąp b ô a ą
1
p1 b ô a ą
2
p2 b,
whenever p “ tp1, . . . , pnu, p
1 “
řn
s“1 ps δ
1
s, and p
2 “
řn´1
s“1 ps δ
2
s .
Henceforth whenever there is no possibility of confusion we will refer to either
∆1 or ∆2, simply as ∆.
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Chapter 2
A geometric approach to
representing context preferences
2.1 Motivation
The model we present in this chapter is closely related to Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (2003) ([GS03]). In that paper the authors provide a re-interpretation of
their model of case-based decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2002)
and work in the same context space as we do in this thesis. That is, where
states play the role of cases and probabilities or beliefs play the role of context.
Whilst the results of this chapter only apply to the context space that is the
set of probability distributions over a finite state-space, the proofs of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1995), (2001) and (2003) suggest that there is no reason why
they cannot be extended to the type of context space we find in case-based
decision theory.
The main reason why we propose the present model as an alternative to [vNM]
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is the following. When the task of ranking alternatives is nontrivial, the model
that defines preferences over the smallest possible domain, whilst still giving
rise to an appropriate expected utility representation, should, all other things
being equal, dominate other models. Moreover, expected utility representa-
tions are most appealing for decision problems where an agent anticipates
being in a position of uncertainty about the future, is prepared to define an
order over the set of alternatives for each of the anticipated positions of un-
certainty, and does so in a consistent way. The model of [vNM], by defining
preferences on mixtures of outcomes, in general demands a good deal more
information regarding preferences than this.
We argue that especially when the uncertainty concerns the actions of a non-
strategic actor such as nature, this excess information is of no use to the
decision maker. The model proposed here defines preferences on the smallest
possible domain for preferences that will guarantee the existence of a single ex-
pected utility function that faithfully represents preferences conditional upon
any of the anticipated positions of uncertainty. The cost of doing so is that
preferences must, in an appropriate sense, be diverse.
A different and equally appealing justification for the model in this chapter is
provided by [GS03]. There the authors provide a convincing argument of why
it may be implausible to define preferences over lotteries on observable con-
sequences in certain types of game both against nature and opponents. The
games the authors have in mind are the dictator and ultimatum games where
players are often observed playing dominated strategies. In the same spirit as
Hammond (1989), they suggest that “extended” or psychological consequences,
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which cannot be explicitly simulated in experiments may well be giving rise to
the apparent failure of expected utility to model behaviour. In contrast with
[vNM], they argue for a model of expected utility “in the context of the game”.
This chapter improves upon the model of [GS03] in two respects. Firstly, we
weaken the diversity condition in an important way. The resulting diversity
condition has two parts the first of which has been anticipated by Ashkenazi
and Lehrer (2001). Together the two diversity conditions are somewhat weaker
than that of [GS03], allowing for diagrammatic representation of a variety of
preferences that were previously excluded when for instance the number of
states is equal to 3. In [GS03] p.189 the authors state that they “do not know
of a set of axioms that are necessary and sufficient for a representation . . . by
a matrix u that need not be diversified”. This chapter provides just such a set
of conditions on preferences. Moreover the conditions make precise the two
distinct issues that arise when we seek a linear utility representation of pref-
erences when the context space is the positive orthant. Secondly, we provide
an alternative to the “combination” condition of [GS03] that gives rise to the
linear form of the representation. The resulting conditions are weaker and we
argue more intuitive. The main theorem of this chapter is, like that of [GS03],
a statement of equivalence between conditions on preferences and an expected
utility representation with specific properties.
The exposition consists of three parts. The first is where the implications
of imposing conditions on pairs of alternatives are considered and the sec-
ond is where conditions triples and quadruples are considered and where the
main representation theorem is presented. Finally, in the third part a detailed
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comparison with the model of [GS03] is made.
2.2 Conditions on pairs of alternatives across
contexts
We will now look at the extent to which it is possible to represent context
preferences pA,ąpqpP∆ when the following conditions are imposed.
Definition (Asymmetry (Asy.)).
For all a, b P A, p P ∆ : if a ąp b then  pb ąp aq; equivalently,
p P Bab ñ p RWab.
Definition (Weak Pareto dominance (WP)).
For all p in ∆ : if  pa ąs bq for all s P suppppq, then  pa ąp bq; equivalently,
p P Bab ñ Ds P suppppq : δs P Bab.
Definition (Continuity (C’ty)).
For all a, b P A, p P ∆ : if a ąp b, then there exists an open neighbourhood U
of p in ∆ such that for every q P U we have a ąq b.
Definition (Strong betweenness across contexts (p-SB)).
For all a, b P A, p, q P ∆, and 0 ă λ ă 1, let r :“ λp` p1´ λqq. If  pb ąp aq
and a ąq b, then a ąr b ; equivalently,
p P ∆zWab ^ q P Bab ñ r P Bab.
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Taken together, (p-SB) and (WP) are a weakening of the combination condi-
tion of [GS03]. This condition is written in the following way, where Áp“ąp
Y „p. (It is clear that by definition of „p this is in fact a disjoint union, which
henceforth will be written as 9Y.)
Definition 2.1 (Combination (Comb.) (Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003)).
For all a, b P A, p, q P ∆, and 0 ă λ ă 1, let r :“ λp ` p1 ´ λqq. If a Áp b
pa ąp bq and a Áq b, then a Ár b pa ąr bq ; equivalently, both
p P ∆zWab ^ q P ∆zWab ñ r P ∆zWab,
and
p P Bab ^ q P ∆zBab ñ r P Bab.
It is clear that the second of the two statements in condition (Comb.) is equiv-
alent to (p-SB) and the first is stronger than (WP). (Although we omit a proof
of this claim, the argument follows by an argument which we present in the
next chapter: proposition (3.2). Indeed, it is clear that condition (p-SB) is
more than just combination or betweenness as described in Chew (1989) for
instance. It contains what may intuitively be described as a thinness property
of Nab for each a, b P A, the discussion of which we defer to chapter 3.
We now provide the definition of three kinds of separation by a hyperplane
that are used in the sequel.
Definition 2.2 (Webster (1994)). Let H, A and B be subsets of Rn with H
being a hyperplane.
• H is said to separate A and B if A lies in one of the closed half-spaces
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determined by H, and B lies in the other.
• H is said to properly separate A and B if it separates them but does not
contain them both.
• H is said to strictly separate A and B if A lies in one of the open half-
spaces determined by H and B lies in the other.
The next result is the main mathematical result of this section, and the rep-
resentation theorem of this section follows as a corollary.
Proposition 2.1. Let conditions (Asy.), (WP), (C’ty) and (p-SB) hold for
the familly of ordered sets pA,ąpqpP∆. Then for all a, b P A, if Bab is nonempty,
then there exists a hyperplane H in Rn´1 such that
H X∆ “ Nab
Furthermore, when both Bab andWab are nonempty, H is the unique hyperplane
that supports each set and strictly separates them.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we consider an arbitrary pair of elements a, b P
A. We first consider the case where Wab is empty. The proof for this case is
presented as follows: step (i) we show that Nab Ă H for some hyperplane in
Rn´1, and in step (ii) we show that H X∆ Ă Nab. For the case where Wab is
nonempty, once again (i) we first show that Nab Ă H for some hyperplane in
Rn´1 that supports Bab andWab, (ii) we then show that H properly separates
these sets, and then (iii) we show that H X∆ Ă Nab.
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Case (Wab “ H), step (i): Note that if Nab is empty, then the proposi-
tion is satisfied for any hyperplane H that does not intersect ∆. Thus sup-
pose Nab is nonempty. Then since Nab ‰ ∆, ∆ “ Nab 9YBab, where Bab is
nonempty. If we let T :“ ts P S : a „p bu, then condition (WP) implies that
∆T :“ convptδs : s P T uq is a subset of Nab.
We now show that condition (p-SB) implies that ∆T contains Nab. Suppose
p P Nabz∆T ‰ H. Note that the set T is maximal in the sense that it contains
all the elements s of S such that a „s b holds. Moreover, as Bab is nonempty,
condition (WP) implies that SzT is nonempty, so we know that every extremal
measure in ∆z∆T is contained in Bab. This implies that because p lies outside
∆T , it cannot be extremal. Furthermore, because ∆T is closed and convex,
it is equal to its convex hull, thus p cannot be written as a convex combina-
tion of the extremal elements of ∆T . Condition (p-SB) implies that ∆SzT is
a subset of Bab, so p lies outside the set of probability measures with support
SzT . Therefore, suppppq contains elements of both T and its complement in S.
Therefore without loss of generality we may suppose
p “
nÿ
s“1
λsδs,
where for s “ 1, . . . k, s P T and for s “ k ` 1, . . . n, s P SzT , and the λs sum
to one. (To mitigate the fact that we are in Rn´1, we assume, without loss of
generality, that δn “ 0 P Rn´1, and let λn ” 1´
řn´1
s“1 λs.)
Let λ1 :“
řk
s“1 λs and λ
2 :“
řn
s“k`1 λs. By the argument of the preceding
55
paragraph, neither λ1 nor λ2 equals zero. If we let q1 :“ 1
λ1
řk
s“1 λsδs and
q2 :“ 1
λ2
řn
s“k`1 λsδs, then q
1 and q2 clearly lie in ∆T and ∆SzT respectively.
Now consider the affine hull of q1 and p in Rn´1. This may be represented by
r : R ÝÑ Rn´1, ν ÞÑ rpνq where
rpνq :“ νp` p1´ νqq1,
and so by the definition of p and q1, we have
rpνq “ ν
` kÿ
s“1
λsδs `
nÿ
s“k`1
λsδs
˘
` p1´ νq
1
λ1
kÿ
s“1
λsδs
“ ν
nÿ
s“k`1
λsδs `
`
p1´ νq
1
λ1
` ν
˘ kÿ
s“1
λsδs.
Now if p1´ νq 1
λ1
` ν “ 0 whenever ν “ 1{λ2, then we have
rpνq “ q2.
The following computation shows that this is indeed true because λ1`λ2 “ 1:
p1´ νq
1
λ1
` ν “
pλ2 ´ 1q
λ2
1
λ1
`
1
λ2
“
pλ2 ´ 1` λ1q
λ2λ1
.
Finally, the fact that 1{λ2 is greater than 1 implies that q2 “ rp 1
λ2
q lies further
from q1 “ rp0q in affpp, q1q than p “ rp1q, so that condition (p-SB) implies
that p lies in Bab, contradicting the assumption that it was an element of Nab.
Therefore we conclude that Nab is a subset of ∆T .
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Now the fact that ∆T is contained in H X ∆ for some hyperplane in R
n´1
follows from the fact that ∆T is a convex set together with the fact that
dimp∆T q ă dimp∆q “ n ´ 1, for then ∆T is equal to its boundary in Rn´1.
Theorem 2.4.12 of Webster p.71 then implies the desired result.
Case (Wab “ H) Step (ii): To identify a hyperplane in ∆ that satisfies
HX∆ “ Nab, we we first note that because SzT is nonempty, k :“ |T | ď n´1.
So the dimension of ∆T is less than or equal to n´ 2. Note that the extremal
points δs, s P T , define a basis for affp∆T q, and therefore this too is of di-
mension k ´ 1. This in turn implies that affp∆T q contains no elements of ∆
other than ∆T , for if it did, then any such a point would lie outside the span
of tδsusPS, and the dimension of affp∆T q would necessarily be greater than k´1.
If k “ n ´ 1 then affp∆T q is itself the uniquely identified hyperplane H in
Rn´1 that satisfies HX∆ “ Nab. If not then for each s “ k`1, . . . n, consider
the affine hull of the pair p :“ 1
k
pδ1, . . . , δkq, and p` δs. That is the trans-
lation by p of the straight line in Rn´1 that is spanned by δs for each s in
SzT . Recalling that δn “ 0, so that the affine hull of p and p` δn is just the
point p, we note that for each k ` 1 ď s ď n ´ 1, the image of the function
rs : R ÝÑ Rn´1, ν ÞÑ rspνq is equal to affpp, p` δsq whenever
rspνq :“ νpp` δsq ` p1´ νqp
“ νδs ` p.
The definition of p is such that for every s, rspνq is a probability distribu-
tion and hence an element of ∆, if and only if ν “ 0, and at this value
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rsp0q “ p P ∆T . An identical argument is true of affine combinations of ele-
ments of the set ∆T Y trk`1p1q, . . . , rn´1p1qu as only affine combinations that
assign zero weight to elements outside ∆T are probability distributions. Fi-
nally, since the vectors δs, s “ 1, . . . , k and rsp1q, s “ k ` 1, . . . n ´ 1 are a
set of n´ 1 linearly independent vectors, they define the basis for the desired
hyperplane H in Rn´1.
Case (Wab ‰ H), step (i): We know that by condition (Asy.), Bab and Wab
are disjoint, and by condition (C’ty) open subsets of the connected set ∆.
Moreover, because of the fact that Wab ” Bba, we only need to consider the
sub-case where Bab is also nonempty, so that by proposition (3.1.20) they are
topologically separated sets, that are topologically separated by
Nab “ ∆zpBab YWabq
which is therefore also a nonempty set.
We will first show that Nab is a subset of both cl∆pBabq and cl∆pWabq. Then,
because condition (p-SB) implies that Bab is convex, theorem (2.3.5) of Web-
ster p.62 states that cl∆pBabq is also convex. Moreover, the symmetry between
Bab and Wab (Wab ” Bba), will allow us to conclude that
Nab Ă cl∆pBabq X cl∆pWabq
Then by theorem (2.1.3) of Webster p.50, we know that arbitrary intersections
of convex sets are convex. The fact that Nab is equal to this intersection will
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then follow immediately from the fact Bab andWab are topologically separated,
and so neither contains closure points of the other. This will allow us to con-
clude that Nab is convex.
We now show that Nab Ă cl∆pBabq. Take any element p in Nab and q in
Bab. By condition (p-SB), we know that q
1
2
p ” 1
2
q ` 1
2
p is also a element of
Bab. Then, by the same condition, the same is also true of q
1
4
p ” 1
4
q ` 3
4
p.
Indeed, it is true for the entire sequence qp1
2
qjp, j P N. Moreover, since this
sequence converges (in the weak* topology on ∆) to p, the latter is an element
the closure of Bab.
This argument not only proves that Nab is a subset of cl∆ Bab, but also, since
condition (C’ty) implies that Bab is open in ∆, Nab is equal to the boundary
of Bab in ∆, bd∆pBabq. By symmetry, the same is true of Wab “ ∆z cl∆pBabq.
Therefore, Nab is equal to the common boundary of Bab and Wab in ∆. Now
since Bab has nonempty interior relative to Rn´1, and ∆ is a closed subset of
Rn´1 lemma (3.1.32) applied with Z “ Rn´1, Y “ ∆ and Bab “ X implies
that the boundary of Bab relative toR
n´1 contains the boundary of Bab relative
to ∆, and the same is true for Wab.
We have therefore shown that Nab is a convex subset of
rebdpBabq X rebdpWabq,
and is equal to its own boundary in Rn´1. Theorem (2.4.12) of Webster p.71
then implies that there exists a hyperplane H in Rn´1 that contains Nab, and
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nontrivially supports both Bab and Wab.
Case (Wab ‰ H), step (ii): To see that H properly separates Bab andWab, we
first show that Nab (and hence H) has nonempty intersection with ri∆. Sup-
pose Nab Ă rebdp∆q. Then since ri∆zNab “ ri∆, Nab does not topologically
separate the connected set ri∆. Now note that we have
ri∆ Ă ∆zNab Ă ∆,
so that, by theorem (23.4) of Munkres p.166, ∆zNab “ BabYWab is a connected
set. This of course contradicts conditions (Asy.) and (C’ty) which together
imply that Bab and Wab are disjoint open sets.
Suppose that H does not separate Bab and Wab. Then because H supports
each set, Bab YWab is contained in only one of the half spaces determined by
H . However the fact that Nab is a subset of H implies that ∆ is contained
in only one of the closed half spaces determined by H . But H has nonempty
intersection with rip∆q, and as rip∆q is open in Rn´1 it intersects both the
half-spaces determined by H . This is the desired contradiction, and thus H
separates Bab and Wab. Indeed, because each of these sets is open, neither lies
in H , and so H properly separates Bab and Wab.
Case (Wab ‰ H), step (iii): To show that ∆ X H is a subset of Nab, the
first step is to show that ri∆ X H is a subset of Nab. The remainder of the
proof follows by noting that since ri∆ X H is nonempty and ∆ is closed,
∆ XH “ cl∆XHpri∆ XHq, and the desired conclusion then follows by noting
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that for arbitrary sets X Ă Y Ă Z, we have clY X “ Y X clZ X , so that
cl∆XHpri∆XHq “ p∆XHq X cl∆pri∆XHq,
where cl∆pri∆XHq is a subset of Nab as the latter is closed in ∆.
To see that ri∆ X H is indeed a subset of Nab, suppose otherwise and ob-
tain a contradiction. Take p P pri∆ XHq X Bab. Note that since Bab is open
in ∆, it is open in any subspace (such as ri∆) of ∆. Then since ri∆ is open
in Rn´1, any open subset of ri∆ is open in Rn´1. Thus p is an element of
ri∆ X Bab, and this set is open in Rn´1. Since p lies in H , every open set in
Rn´1 containing p intersects both the open half-spaces generated by H . This
contradicts the fact that H supports Bab. In the same way, p cannot lie in
Wab, for recall that Bba ”Wab and that a and b were arbitrary.
For uniqueness of H , we recall that H X ri∆ is nonempty, and because ri∆ is
open in Rn´1, H X ri∆ is open in H .1 Therefore, affpH X ri∆q “ affpNabq is
equal to H which is unique because Nab is unique.
Definition 2.3. For every a, b P A, define Hab to be a hyperplane in Rn´1
satisfying Hab X∆0 “ Nab. Now, using the affine homeomorphism en defined
in proposition (1.1), let H1ab :“ enpHabq in aff ∆ Ă R
n. Finally, define Iab to
be the affine hull of H1ab Y t0u in R
n.
Lemma 2.1. For all a, b P A, given a choice of Hab in Rn´1, defined as in
definition (2.3), Iab is a uniquely identified pn´1q-dimensional linear subspace
1Then there exists a homeomorphism between H X ri∆ and H , and because dimension
is a topological invariant of Euclidean space (see Hurewicz and Wallman (1948)), H X ri∆
is of the same dimension as H .
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of Rn. Moreover, Bab andWab are strictly separated by Iab and IabX∆ “ Nab.
Proof. For the first statement, note that given a choice ofHab,H1ab “ enpHabq is
unique and pn´2q-dimensional because en is a homeomorphism, and dimension
is a topological invariant. Then, since aff ∆ Ă Rn is bounded away from 0, the
latter is independent of every element of H1ab. Therefore, Iab :“ affpH
1
abYt0uq
is an pn´ 1q-dimensional linear subspace of Rn.
For the latter part, we note that if Hab X Bab is nonempty, then because
IabX∆ “ H1abX∆, H
1
ab must also have nonempty intersection with Bab. Then,
if p1 P H1ab X Bab, by corollary (1.1), it must be that e
´1
n pp
1q P Bab if and only
if enppq P Bab. This means that Hab X Bab is nonempty which of course con-
tradicts proposition (2.1) together with the definition of Hab. Since the same
is also true of Wab by symmetry, the proof is complete.
Remark 2.1. For each a, b P A, we define the subspace IKab to be the orthogonal
complement of Iab in Rn. Also, we denote the open half-space in Rn that is
determined by Iab and contains Bab by Yab. Then by the fundamental theorem
of linear algebra, IKab is of dimension 1.
We now present the first representation result that consists of an order home-
omorphism between pA,ąpqpP∆ and pR,ąq.
Theorem 2.1. Preferences pA,ąpq : p P ∆ satisfy conditions (Asy.), (WP),
(C’ty) and (p-SB) if and only if for each pair a, b P A, there exists fab : S Ñ R
and Fab : ∆Ñ R such that for all p P ∆ the following three properties hold
i. Fabppq “
ř
s psf
ab
s ,
ii. Fba “ ´Fab, and
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iii. a ąp b ô Fabppq ą 0,
Moreover, if Bab and Wab are both nonempty, then up to a positive scalar
multiple, fab is unique.
From here on we will refer to this kind of representation as an expected pref-
erence representation, and Fab will be referred to as an expected preference
operator.
Proof. As usual the necessity of the conditions is immediate with (Asy.) fol-
lowing from (ii) and (iii); (WP) and (p-SB) from (iii) and (i); and (C’ty)
directly from (i). We now prove that the conditions are sufficient. Take any
distinct pair a, b P A. Let fab : S Ñ R, be the function whose values are such
that for each s P S, fabs is the s
th entry of a vector in fab P IKab X Yab. In the
same way, we define the function f ba in terms of the vector ´fab.
Now the inner product in Rn of such a vector with any element of Bab Ă Yab is
always positive, and xfab, py is equal to
ř
s psf
ab
s . By letting F
1
abp¨q :“ xfab, ¨y,
we define a bounded linear functional from Rn to R, we can then let Fab be
defined as the restriction of F 1ab to ∆. On the other hand if p lies in ∆ ´ Bab
then either p P IabX∆ “ Nab in which case Fabppq “ 0 or p PWab. If p PWab,
then Wab is nonempty, and by proposition (2.1) we know that Iab strictly sep-
arates Bab from Wab. That is Wab lies in the opposite half-space to Bab. Thus
Fabppq ă 0 as required. Now, note that because fba “ ´fab, the linear func-
tional Fba :“ xfba, ¨y is equal to ´Fab, and it too satisfies properties i, ii and iii.
For any a “ b, if we define faa “ 0 P Rn, then F 1aa is the zero operator,
with kernel equal to all of Rn, and hence Faappq “ 0 for all p P ∆ and it is
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plain to see that Faa satisfies properties i, ii and iii.
Now suppose that G : pA ˆ Aq ˆ ∆ is another expected preference repre-
sentation of tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u. We wish to show that in the case where both
Bab and Wab are nonempty, for some θ ą 0, G “ θF .
By the assumption that it is an expected preference representation we know
that for all a, b P A and p P ∆,
a ąp b ô Gabppq ą 0,
and for some gab : S Ñ R,
Gabppq “ Eppg
abq “
ÿ
s
gabs ps.
Therefore, for each a, b, the set of values tgabs , s P Su uniquely defines a vector
in Rn, via the transformation
tgabs , s P Su ÞÑ gab :“
ÿ
s
gabs δs,
where tδs : s P Su is the standard basis of Rn. This vector, in turn, uniquely
defines a linear operator G1ab on R
n such that both the element 0 and the set
Nab are contained in its kernel.
Now whenever Bab and Wab are both nonempty, by lemma (2.1), Nab inter-
sects the interior of ∆ and it is n´ 2-dimensional. It therefore contains a set
tp1, . . . pn´1u of n´ 1 affinely independent elements. The linear hull of this set
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equal to the linear subspace Iab which is the kernel of Fab. Now note that for
any linear combination tλiu of the tpiu,
G1abpλ1p1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` λn´1pn´1q “
n´1ÿ
i“1
λiG
1
abppiq
is equal to 0 because G1abppiq “ 0 for all i. Therefore, kerG
1
ab “ kerF
1
ab, so that
gab P IKab. Then the fact that for all p P ∆,
Gabppq ą 0 ô Fabppq ą 0
implies that gab P Yab. This of course implies that Gab “ θFab for some
θ ą 0.
2.3 Conditions on triples of alternatives and
separability across alternatives.
So far, as we have only imposed conditions on how preferences rank pairs of
elements of A in isolation. Major differences with context-free preferences are
revealed once we consider how the no-strict-preference sets tNab : a, b P Au are
arranged in relation to one another in context space. This we must do if we are
to obtain a utility representation of preferences. Unlike the model of [vNM],
with preferences defined on ∆pA ˆ Sq where the level sets of the expected
utility function are all parallel with one another, or the model of Dekel (1986)
where level sets may fail to be parallel provided they do not intersect, in the
context preferences approach, the sets tNab : a, b P Au may well intersect one
another without contradicting conditions such as transitivity a form of which
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we introduce below. Indeed, although it is not necessary for the existence of
an expected utility function, if the intersection of these sets is not of maximal
dimension then in general we will be unable say more about the representation
than we have in the previous section.
The first property that is at the heart of the discussion in the previous para-
graph is a subtle property of context preferences that have an expected util-
ity representation that relates triples of elements of A. Following Bourbaki
(1970, p.137) we will refer to it as the groupoid property. In the present
setting, this property applies to the family of expected preference operators
tFab : ∆Ñ Rua,bPA that were introduced in the previous section, and is char-
acterized as follows: for any a, b, b1 and c in A if
Fabppq ` Fb1cppq “ Facppq
for each p P ∆, then b „p b
1 for each p P ∆. The groupoid property is closely
related to “tradeoff consistency” as proposed by Kobberling andWakker (2003)
which takes the form pa, bq „˚. pa, b
1q implies b „. b1, where „˚ is an order that
is defined on differences (or more abstractly speaking simply pairs) and „.
is a standard context ordering. The following theorem shows that context
preferences have an expected utility representation if and only if they have
an expected preference representation satisfying the strong groupoid property.
This is simply the groupoid property and its converse. The theorem will be
instrumental in what follows.
Theorem 2.2. For context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u, the following two
statements are equivalent:
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(1) There exists an expected preference representation F : pAˆAqˆ∆Ñ R
of preferences such that for each a, b, b1 and c P A, and all p P ∆,
Fabppq ` Fb1cppq “ Facppq
if and only if b „p b
1 for all p P ∆.
(2) There exists an expected utility representation U : Aˆ∆Ñ R of prefer-
ences.
Moreover, the representation in (1) is unique up to a ratio scale (CRS) if
and only if the representation in (2) is unique up to unit-comparability (CUC)
across states.
Proof. First suppose statement (1) is true. Let Fijppq “
ř
s psf
ij
s for f
ij :
S Ñ R, and let fij be the vector with elements tf ijs u. Then for all i P A, and
arbitrary a, define ui :“ fia, so that for all c, d P A, p P ∆ we have
Fcdppq “ “ xfcd, py
“ xpfcb ` fb1dq, py
“ xfcb, py ` xfb1d, py
“ xuc, py ´ xud, py.
Now if for each i P A and s P S we define uis to be the s
th element of ui, then
uis ” f
ia
s and let U : A ˆ∆ Ñ R, pa, pq ÞÑ
ř
s psu
a
s , then for all c, d P A and
p P ∆,
c ąp d ô Fcdppq ą 0 ô Upc, pq ą Upd, pq.
Thus statement (1) implies statement (2). Note that we only needed the if
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part of the statement “if and only if b „p b
1 for all p P ∆”.
Now suppose that statement (2) is true. That is there exists an expected
utility representation U : A ˆ ∆ Ñ R of preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u. By
definition (1.2), there exists u : A ˆ S Ñ R, with Upa, pq :“
ř
s psu
a
s and for
all c, d P A and p P ∆
i ąp j ô Upc, pq ą Upd, pq.
Now for each i, j P A and p P ∆, let Fijppq :“ Upi, pq ´ Upj, pq. Then clearly
pFij ; i, j P Aq is an expected preference representation. Moreover, if for every
a, b, b1, c P A and p P ∆ we have
Fabppq ` Fb1cppq “
ÿ
s
pspu
a
s ´ u
b
sq `
ÿ
s
pspu
b1
s ´ u
c
sq
“ Facppq, (2.1)
then since this holds for all degenerate probability measures δs, we have
uas ´ u
b
s “ u
a
s ´ u
b1
s and therefore b „p b
1 for all p P ∆ by condition (WP)
which is itself necessary for (2). On the other hand, if b „p b
1 for all p P ∆,
then equation (2.1) holds for all p P ∆ simply because U is a utility represen-
tation. Thus statement (2) implies statement (1).
We now show that if the expected utility representation is unique up to unit-
comparability across states the corresponding expected preference representa-
tion is unique up to a ratio scale. We prove the contrapositive of this state-
ment. To this end, suppose pGij ; i, j P Aq is another expected preference
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representation of tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u. Then by the first part of the existence
proof above, there exists an expected utility representation W : A ˆ∆ Ñ R,
pa, sq ÞÑ
ř
s psw
a
s such that for all i, j P A and p P ∆,
i ąp j ô Gijppq ą 0 ôW pi, pq ą W pj, pq.
If for some c, d P A, the following functions from S to R satisfy (point wise)
wc ´ wd ”W pc, ¨q ´W pd, ¨q ‰ θ
`
Upc, ¨q ´ Upd, ¨q
˘
” θpuc ´ udq
for all θ ą 0. This is equivalent to the existence of an element s P S such that
wcs ´ w
d
s ‰ θpu
c
s ´ u
d
sq. From this we conclude that
wcs ‰ θu
c
s ` κs,
where κs :“ ´θu
d
s ` w
d
s P R. That is, the existence of an expected preference
representation G that is not a positive scalar multiple of F implies that the
expected utility representation is not unique up to unit-comparability.
We now show, also by proving the contrapositive statement, that if the ex-
pected preference representation F , that we defined in the first part of the
existence proof above, is unique up to a ratio scale, then the expected util-
ity representation that it gave rise to is unique up to unit-comparability. To
this end, suppose that V : A ˆ∆ Ñ R, pi, pq ÞÑ
ř
s psv
i
s is another expected
utility representation such that for some i P A, the function vi : S Ñ R
pointwise satisfies vi ‰ θui ` κ, for all θ ą 0 and all κS Ñ R. That is, the
expected utility representation U that we have identified is not unique up to
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unit-comparability across states. Then, pointwise, this implies that
vc ´ vd ‰ θuc ` κ´ vd
for all such θ and κ. Then letting κ :“ ´θud ` vd, we see that for all θ ą 0,
vc ´ vd ‰ θpuc ´ udq.
Now let Gij, i, j P A be the respective expected preference representation that
V gives rise to: that is gij :“ vi ´ vj for every i, j P A. Then for all θ ą 0 we
have
Gcd ‰ θFcd,
so that F is not unique upto a positive scalar multiplication, and hence not
unique up to a ratio scale.
Definition 2.4. We will say that an expected preference representation has
the strong groupoid property if it satisfies (1) of theorem (2.2).
An immediate implication of the strong groupoid property is that preferences
satisfy negative-transitivity. This is because preferences satisfy Fijppq ą 0 if
and only if i ąp j, and so by the strong groupoid property, we have that for
all a, b and c in A, and all p in ∆, if Fabppq ď 0 and Fbcppq ď 0 then Facppq ď 0
which is equivalent to
 pa ąp bq ^  pb ąp cq ñ  pa ąp cq
which is the definition of negative-transitivity which we denote by condition
(NT).
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Definition (Negative transitivity (NT)).
For all a, b, c P A and p P ∆: if  pa ąp bq and  pb ąp cq, then  pa ąp cq;
equivalently,
p P Bac ñ p P Bab Y Bbc .
Negative-transitivity, as the logical inverse of transitivity of strict preference,
can be viewed as shorthand for a condition which states that all sequences
involving ą. and „. are transitive, with ą being the dominant relation in the
sequence: for instance if a ą. b „. c then a ą. c; and if a „. b „. c then a „. c.
It is well known that (NT) and (Asy) are together equivalent to assuming a
weak preference relation Á. is both complete and transitive. We choose this
approach here, as we feel it is not only more appropriate, given the nature of
(C’ty), but also because in future work we wish to weaken (NT) to transitivity
so as to allow for of strict preference which, as we mentioned in chapter 1,
seems to be a more intuitive and natural condition for context preferences.
As we discuss in example (2.2), condition (NT) together with the conditions on
pairs introduced in the previous section are insufficient for the strong groupoid
property. First we provide a counterexample to condition (NT).
Example 2.1. [Getting to university continued] Recall from chapter 1, Val’s
context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u with A :“ ta, b, cu, S :“ tr, s, tu, where
a ąs c ąs b when it is sunny, c ąr b ąr a when it is raining and b ąt a ąt
c when it is icey. In this case, if conditions (Asy.), (C’ty), (WP), (p-SB)
are satisfied, then theorem (2.1) ensures that there is an expected preference
representation. If condition (NT) is not satisfied, the sets Nab, Nac and Nbc
might well be of the following form.
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0 pt=1
pr=1
b ą. a ą. c
a ą. b ą. c
a ą. c ą. b
c ą. a ą. b
c ą. b ą. a
b ą. c ą. a
Figure 2.1: The shaded region in the center represents the region in which
a ą. b ą. c ą. a. Such preferences may be explained by regret aversion as in
Loomes and Sugden (1982).3
Suppose that Val’s preferences do satisfy (NT), and moreover, using theorem
(2.2), suppose an analyst is able to deduce that her preferences give rise to
rock-paper-scissors type pay-off vectors ua :“ p0,´1, 1q, ub :“ p1, 0,´1q and
uc :“ p´1, 1, 0q. Then the matrix of payoff differences is:
¨
˚˚˚
˚˝
fTab
fTac
fTbc
˛
‹‹‹‹‚“
¨
˚˚˚
˚˝
pua ´ ubq
T
pua ´ ucq
T
pub ´ ucq
T
˛
‹‹‹‹‚“
¨
˚˚˚
˚˝
´1 ´1 2
1 ´2 1
2 ´1 ´1
˛
‹‹‹‹‚
Thus all p in Nab satisfy 0 “ ´pr ´ ps ` 2pt “ 2 ´ 3pr ´ 3pt. Equivalently,
Nab “ tp P clR
2
ą0 : pr “
2
3
´ptu. Similarly, Nac is characterized by tp : pr “
1
3
u
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and finally, Nbc is equal to tp : pt “
1
3
u. All three are plotted in the following
figure.
0 pr=1
ps=1
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
3
b ą. a ą. c
a ą. b ą. c
a ą. c ą. b
c ą. a ą. b
c ą. b ą. a
b ą. c ą. a
Figure 2.2: The case where Val’s preferences are identical to those implied by
the canonical rock-paper-scissors payoff matrix.
Example 2.2. [Getting to university continued] Suppose instead that Val’s
preferences satisfy c ąr a ąr b, but are otherwise similar to example (2.1); in
particular, condition (NT) and (p-SB) are satisfied. In this case, it may well
be that preferences are like those in figure (2.2).
As example (2.2) shows, without further conditions we are not able to improve
upon the representation of theorem (2.1). We note that the example is not
exceptional, indeed expected utility is the special case where for every triple
ta, b, cu of distinct elements in A, the hyperplanes determined by the sets Nij,
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0c ą. a ą. b
a ą. c ą. b
a ą. b ą. c b ą. a ą. c
D
pt=1
pr=1 kerFab kerFbc
kerFac
Figure 2.3: The case where preferences satisfy condition (NT), but where there
is no expected utility representation. The reason is that for any x in the shaded
region, labeled D, we have Fabpxq ă 0, Fbcpxq ă 0 and Facpxq ą 0 which clearly
violates the strong groupoid property.
for i ‰ j in ta, b, cu are congruent as opposed to lying in general position.
It is clear that more precise information regarding preferences is needed if
in general we are to be assured of an EU representation. The question is
how to do this in a minimal way, so as to impose the least restrictive condi-
tions on the smallest possible domain for preferences. Extending preferences
pąp, p P ∆q to the space of mixtures of elements of the space of alternatives A,
which we denote by ∆pAq provides more information regarding the strength of
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preference for one alternative over another for each p, but it does not ensure
consistency of preferences across p.
Definition (Div.). For any d P A let pa, b, cq be a list of distinct alternatives
that excludes d. Preferences are weakly diverse if either:
1) for any such list, there exists p such that a ąp b ąp c ąp d; or
2) for any such list, there exists p such that d ąp a ąp b ąp c
or both. If |A| ă 4, then for any strict ordering of A, there is a p such that
ąp is that ordering.
The condition that appears in [GS03] as well as Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995,
2001) is similar to (Div.). It requires that for every possible list pa, b, c, dq of
distinct alternatives there is a p P ∆ such that a ąp b ąp c ąp d. Clearly this
implies that both (1) and (2) of definition (Div.) hold and as such the class
of context preferences that satisfy (Div.) is substantially larger. We provide
some support for this claim in the final section of this chapter. There we will
also show that at least for the present context space, ∆, (Div.) is equivalent
to the next condition.
Definition (Weak diversity (Div.)).
i) For any list pa, b, cq of distinct alternatives, there is a p P ∆ such that
a ąp b ąp c. If |A| “ 2, then for each strict ordering of A, there is a p
such that ąp is that ordering.
ii) For any list pa, b, c, dq of distinct alternatives, there exists p in ∆ such
that a „p b „p c p d .
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Remark 2.2. Note that (Div.(ii)) is void whenever |A| ă 4.
We now present the consequences of imposing (Div.(i)) along with (NT) and
the pairwise conditions of the previous section.
Lemma 2.2. Let |A| ą 2. If context preferences pA,ąpqpP∆ satisfy conditions
(Asy.), (WP), (C’ty), (p-SB), (NT) and (Div.(i)), then for all distinct a, b, c P
A, Nabc is nonempty and of dimension greater than or equal to n´ 3.
Proof. Fix three distinct elements a, b, c P A. First note that condition (NT)
implies that Nabc “ Nab XNbc. By condition (Div.(i)), we know that
Bab X Bbc :“ tp P ∆ : a ąp b ąp cu ‰ H,
and since Bca X Bab ” tc ą. a ą. bu is nonempty and via (NT) contained in
BabXWbc, we see that the latter is also nonempty. Moreover, condition (Asy.)
implies that Bbc XWbc is empty, so that Bab X Bbc and Bab XWbc are disjoint
subsets of Bab. By condition (C’ty), and the fact that the intersection of open
sets is open, we know that these two subsets are also open in both ∆ and Bab.
By condition (p-SB), Bab is convex and therefore connected. Then proposition
(3.5) implies that Bab X Bbc and Bab XWbc are (topologically) separated sets
by their nonempty complement Bab XNbc in Bab.4
By an identical argument the sets Wab X Bbc and Wab XWbc are also open,
nonempty, disjoint subset of Wab and therefore topologically separated by the
nonempty set Wab XNbc in Wab. Now Bab and Wab are themselves (topologi-
cally) separated sets, so that Bab XNbc and Wab XNbc are, by definition (3.7),
4Please see the next chapter for the definition of topologically separated sets
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(topologically) separated sets.
We will show that ripNbcq also has nonempty intersection with both Bab and
Wab. Suppose that ripNbcq Ă Bab. Then since since Nbc is by proposition (2.1),
a convex subset of a Euclidean space, theorem (2.3.8) of Webster p. 64 ensures
that clpNbcq “ clpriNbcq, which is equal to Nbc as the latter is closed in ∆, and
∆ is closed. However, this implies that clBab contains Nbc, so that by the
definition of (topologically) separated sets we must have Wab X Nbc “ H: a
contradiction of what we have shown in the previous paragraph.
Furthermore, the set riNbc, as the interior of a convex set is, by theorem (2.3.5)
of Webster p.62, also convex and therefore connected. Then since Bab X riNbc
and Wab X riNbc are open, nonempty, and disjoint in riNbc, it must be that
their complement in riNbc, Nab X riNbc, separates them. This shows that
Nab X riNbc is nonempty and it disconnects the open subset riNbc of Hbc.
Now since Hbc is a hyperplane in Rn´1 it is homeomorphic to Rn´2, so that
riNbc is an n´ 2-dimensional manifold. Then corollary (1) of theorem (IV 4)
of Hurewicz and Wallman p.48 states that a manifold such as riNbc cannot be
disconnected by a subset of dimension less than or equal to n´4. This implies
that the dimension of NabX riNbc, and hence Nabc, is greater than or equal to
n´ 3.
Lemma 2.3. Let |A| ą 2. If conditions (Asy.), (WP), (C’ty), (p-SB), (NT)
and (Div.(i)) hold for context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u, then for all distinct
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a, b and c in A,
dimpNabcq “ dimHabc “ dimpHab XHbcq “ n´ 3,
where Habc denotes the intersection Hab XHbc XHac.
Proof. Let a, b and c be distinct elements in A. By proposition (2.1) the affine
hullsHab ofNab,Hbc ofNbc andHac ofNac are all n´2-dimensional. By lemma
(2.2), we know that the affine hull of Nabc is at least of dimension n´ 3. Then
because the affine hull of a set in Rn´1 is defined to be the intersection of all
the flats in Rn´1 that contain the set, and because we know that for all i ‰ j
in ta, b, cu, Nabc Ă affNij “ Hij simply because Nabc Ă Nij, we conclude that
affNabc Ă Habc and that therefore the dimension of Habc is greater than or
equal to n´ 3. In particular, this implies that Hab XHbc is nonempty, so that
by theorem 1.3.8 of Webster p.14, we find that
dimpHab XHbcq “ dimHab ` dimHbc ´ dimpHab `Hbcq
“ n´ 2` n´ 2´ pn ´ 1q “ n´ 3,
where dimpHab`Hbcq “ n´1 because Hab ‰ Hbc by condition (Div.(i)). That
is, if Hab “ Hbc then Bab is strictly separated from either Bbc or Wbc, so that
either ta ą. b ą. cu “ Bab X Bbc or tc ą. a ą. bu Ă Bab XWbc is empty.
In summary, the above, together with lemma (2.2), allows us to conclude
that
n ´ 3 ď dimpaffNabcq ď dimHabc ď dimpHab XHbcq “ n ´ 3.
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Next we briefly state and prove a result about the relationship between half-
spaces and cones generated by intersections of half-spaces with the sphere,
that will be used often in what follows.
Proposition 2.2. Let tXαu be a family of open half-spaces in a Euclidean
space, E, such that 0 lies in the boundary of each member and let X “
Ş
αXα.
Then X “ conepS X Xαq ´ t0u, where S is the boundary of an open ball of
fixed radius, and is centered around 0.
Proof. Note that if Y is an open half-space, with 0 in its boundary if and only
if there exists an inward pointing vector f of Y . That is f such that xf, xy ą 0
for all x P Y . Now suppose that x lies in
conepS X Y q ´ t0u “ ty P E : y “ λz, z P S X Y, λ ą 0u.
Then then there exists z P S X Y , λ ą 0 such that x “ λz. Then since
z P Y , we know that xf, zy ą 0, then by linearity of inner product in each of
its arguments, xf, λzy ą 0, so that x P Y . On the other hand, if x P Y , then
letting λ “ 1{‖x‖, which is well defined and positive since 0 lies outside Y , we
see that λx P SXY and so x lies in conepSXY q´t0u. Indeed this is also true
of arbitrary intersections of open half-spaces: the above argument holds with
X replacing Y , with the statements holding simultaneously for every tfαu in
the corresponding family of inward pointing vectors.
The following consequence of (Div.(i)) is mentioned but not proved in the
conclusion of Ashkenazi and Lehrer (2001). On the one hand it provides
useful information about the set Nabc, but it will also allow for a simple (almost
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diagrammatic) proof of the existence of a utility function for triples of elements
of A.
Proposition 2.3. Let |A| ą 2. If context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u
satisfy (Asy.), (WP), (C’ty), (p-SB), (NT) and (Div.(i)), then for all distinct
a, b, c P A, Nabc X ri∆ is nonempty.
Proof. Let a, b and c be distinct elements in A. We will first prove the following
claim.
Claim. If Nabc Ă rebd∆, then there exists s P S such that for all p P Nabc,
s R suppppq.
Proof of Claim. Recall that ri∆ ” tp P ∆ : ps ą 0, @s P Su, that is the set of
probability measures such that suppppq “ S. By the premise of the claim we
know that for no p P Nabc do we have suppppq “ S, and if the conclusion of
the claim is false, then ď
pPNabc
suppppq “ S.
So let p1 be an arbitrary element of Nabc, and define S1 to be its support.
Then 1 ď |S1| ă n, so there exists p2 P Nabc such that supppp2qzS1 ‰ H.
Now recall that as the intersection of convex sets, Nabc is convex, this implies
that r2 :“ p2
1
2
p1 P Nabc, and moreover, S2 :“ supppr2q “ S1 Y supppp2q. The
hypothesis that Nabc Ă rebd∆ then implies that S2 ‰ S, so that because S2
must have at least one more element than S1, we have 2 ď |S2| ă n.
We now make the induction hypothesis, and take rj to be the j
th element
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in a sequence in Nabc that is recursively constructed as we did for r2. That is
rj “ pj 1{2 rj´1 “ pj 1{2 ppj´1 1{2 rj´2q “ . . . ,
where for i “ 1, . . . , j, pi P Nabc, and Si :“ supppriq and for i ą 2, suppppiqzSi´1 ‰
H. Then as rj P rebd∆, j ď |Sj | ă n, so that as in the first step, there exists
pj`1 P Nabc such that suppppi`1qzSi ‰ H. Then once again convexity of Nabc
implies that it contains rj`1 :“ pj`1 1{2 rj, so that Sj`1 :“ suppprj`1q ‰ S,
and j ` 1 ď |Sj`1| ă n.
Now as this completes the inductive step, there exists such an rj for each
j P N, and so it is also true for j “ n. This provides the desired contradiction
of the hypothesis that the both Nabc Ă rebd∆ and
Ť
pPNabc suppppq “ S can
simultaneously hold.
Now recall that every n ´ 2-dimensional face of ∆ is the convex hull of n ´ 1
extremal elements of ∆. By the above claim, we know that if Nabc Ă rebd∆,
then Nabc is a subset of at least one such face ∆n´1 of ∆. Let J :“ aff ∆n´1,
and let Y and Z be the open half spaces in Rn´1 determined by J . Since
J X ri∆ is empty, J supports ∆, and as such we may suppose that ri∆ Ă Y .
Then as Nabc Ă ∆n´1, affNabc is a subset of J , so that by lemma (2.3)
dimpHab XHbc X Jq “ dimpHabcq “ n´ 3.
Also, proposition (2.1) together with condition (Div.) implies that both Hab
and Hbc are distinct from J as they both intersect the relative interior of ∆.
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Now consider the quotient of the affine hull of ∆, Rn´1, with respect to Habc:
Rn´1{Habc :“ ty `Habc : y P Rn´1u.
For all subsets X of Rn´1, we denote the quotient with respect to Habc by rX ,
and we will also denote an element of ĆRn´1 by ry, bearing in mind the fact
that this is an n ´ 3-dimensional subset of Rn´1. By theorem 1 of Halmos
(1974) p34, if X and Habc are complementary subspaces in R
n´1, then the
correspondence that assigns to each vector y in X , the coset y ` Habc is an
isomorphism between X and ĆRn´1. A natural example of such a subspace is
the orthogonal complement of Habc in Rn´1:
HKabc :“ tx P R
n´1 : xx, zy “ 0 for all z P Habcu,
By theorem 2 in the same section of Halmos, we know that ĆRn´1 is a 2-
dimensional space.
Now for any hyperplane H in Rn´1 that contains Habc, there exists p P
H ´ Habc, so that because ČH XHabc “ ĄHabc “ r0, and p R r0, we conclude
that affpr0, rpq is a 1-dimensional subspace of ĆRn´1 that lies in rH . Now the fact
that rH is in fact equal to affpr0, rpq follows from the fact that if there existed
ry P rH such that ry R affpr0, rpq, the affine hull of these three independent points
would be equal to the 2-dimensional space ĆRn´1. Then this would imply that
ĆRn´1 is equal to rH , that is Rn´1 “ H `Habc “ H , which would contradict
the assumption that H is a hyperplane in Rn´1.
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The above argument implies that ĄHab, ĄHbc and rJ are all one-dimensional
subspaces of ĆRn´1. Indeed since Hab, Hbc and J are distinct hyperplanes with
the set Habc in common, they each contain an element that lies outside both
of the others, and therefore outside Habc. We therefore conclude thatĄHab,ĄHbc
and rJ are distinct one-dimensional subspaces of ĆRn´1.
Now let S be the unit sphere in ĆRn´1 that τ -separates the relative interior
of the closed unit disc D centered around r0 from ĆRn´1 ´ D. Consider the
intersection of S with any one-dimensional subspace H of ĆRn´1. As is the
case in R2, because H intersects r0, it intersects D, then since H is unbounded
it cannot be contained in D. Then since H is a subspace, it is connected, and
so the open, nonempty and disjoint sets H X riD and H X pĆRn´1 ´ Dq are,
by proposition (3.5), separated by S in H . This implies that S XH contains
at least one point x. Now since ´x also lies on the boundary of the unit
disc, and because H is a subspace, ´x also lies in S X H . Indeed, since H
is one-dimensional, affp´x, xq “ H . Moreover, for every 0 ď λ ă 1, we have
λx P riD, whilst for λ ą 1, we have λx R D. Then since the same is true of
´x, we conclude that S XH is equal to the pair of what are called antipodal
points t´x, xu .
Now note that if H 1 is another such one-dimensional subspace of ĆRn´1, dis-
tinct from H , then because H X H 1 “ r0, there exists y ‰ x such that
H 1XS “ t´y, yu. This implies that the intersection of S with each of the sets
ĄHab,ĄHbc and rJ is characterized by a distinct pair of antipodal points.
Next we define R : ĆRn´1ˆr0, 2πs ÝÑ ĆRn´1 to be the standard (anti-clockwise)
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rotation matrix in R2.5
px, θq ÞÝÑ Rpx, θq “
»
—–x1 cospθq ´ x2 sinpθq
x1 sinpθq ` x2 cospθq
ﬁ
ﬃﬂ
Take x to be the element of rJXS satisfying the property that for all 0 ă θ ă π,
Rpx, θq P rY X S, where we recall that Y is the open half-space in Rn´1 that
is determined by J and contains ri∆. This we can do because Rpx, 0q and
Rpx, πq lie in rJ , and by proposition (2.2) rY “ coneprY X Sq ´ r0.
Now let y be an element of ĄHab X S. Then because ĄHab is distinct from rJ , it
holds that for some unique 0 ă θ ă 2π other than π, we have Rpx, θq “ y. If
θ ă π, then y P rY , and if not, then θ ą π and since modulo 2π, θ ` π is less
than π, we see that ´y “ Rpx, θ ` πq is an element of rY instead. So without
loss of generality there exists 0 ă θab ă π, such that yab “ Rpx, θabq lies in
Hab X prY X Sq. Similarly, there exists 0 ă θbc ă π, such that ybc “ Rpx, θbcq is
in Hbc X prY X Sq, and since ĄHbc is distinct from ĄHab we know that θbc ‰ θab.
Without loss of generality, suppose that θab ă θbc, and denote the open set
sθab, θbcr by Θ, and the open set sθab ` π, θbc ` πr by π ` Θ. Then note that
Rpx,Θq Ă rY and Rpx, π ` Θq Ă rZ, that is rJ strictly separates the two
sets. Similarly, since Θ is a subset of sθab, θab ` πr, and π ` Θ is a subset
of sθab ` π, 2πs Y r0, θabr, we see that ĄHab also strictly separates Rpx,Θq from
Rpx, π`Θq. An identical argument also shows thatĄHbc also strictly separates
the two sets.
5This a reduced form of the actual matrix we need, which is formally constructed in the
main result that follows.
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Recall that Y.. is the half-space in Rn´1 that is determined by H.. and contains
B.. and Z.. is the open half-space of Rn´1 that is determined by H.. and con-
tainsW... The definition of strict separation implies that if Rpx,Θq is a subset
of say ĂYabX ĂYbc, then Rpx, π`Θq ĂĄZab X ĂZbc, or alternatively, if Rpx,Θq is a
subset of ĂYabXĂZbc then Rpx, π`Θq is a subset ofĄZabXĂYbc. In fact because the
other two cases are obtained by replacing Y with Z in the preceding sentence,
we will consider only this pair.
Consider the case where Rpx, π`Θq ĂĄZabX ĂZbc. The fact that Rpx, π`Θq “
ĄZabX ĂZbcXS follows from the fact that Rpx, ζq is an element ofĄZabX ĂZbcXS
if and only if θab ` π ă ζ ă θbc ` π. Then proposition (2.2) implies that
ĄZab X ĂZbc Ă rZ, so that because rZ :“ ty `Habc : y P Zu, we immediately see
that Zab X Zbc is a subset of Z. Then because Wab XWbc is nonempty by
condition (Div.), and open in ∆ by condition (C’ty), it has nonempty relative
interior, and as such, it contains elements of the relative interior of ∆. More-
over, because WabXWbc is a subset of ZabXZbc there exists y P ri∆ such that
y P Z: a contradiction of the fact that ri∆ Ă Y .
The case where Rpx, π ` Θq Ă ĄZab X ĂYbc differs only in that we addition-
ally need to show that the set Wab XWbc is nonempty. This follows from the
fact that it is equal to tb ą. au X tb ą. cu, so that tb ą. a ą. cu is its subset,
together with condition (Div.).
We now begin the actual construction of the representation in the following
lemma.
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For all a, b, c P A, we define H2abc, H
1
abc and Habc :“ affpH
1
abc Y t0uq, and
by lemma (2.3) we know that dimpH2abcq “ n ´ 3, so that by an identical ar-
gument dimpHabcq “ n ´ 2. Furthermore, if N 2abc X ri∆
2, then we know that
N 2abc is n´ 3-dimensional, so that Hab X∆
1 is of dimension n ´ 2.
Lemma 2.4. Let A “ ta, b, cu. Let preferences pA,ąpqpP∆ satisfy condition
(Div.(i)). Then the following two statements are equivalent:
1. pA,ąpqpP∆ also satisfy (Asy.), (WP), (C’ty), (p-SB) and (NT),
2. There exists a triple of functions Fab, Fbc and Fac, from ∆ to R, that
that satisfy theorem (2.1), and have the property that for all p in ∆,
Fabppq ` Fbcppq “ Facppq.
Note that if statement 2 is satisfied, then by theorem (2.1) conditions (Asy.),
(WP), (C’ty) and (p-SB) are all satisfied whether or not condition (Div.(i))
holds. Moreover, for all p P ∆, if Fabppq ď 0 and Fbcppq ď 0, then by statement
2, Facppq is also less than or equal to zero. By theorem (2.1), this fact is
equivalent to the statement  pa ąp bq and  pb ąp cq implies  pa ąp cq, which
is the definition of negative transitivity (NT). This shows that 2 implies 1.
The substance of the proof that follows is how in the presence of condition
(Div.(i)), 1 is sufficient for 2.
Proof. Step 1. Throughout this proof we work in Rn. By lemma (1.1) all
the results we have obtained in this section in Rn´1 “ aff ∆0 also hold in
aff ∆ Ă Rn. By lemma (2.1), I.. is equal to affpN.., 0q which is equal to a
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hyperplane through the origin in Rn that separates B.. Ă Y.. from W.. Ă Z..,
where Y.. and Z.. are the half-spaces in Rn that are determined by I... An
identical argument shows that affpNabc, 0q “ affpHabc, 0q is by lemma (2.3) of
dimension n ´ 2.
To see that affpNabc, 0q is equal to Iabc :“ Iab X Ibc X Iac, we note once again
that the affine hull of a set is the intersection of all the flats that contain that
set, and tNabc, 0u is a subset of tN.., 0u. The fact that the sets tI..u are distinct
(because the sets tH..u are distinct) and n´ 1-dimensional then completes the
argument. Therefore, in an identical manner to the case for HKabc in proposi-
tion (2.3), the 2-dimensional subspace of Rn, IKabc, is isomorphic to R
n{Iabc
under the correspondence x ÞÑ x` Iabc for x P IKabc.
The fact that I.. has 1-dimensional intersection with I
K
abc follows from the
fact that IK.. is a 1-dimensional subset of I
K
abc and I.. ` I
K
.. “ R
n. (Recall
that Iabc is a subset of I.. if and only if IK.. is a subset of Iabc.) Thus I.. is a
hyperplane through the origin that determines two half-spaces in IKabc. These
half-spaces are equal to Y.. X I
K
abc and Z.. X I
K
abc, and the former contains the
set IK.. X Y... Therefore, the set I
K
abc contains any candidate triple fab, fbc and
fac of vectors that satisfy
fab ` fbc “ fac
as well as being perpendicular to the boundary of and pointing into their re-
spective half-spaces Yab, Ybc and Yac as required for theorem (2.1). Using the
same technique as in proposition (2.3), we will now find such a triple.
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By proposition (2.3), there exists r P ri∆ X Iabc. Since ∆ X Iabc “ Nabc,
r lies in Nabc, which by condition (NT) is equal to Nab X Nbc. Then since
Nab and Nbc are, by condition (Div.(i)), distinct, let p P ri∆X pNabzNabcq and
q P ri∆ X pNbczNabcq such that affpp, rq ‰ affpq, rq. Such a pair exist because
firstly ri∆ XN.. is nonempty and of dimension n ´ 2 by lemma (2.1), whilst
Nabc is of dimension n´ 3. Secondly, affpp, rq Ă affpp,Nabcq “ affpNabq “ Hab
is not equal to affpNbcq which contains affpq, rq.
Now since affpp, rq and affpq, rq are distinct lines with the point r in com-
mon, p, q and r form an independent set of points, so that the flat affpp, q, rq
is two dimensional. Since all three points lie in ∆, this flat is contained in
aff ∆, and moreover, its intersection with Iabc is the singleton tru. This im-
plies that affpp, q, rq and Iabc are complementary flats in Rn. In turn, the fact
that Iac contains elements that lie outside Iabc implies that the intersection of
Iac with affpp, q, rq is one dimensional, contains r, and by condition (Div.(i)),
is distinct from affpp, rq and affpq, rq.
Next consider the orthogonal projection rP : Rn ÝÑ IKabc. The kernel of rP
is equal to Iabc so that for any z P IKabc, rP´1pzq is equal to z ` Iabc: the trans-
lation of Iabc by z. Moreover, the fact that rP is continuous and linear, means
that rP pN..q is a convex and closed subset of I.. X IKabc, and since N.. contains
Nabc, the projection of N.. contains the origin. Clearly, because p lies outside
Iabc, rP ppq ‰ 0, and the same is true of q. We claim that rP ppq lies in IabXIKabc
and rP pqq lies in Ibc X IKabc.
Claim 2.1. rP ppq lies in Iab X IKabc and rP pqq lies in Ibc X IKabc.
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First note that Iabc is of dimension one less than Iab, and that both are sub-
spaces, so that Iabc determines two half-spaces in Iab. (By taking an appro-
priate rotation, we see that they are homeomorphic to canonical subspaces
of Rn that differ by one dimension.) Now let the open half-space to which p
belongs be denoted by K. By proposition (2.2) K is a convex cone and Iabc is
its (relative) boundary. Then for any element z of Iabc, p
1
2
z lies in K because
K is convex. Then, by the fact that it is a cone and 2p1{2p ` 1{2zq “ p ` z
lies in K. Therefore, p ` Iabc is a subset of Iab, and because rP ppq equal to
pp ` Iabcq X IKabc, the proof of the claim is complete. An identical argument
holds for q and Ibc X IKabc.
Now the fact that rP is continuous and linear means that the image of affpp, q, rq
under rP is a two dimensional subspace of (and hence equal to) IKabc. Let
P : affpp, q, rq ÝÑ IKabc be the restriction of rP to affpp, q, rq. Then P is a
bounded linear isomorphism and as such, by the open mapping theorem, it
maps open sets to open sets. It is therefore a homeomorphism between the
two spaces, and moreover, P´1 is also a projection operator with identical
properties to P , in that P´1pxq is equal to px` Iabcq X affpp, q, rq.
Let the intersection of sets such as ri∆ with affpp, q, rq be denoted by ri∆1.
By the above, P pri∆1q is open in IKabc and moreover as r is an element of ri∆
1,
0 P P pri∆1q. This implies that we are free to choose a closed disc D Ă IKabc of
fixed radius ǫ around the origin, that is small enough to be contained in ri∆1.
That is, small enough so that P´1pDq is contained in ri∆1. Let S be the circle
that defines the boundary of this disc. For the purposes of the next claim we
denote the image of any set X under P by rX .
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Claim 2.2. In IKabc, the open half-space , ĂY.. is equal to coneĂB.. ´ t0u. Fur-
thermore, for all i, j, k, l P ta, b, cu such that i ‰ j and k ‰ l,
ĂYij X ĂYkl “ conepĂBij X ĂBklq ´ t0u.
First note that an identical argument to the one we made in claim (2.1) for Iab
shows that because Iabc is the relative boundary of the open convex cone Y.. in
Rn, the projection of Y 1.., is equal to ĂY.. “ Y.. X IKabc. Now the fact the B.. is a
subset of Y.. implies that ĂB.. is a subset of ĂY... Indeed, proposition (2.2) implies
that the same is true for each of the cones ĂYij X ĂYkl for i, j, k, l P ta, b, cu such
that i ‰ j and k ‰ l, and, with the exception of the cases where both k “ j
and l “ i, these cones are nonempty by distinctness of the sets I 1...
As ĂY.. is an open half-space in IKabc, and its boundary, I.. contains the ori-
gin, proposition (2.2) implies that ĂY.. “ conepS X Y..q ´ t0u. Now by the
preceding paragraph S X Y.. is a nonempty subset of D, and so its pre-image
under P is a nonempty subset of ∆1 X Y 1.. ” B.. X affpp, q, rq. So therefore,
P pB1..q “ ĂB.. contains the set S X Y.. and the first part of the claim follows.
The second part follows by an identical argument.
The above claim will allow us to work exclusively on IKabc. So in the knowledge
that x P ĂY.. if and only if there exists λ ą 0 such that P´1pλxq P B.., for the
remainder of this proof we avoid superfluous notation and write of projections
to IKabc without explicit reference to the fact. For example Y.., B.. and N.., will
refer to ĂY.., ĂB.. and ĂN.. respectively.
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Let B “ tb1, b2u be a pair of of orthonormal vectors in I
K
abc and let C “
tc1, . . . , cn´2u be any orthonormal ordered basis for the n ´ 2-dimensional
subspace Iabc such that tB,Cu, which defines an orthonormal basis for Rn,
listed in this particular order is equivalently oriented to the standard basis
tδ1, . . . , δnu. That is, the matrix that consists of the vectors that define the
basis we have chosen,
G “
„
b1, b2, c1, . . . , cn´2

has positive determinant. Now define the function R : r0, 2πs ˆ Rn ÝÑ Rn
such that for each θ P r0, 2πs, Rθ :“ Rpθ, ¨q is defined to be the composition
G ˝
»
———————–
cospθq ´ sinpθq 0 . . .
sinpθq cospθq 0 . . .
0 0 1
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
˝G˚.
Then R defines a rotation on IKabc, for it leaves vectors that are spanned by C
unchanged. To see this, consider Rpθ, c1q. Since tB,Cu defines an orthonormal
basis, G˚pc1q “ δ3 as every row of G˚ is the transpose of a vector in the basis.
Then δ3 is clearly left unchanged by the second matrix in the composition.
Finally, since Gpδ3q “ c1, we see that for any given value of θ, a vector in
Iabc is unchanged by composition with Rpθ, q. For any given x P Rn, will also
use the notation Rx as shorthand for the function Rp¨, xq : r0, 2πs ÝÑ Rn; no
confusion should arise because we will always use Latin subscripts for elements
of Rn and Greek subscripts for elements of r0, 2πs.
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Let p be an element of Nac X S such that for any 0 ă θ ă π, Rppθq is an
element of Bac and for all π ă θ ă 2π, Rppθq P Wac. We can do this without
loss of generality because if y “ ´p, then by claim (2.2), Rypθq “ Rppθ ` πq
must lie in the opposite semi-circle to Rppθq.
Now as bothNabXS andNbcXS are also nonempty, and by the same argument
as in proposition (2.3), we know that there epist θab and θbc in s0, πr such that
Rppθabq P Nab and Rppθbcq P Nbc. We will now show that there are two types
of arrangements for the hyperplanes that define preferences satisfying (NT).
First suppose that θab ă θbc, and that for any 0 ď ζ ă θab, Rppζq lies in
Bab. Then since θab lies in s0, πr, the point θab`π lies in sπ, 2πr, so that for all
θab ă ζ ă π we have Rppζq PWab X Bac “ tb ą. a ą. cu. Then condition (NT)
implies that for all such ζ , the vector Rppζq lies in Bbc, thereby contradicting
the fact that θbc lies between 0 and π.
Instead, we maintain the assumption that θab ă θbc, and suppose that for all
0 ď ζ ă θab we have Rppζq P Wab. Then for all such ζ we have Rppζq P
Bba X Bac ” tb ą. a ą. cu, so that by (NT), we see that Rppζq P Bbc.
Furthermore, as we rotate anti-clockwise through the threshold correspond-
ing the value θab strict preference for b over a changes to strict preference
for a over b, so that for θab ă ζ ă θbc, the vector Rppζq is an element of
Bab X Bbc “ ta ą. b ą. cu which is a subset of Bac as required.
Indeed an iteration of the above argument shows no contradictions arise, and
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the following “table” describes preferences when 0 ă θab ă θbc ă π:
Rppζq P
$’’’’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’’’’%
tb ą. a Á. cu ô 0 ď ζ ă θab
ta Á. b ą. cu ô θab ď ζ ă θbc
ta ą. c Á. bu ô θbc ď ζ ă π
tc Á. a ą. bu ô π ď ζ ă θab ` π
tc ą. b Á. au ô θab ` π ď ζ ă θbc ` π
tb Á. c ą. au ô θbc ` π ď ζ ă 2π
(2.2)
We conclude therefore, that as we rotate anti-clockwise through the 6-tuple of
thresholds, transitivity dictates that preferences permute the order of a single
pair of elements of A, and as such these pairs must be neighbours under the
order. To be concise, preferences permute through the following sequence as
we rotate anti-clockwise: bacÑ abcÑ acbÑ cabÑ cbaÑ bca, before return-
ing to bac.
An identical argument shows that if 0 ă θbc ă θab ă π, then preferences
permute through the opposite sequence as we rotate anti-clockwise: acb Ñ
abcÑ bacÑ bcaÑ cbaÑ cab, and then back to acb.
Consider the case where 0 ă θab ă θbc ă π. We claim that if we take
y :“ Rppθabq, then py ` Ibcq X Iac is nonempty. An identical argument holds
for the case θab ă θbc, where instead we take y
1 “ Rppθbcq and show that
py1 ` Iabq X Iac is nonempty.
Note that since y :“ Rppθabq and θab ă θbc, from the above we know that
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y P Bbc. Then since Ibc is the boundary of the half-space Ybc, y ` Ibc is a
subset of Ybc. Now since Ibc and Iac are complementary subspaces of IKabc and
y ` Ibc is a coset of Ibc, y ` Ibc and Iac are also complementary subspaces of
IKabc. Since Ibc and Iac intersect only at the origin, y` Ibc and Iac intersect at
a unique vector other than the origin, which we denote by z.
On the one hand, since z is an element of y ` Ibc Ă Ybc, we know that for
some λ ą 0, λz P Bbc X S. On the other, z lies in Iac. This implies that
either λz “ Rpp0q, or λz “ Rppπq, both of which are elements of Nac. At λz
therefore, preferences satisfy b ą. c „. a, and the table of preferences (2.2)
tells us that 0 ď ζ ă θab. Now since θab ď π, we conclude that ζ “ 0 and
λz “ p.
Now consider the vector z ´ y. The fact that z lies in y ` Ibc, together with
the definition of this set implies that z´y P Ibc. Once again we need to estab-
lish the orientation of x. Now since y “ Rppθabq, ´y is equal to Rppθab ` πq,
so that by table (2.2) we see that ´y P tc ą. b Á. au. This implies that
´y is an element of Yca, and since z is an element of the boundary, Iac, of
Yca,
1
2
z ` 1
2
p´yq P Yca by convexity and then by the fact that Yca is a cone,
2p1
2
z ` 1
2
p´yqq “ z ´ y is in Yca.
We conclude therefore that x :“ z ´ y is an element of Ibc X Yca, and so
for some µ ą 0, preferences at µx satisfy b „µx c ąµx a, and so table (2.2) tells
us that µx “ Rppθbc ` πq.
Next we show that the rotation of the vectors x, y and z in the same, anti-
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clockwise direction by pi
2
lies in the intersection of the appropriate half-space
with the orthogonal complement of the respective hyperplane to which they
belong.
To this end, note that because θab ă θab `
pi
2
ă θab ` π, at y
1 “ Rppθab ` pi2 q,
by table (2.2), preferences satisfy a ąy1 b, so that y
1 P Yab. Moreover, since
Rppθab `
pi
2
q “ Rpi
2
pRppθabqq “ Rpy,
pi
2
q, we see that y1 is indeed the rotation of
y anti-clockwise by a right-angle onto the set IKab.
Similarly, since λz “ p “ Rpp0q, and 0 ă
pi
2
ă π, preferences at Rpp, pi
2
q P IKac
satisfy a ą. c. Therefore z
1 :“ 1
λ
Rpp, pi
2
q, which, by linearity of R in its first
argument, is equal to Rpz, pi
2
q, is an element of Yab.
In the same way, for the vector µx “ Rppθbc ` πq P Ibc, the fact that
3
2
π ă 2π
implies that θbc `
3pi
2
pmod 2πq lies in r0, θbcq Y pθbc ` π, 2πs. Therefore, by an
identical argument to the above, we see that the rotation under R of µx by pi
2
anti-clockwise, is equal to Rppθbc `
3pi
2
q, an element of Ybc X IKbc. Then letting
x1 :“ 1
µ
Rppθbc `
3pi
2
q, we see that because
1
µ
RpRppθbc ` πq, π{2qq “ Rpx, π{2q,
and x “ z ´ y, we have
x1 “ Rpx, π{2q “ Rpz ´ y, π{2q “ Rpz, π{2q ´Rpy, π{2q “ z1 ´ y1.
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Now if we define fab “ y
1, fbc “ x1 and fac “ z1, we see that
fab ` fbc “ fac
Then, defining F 1.. to be the linear functional on R
n defined by the inner
product xf..,´y on Rn and F.. its restriction to the set ∆, we see that for all
p P ∆
Fabppq ` Fbcppq “ Facppq,
as required.
Theorem (2.2) together with lemma(2.4) show that for |A| ď 3 the pairwise
conditions together with (NT) and Div.(i)) are sufficient for the existence of
an expected utility function that is CUC across states.
In order to obtain the corresponding result for the case where |A| ě 4,
we make use of condition (Div.(ii)). This condition, is not necessary for the
existence of an expected utility function, but, like condition (Div.(i)), it is
needed in the sufficiency argument to ensure that the system of equations is
consistent. In particular, (Div.(ii)) ensures that preferences such as those we
observe in figure (2.4) are ruled out.
Lemma 2.5. Let |A| ą 3. If preferences satisfy conditions (Asy.), (C’ty),
(WP), (NT), (p-SB), (Div.i) and (Div.ii), then for all distinct a, b, c, d P A,
IKab “ C :“ I
K
abc X I
K
abd
Proof. Let a, b, c and d be four distinct elements of A. The fact that IKab is
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Nab
Nac
Nbc
Nad
NbdNcd
kerFcd “ kerpFca ` Fadq
ps “ 1 pr “ 1
pt “ 1
d ą. a ą. b ą. c
c ą. b ą. d ą. a
a ą. b ą. c ą. d
Figure 2.4: The preferences in this figure clearly fail to satisfy (Div.ii) for
at the point p “ p1
3
, 1
3
q, we have a „p b „p c „p d, and there is no other
point such that a „p b „p c. If the set Ncd (in green) happened to lie on
the dashed line that defines kerpFca`Fadq, then there would be an expected
utility representation. There is, however, no behavioural reason why the agent
should have such preferences.
a subset of both IKabc and I
K
abd follows from the fact that, by construction,
Iabc and Iabd are both subsets of Iab. For the reverse inclusion, since IKab is a
1-dimensional subspace of C, and C is itself a subspace, we know that C is
equal to IKab if it is 1-dimensional. As I
K
abc and I
K
abc are both 2-dimensional,
their intersection is at most 2-dimensional and C attains this dimension if and
only if IKabc “ I
K
abd “ C.
We will suppose that this is true and seek a contradiction of condition (Div.ii).
First note that since IKabc “ I
K
abd and both are 2-dimensional, their orthogonal
complement CK is a subspace of dimension n ´ 2. Moreover, as Iabc and Iabd
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are both orthogonal to C, CK contains both of these n ´ 2-dimensional sub-
spaces of Rn. We conclude, therefore, that Iabc and Iabd are equal.
This implies that Nabc “ ∆ X Iabc “ ∆ X Iabd “ Nabd. That is a „p b „p c
holds if and only if a „p b „p d. By condition (NT) we conclude that the set
tp : a p b „p c „p du is empty, a contradiction of condition (Div.ii).
Theorem 2.3. The following two statements are equivalent.
1) Context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u satisfy conditions (Asy.), (C’ty),
(WP), (p-SB), (NT) and (Div.).
2) Context preferences have an expected preference representation F : A ˆ
A ˆ∆ Ñ R with the strong groupoid property. The vectors tfij P Rn :
i, j P Au that characterize F satisfy both the following:
i) for every list pa, b, cq of 3 distinct elements in A, the closed cord
between fab and fbc lies outside the closure of the negative orthant;
ii) for every list pa, b, c, dq of 4 distinct elements in A, fab and fbc and
fcd are linearly independent.
Note that when |S| “ 2, there are no preferences satisfying the conditions, and
so the theorem is trivially satisfied.
Proof. We prove that (1)ñ (2) by showing that (1) and not (2) fails to hold.
First we show that (1) implies the existence of an expected preference repre-
sentation with the strong groupoid property. Thus if not (2) is to hold, then
it must be that not (2.i) or not (2.ii). Once this is shown to be false, the only
remaining possibility is the required one.
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We then argue that (2)ñ(Div.), for (NT) is implied by the strong groupoid
property and via theorem (2.1) the existence of an expected preference repre-
sentation implies (Asy.), (C’ty), (WP) and (p-SB). So we show that a strong
groupoid expected preference representation that satisfies (2.i) must satisfy
(Div.i). Finally, we show that a (2) is also sufficient for (Div.ii).
(1)ñ (2): Let a, b be a distinct pair in A, and take fab to be the vector
in IKab X Yab that has length one. Now for all x P A, a, b, x is either a triple of
distinct elements of A, or x P ta, bu. Now when they form a triple, lemma (2.4)
implies that we may find unique vectors fbx P IKbx X Ybx and fax P I
K
ax X Yax
fab ` fbx “ fax, or, equivalently fbx “ fax ´ fab. (2.3)
Whenever x is equal to b, then we can still choose the vector fbx to solve the
equation fab`fbb “ fab, so that fbb is the unique element of IKbb “ pR
nqK “ t0u.
If x “ a, then the same equation yields fab ` fba “ faa, and so if we choose
faa “ 0, then fba “ ´fab P IKab X Yba.
So far, we have identified a collection of vectors pfij , pi, jq P ta, bu ˆ Aq. This
collection not only satisfies the groupoid property, but also each member of
the collection defines a linear operator Fyx :“ xfyx, y such that Fyxppq ą 0 if
and only if y ąp x.
Now for all x ‰ a, b, let fxb :“ ´fbx P IKbx X Yxb and fxa :“ ´fax P I
K
ax X Yxa.
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Then for each x, the equation fab ` fbx “ fax is equivalent to
´fax “ ´fbx ´ fab ô fxb ` fba “ fxa ;
and hence in the latter equation, by taking fba to the right-hand-side and using
the fact that fab is the additive inverse of fba, we obtain
fxa ´ fba “ fxb ô fxa ` fab “ fxb ;
and then multiplying the latter equation by ´1, and once again substituting
in each of the additive inverses,
´fxa ´ fab “ ´fxb ô fba ` fax “ fbx ;
then once again in the latter equation, taking fax to the other side and using
the fact that fax is the additive inverse of fax, we obtain
´fax ` fbx “ fba ô fbx ` fxa “ fba ;
and finally, multiplying through be ´1, and repeating the penultimate step,
we obtain
´fbx ´ fxa “ ´fba ô fax ` fxb “ fab.
To summarize, so far we have identified a collection of vectors fij for pi, jq P
pta, bu ˆ Aq Y pA ˆ ta, buq. This collection not only satisfies the groupoid
property, but also each member of the collection defines a linear operator
Fyx :“ xfyx, y such that Fyxppq ą 0 if and only if y ąp x.
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Now for each pair c, d P A, take the two corresponding vectors fac and fad,
that we have identified above, and define fcd to be the element that satisfies
fcd “ fad´fac “ fca`fad. First note that ´fcd “ ´pfca`fadq “ fda`fca ” fdc.
Then since fad P IKad and fac P I
K
ac, fcd lies in the direct sum I
K
ad ‘ I
K
ac, which,
by the proof of lemma (2.4), is equal to IKacd. So if fcd is also an element of
IKbcd, then fcd lies in I
K
acdXI
K
bcd which, by lemma (2.5), is equal to I
K
cd. We now
show that this is true.
Consider the vectors fbc and fbd, defined in equation (2.3) immediately above.
Any linear combination of these two vectors lies in IKbc‘ I
K
bc “ I
K
bcd. Moreover,
by equation (2.3) we see that,
fbd ´ fbc “ pfad ´ fabq ´ pfac ´ fabq
“ fad ´ fac,
which is equal to fcd, and therefore we conclude that fcd P IKcd.
Note that the immediately preceding argument holds for c “ d, and in this
case we see that fac “ fad, so that fcd P IKcc “ t0u whenever c “ d. It remains
to be shown that fcd is an element of Ycd whenever c and d are distinct.
First suppose that fcd “ 0. This implies that fac “ fad. In turn, this im-
plies that Iac “ Iad, which violates condition (Div.i). Now suppose that fcd
lies in Zcd ” Ydc. Now if we define Fcd :“ xfcd, ¨y. Then for all p PWcd ” Bdc,
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we have Fcdppq ą 0, and since
Fcdp¨q “ xfad ´ fac, ¨y “ Fadp¨q ´ Facp¨q,
we conclude that for all such p, we have Fadppq ą Facppq.
Now consider the set td ą. a ą. cu. This is clearly a subset of td ą. cu ” Bdc
and moreover, by condition (Div. i) it is nonempty. Thus for any p in this set,
by construction, Fdappq and Facppq are both positive. Moreover, as Fad “ ´Fda,
we see that Fadppq ă 0 and Facppq ą 0 for any p P td ą. a ą. cu Ă Bdc, a contra-
diction of our conclusion in the preceding paragraph. Therefore, fcd P IKcdXYcd
as required.
We now show that for any c, d, d1 and e P A, fcd ` fd1e “ fce is equivalent
to d “ d1. First note that
fcd ` fd1e “ fca ` pfad ` fd1aq ` fae
“ fca ` fae ` pfad ` fd1aq
“ fce ` pfad ` fd1aq
so that fcd` fd1e “ fce if and only if the term in brackets is equal to 0. On the
one hand if d “ d1 then fad`fda “ faa “ 0. On the other hand, if fad`fd1a “ 0,
then fad “ ´fd1a “ fad1 , so that the sets Iad and Iad1 are equal. If d ‰ d1,
then, as we have seen the proof of lemma (2.2), we obtain a contradiction of
condition (Div.i).
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The above shows that there exists an expected preference representation F :
pA ˆ Aq ˆ ∆ Ñ R. Moreover, since Fii “ 0 for all i P A, the quotient set
G “ tFij : i, j P Au{tFij : i “ ju is closed under the law of composition that is
defined for Fij and Fkl such that k “ l. This set is in fact a group under this
law of composition, for it has a unique identity element 0, it contains elements
that have unique additive inverse in G, Fij “ ´Fji, and is clearly associative.
Finally, to see that the expected preference representation F : pAˆAqˆ∆Ñ R
is unique up to a positive scalar multiple, recall that the proof of theorem (2.1)
shows that an expected preference representation is unique up to multiplica-
tion by a positive scalar. As the proof here is identical, we only need to show
that the groupoid property is preserved under multiplication by a scalar.
Note that we chose fab to have norm one, and given this choice the family
of vectors tfij , i, j P Au that we have constructed is, by lemma (2.4) unique.
By the same lemma, it is also clear that for any other choice of positive norm,
say θ ą 0,
θfab “ θfax ` θfxb
for all x P A. Furthermore, our construction was such that for every c, d P A,
fcd “ fad ´ fac, an equality which is also preserved under multiplication by θ.
To complete the proof that statement (1) of our theorem implies (2), we fix a
representation F of preferences that satisfies the strong groupoid property. We
will first show that given such a representation, the negation of (2.i) implies
the negation of condition (Div.i): a contradiction of our assumption that the
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latter is true.
If (2.i) fails to hold, then there exists a triple ta, b, cu of distinct elements
in A such that for some 0 ď λ ď 1, the vector
fλ :“ λfab ` p1´ λqfbc ď 0,
where this inequality means that for every element fλs of f
λ, fλs ď 0. Now
take p P Bab XBbc. Now since p P ∆, every element ps of p satisfies ps ě 0, the
inner product of fλ and p, xfλ, py “
ř
s f
λ
s ps must be non-positive.
Now by bi-linearity of the inner product,
xfλ, py “ λxfab, py ` p1´ λqxfbc, py (2.4)
“ λFabppq ` p1´ λqFbcppq, (2.5)
so that at least one of Fabppq and Fbcppq is non-positive. However, since
p P Bab X Bbc, this contradicts the fact that F is a representation.
To prove statement (2.ii), we suppose that our representation F satisfies (2.i)
but not (2.ii) and seek a contradiction of (Div.(ii)).
Suppose that fcd lies in the linear hull of fab and fbc, Linpfab, fbcq “ IKabc. Then
since fcd is also an element of both Linpfbc, fcdq “ IKbcd and Linpfac, fcdq “ I
K
acd,
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we conclude that
fcd P I
K
abc X I
K
bcd X I
K
acd,
which, by lemma (2.5), is equal to IKbc X I
K
cd X I
K
ac. Now since statement (2)
implies that Bcd and Wcd are both nonempty, and so fcd ‰ 0. Therefore, by
proposition (2.1), I.. is of dimension n´1 and by lemma (2.1) equal to the lin-
ear hull of N... Thus, each of the subspaces I
K
.. are one dimensional and equal
to IKcd. This implies that Icd “ Ibc “ Iac. Therefore, for all p P N.. ” I.. X∆
we have d „p c „p b and a „p c. So that, via condition (NT), we conclude
that a „p b „p c „p d for all such p: a violation of (Div.(ii)).
(2)ñ (1): In the opposite direction, suppose that (2) holds and consider
the following linear programming problem which is based on the one found in
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999) and which we denote by (P ˚).
min
p P∆
x0, py
s.t. Fabppq “ xfab, py ě 1
Fbcppq “ xfbc, py ě 1.
The fact that F is a representation of preferences implies that if this problem
is feasible, then for any p in the feasible set, a ąp b ąp c and (Div.(i)) is
satisfied. Clearly, if a problem is soluble (has an optimal vector) it is feasible,
and Theorem 4.3.4 of Webster p.161 states that (P ˚) is soluble if its primal,
pP q, is soluble, so we now show that pP q is soluble.
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Rewriting (P ) into standard form, so that we minimize y in the closure of the
positive orthant sRn`, means we include the following additional constraints to
ensure that we are choosing y P ∆:
x1, yy ě 1 and x´1, yy ě ´1,
where 1 is a vector of ones in Rn. In standard form therefore, (P ) may be
written as
min
y P sRn
`
xb, yy
s.t. Apyq ě c,
where b is the zero-vector in Rn, and
A “
»
———————–
f˚ab
f˚bc
1˚
´1˚
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
p4ˆnq
c “
»
———————–
1
1
1
´1
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
Therefore, primal problem, pP q, takes the form:
max
x P sR4
`
xc, xy “ x1 ` x2 ` x3 ´ x4
s.t. A˚pxq “ x1fab ` x2fbc ` x31 ´ x41 ď 0,
Now since the objective function in pP q is decreasing in x4, and 0 P R4 is
feasible, any solution must set x4 “ 0. Now for any x
1 such that either x11 or
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x12 is positive, let z “ 1{px
1
1 ` x
1
2q. Then because statement (2) holds, so does
x11zfab ` x
1
2zfbc ę 0
as it is a convex combination of fab and fbc. Moreover, this inequality is
invariant under multiplication by positive constants, so we conclude that for
all x such that either x1 or x2 is positive and x3, x4 “ 0, are infeasible. Then
because 1 “ p1, . . . , 1q˚ P Rn, for any x with x4 “ 0 that is not the zero vector,
x1fab ` x2fbc ` x31 ę 0.
This implies that 0 is the solution of pP q.
Finally, the fact that (2) (and (2.ii) in particular) implies (Div.ii) is then de-
duced by the following brief argument. First, (2.ii) implies that for any distinct
a, b, c and d in A, fab R spantfbc, fcdu “ IKbcd. This in turn implies I
K
ab Ć I
K
bcd,
so that Ibcd Ć Iab. Then, the fact that (2.i) implies (Div.i) means that for any
set, such as ∆, that is transverse to both Iab and Ibcd, Ibcd X∆ ” Nbcd is not
a subset of Nab. That is, (2.ii), by arguments implies the existence of p P ∆
such that b „p c „p„p d and a  b.
Theorem 2.4. The following two statements are equivalent.
1) Context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u satisfy conditions (Asy.), (C’ty),
(WP), (p-SB), (NT) and (Div.).
2) Context preferences have an CUC expected context utility representation
U : A ˆ ∆ Ñ R. The vectors tui P Rn : i P Au that characterize U
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satisfy both the following:
i) for every list pa, b, cq of 3 distinct elements in A, the closed cord
between ua ´ ub and ub ´ uc lies outside the closure of the negative
orthant;
ii) for every list pa, b, c, dq of 4 distinct elements in A, ua´ ub, ub´ uc
and uc ´ ud are linearly independent.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of theorem (2.3) and theorem (2.2).
2.4 Distinguishing the present model from that
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003)
Proposition 2.4. Suppose preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u satisfy (Asy.), (WP),
(C’ty), (p-SB) and (NT). Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(1) (Div.GS) For every list pa, b, c, dq of distinct elements of A, there exists
p P ∆ such that a ąp b ąp c ąp d. If |A| ă 4, then for any strict ordering
of the elements of A, there exists p P ∆ such that ąp is that ordering.
(2) (Div.(iii)) For every list pa, b, c, dq of distinct elements of A, there exists
p, q P ∆ such that
d ąp a „p b „p c ^ c „q b „q a ąq d
If |A| “ 3, the corresponding statement holds in the absence of c, and if
|A| “ 2, then it holds in the absence of both b and c.
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Moreover, if preferences also satisfy (Div.(iii)), then the dimension of Nabcd :“
Nab XNbc XNcd is a convex set of dimension greater than or equal to n´ 4.
Proof. Recall that our background assumption on A is that |A| ě 2. For
|A| “ 2, the statements are immediately equivalent. For |A| ě 3, the proof
that (Div.(iii)) implies (Div.GS) is simple extension to the proof for |A| “ 3.
The latter proof proceeds as follows. Note that pDiv.piiiqq states that there
exists pi, qi, i “ 1, 2, 3 in ∆ such that
d ąp1 a „p1 b ; b „q1 a ąq1 d ;
a ąp2 d „p2 b ; b „q2 d ąq2 a ;
b ąp3 a „p3 d ; d „q3 a ąq3 b .
Now by condition (C’ty), there exists an open neighbourhood O of p1 in ∆,
such that for all r P O, d ąr a and d ąr b. Now since a „p1 b and a ąq3 b,
by condition (p-SB), we know that for 0 ă λ ă 1 sufficiently close to 1,
r1 :“ p1λq3 P O, and d ąr1 a ąr1 b. Similarly, since b ąp3 a, there exists a
convex combination r2 of p3 and p1 such that r2 P O, and d ąr2 b ąr2 a.
A further four iterations of this argument (if necessary using (NT)) show that
each of the 3! strict orders implied by (Div.GS) are implied by (Div.(iii)). For
the converse we will use lemma (2.2). For the case where |A| “ 3, the proof
of lemma (2.2) shows that Nbc has nonempty intersection with both Bab and
Wab. That is, there exists p, q P ∆ such that
a ąp b „p c ^ b „q c ąq a.
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Now in that proof, the choice of a, b and c was arbitrary, thus (Div.GS) implies
(Div.(iii)) for the case where |A| “ 3.
For the case where |A| “ 4, we note that (Div.GS) implies that for every
permutation π of ta, b, cu, there exists ppi, qpi P ∆ such that
d ąppi πpaq ąppi πpbq ąppi πpcq ^ πpaq ąqpi πpbq ąqpi πpcq ąqpi d
So consider the set Bdpa, b, cq :“ Bda X Bdb X Bdc (and Wdpa, b, cq defined sim-
ilarly). Bdpa, b, cq is the finite intersection of convex sets that are open in ∆,
therefore it is convex and open in ∆, the same is true of Wdpa, b, cq. More-
over, for each π, ppi P Bdpa, b, cq and qpi P Wdpa, b, cq. The analogue of lemma
(2.2) holds, therefore, in the topology of Bdpa, b, cq andWdpa, b, cq respectively.
That is, the set Bdpa, b, cqX riNabc is nonempty and of dimension greater than
or equal to n´3, and the same is true ofWdpa, b, cqX riNabc. Since our choice
of d was arbitrary, this completes the proof that (Div.GS) and (Div.(iii)) are
equivalent.
For the last part of the proposition, we note that since Bdpa, b, cq X riNabc
is of the same dimension as Nabc, so is Bda X riNabc and Wda X riNabc, and
so Nda X riNabc, by the same argument as the one we made in showing that
dimNabc ě n ´ 3 in lemma (2.2), disconnects the n ´ 3-dimensional manifold
riNabc, and is therefore of dimension greater than or equal to n´ 4.
The next propositions show that set of possible preferences that satisfy the
pairwise conditions together with (NT) and (Div.GS) is empty for all |A| ě 3
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whenever |S| “ 2 and it is empty for all |A| ě 4 whenever |S| “ 3. There is
a related but somewhat more vague discussion of these facts in conclusion of
Ashkenazi and Lehrer (2001).
Proposition 2.5. (i) If |S| “ 2, then for all |A| ě 3, there are no preferences
tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u satisfying the pairwise conditions together with both (NT)
and (Div.GS).
(ii) If |S| “ 3, then for all |A| ě 4, there are no preferences satisfying the
same conditions as in (i).
(iii) If |S| ě 4, then for all |A| ě 4, the set Nabcd is a convex set of dimension
n´ 4 whenever preferences satisfy the same conditions as in (i)
Proof. First consider the case where |S| “ 2. In this case, ∆ is of dimension
1, and by proposition (2.1) the sets N.. are singletons that are equal to their
affine hull, and separate the sets B.. and W... By proposition (2.4), (Div.GS)
is equivalent to (Div.(iii)). So if there were preferences satisfying (Div.(iii)),
then for |A| ě 3, for all lists pa, b, cq of distinct elements of A, there exist two
elements p, q P ∆ such that a ąp b „p c and b „p c ąp a. This implies that
Nbc is of cardinality greater than one, a contradiction.
For the case where |S| “ 3, we again appeal to proposition (2.4), there we
saw that the sets Bdpa, b, cq XNabc and Wdpa, b, cq XNabc are both nonempty.
Now that fact that Nabc is the intersection of three convex sets, implies that it
is itself convex and conditions (Asy.) and (C’ty) imply that the sets Bdpa, b, cq
and Wdpa, b, cq are disjoint and open, so for any p P Bdpa, b, cq X Nabc and
q PWdpa, b, cqXNabc, convpp, qq Ă Nabc is a one-dimensional set. Thus Nabc is
of dimension at least equal to 1. However by lemma (2.3), we know that Nabc
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is of dimension n ´ 3 “ 0, once more a contradiction.
For the case where |S| “ n ě 4, we note that by proposition (2.4), the di-
mension of Nabcd “ Nad X Nabc is at least n ´ 4 and therefore nonempty for
all . in Therefore, the sets Hda “ affNda and Habc “ affNabc are nonempty
subspaces in Rn that are of dimension n ´ 2 and n ´ 3 respectively. Then
since Habc is not a subset of Hda, their direct sum is the whole of aff ∆, so that
by theorem (1.3.8) of Webster, the dimension of their intersection is equal to
n´ 4.
2.5 Discussion of results
Firstly, we have improved the theorem of [GS03] to the extent that it now
applies to a significantly larger class of preferences. In particular, our diver-
sity condition is not so strong as to rule out all possible context preferences
when the number of states is equal to 3 and the number of alternatives is
greater than or equal to 4. That is, for |S| “ 3 and any |A| ě 4, the theorem
of [GS03] is only true as a result of there being no preferences satisfying the
conditions they impose; whereas in our model, the theorem is meaningful in
such circumstances as the set of possible preferences that satisfy our diversity
axiom is nonempty.
Even in dimensions higher than 3, our model allows for a substantially larger
class of preferences, indeed, given the other conditions, the set of preferences
satisfying (Div.GS) is of measure zero in the set preferences satisfying (Div.).
Nevertheless, when the number of states is two and the number of alternatives
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is greater than 3, then as theorem (2.4) makes clear, there are no preferences
satisfying the conditions in our model either. Note that the diversity condi-
tion may be restated so that the main theorem holds for |S| ě 3 and, provided
|A| “ 2, |S| “ 2 also. This would then be accompanied by a generic non-
existence result for the case where |A| ě 3 and |S| “ 2. Indeed as Ashkenazi
and Lehrer suggest, there appears to be no remotely intuitive condition on
preferences that will extend the model to include the case where there are
only two states.
Due to the fact that our model allows us to meaningfully consider the 2-
dimensional simplex as our context space, we are able to present diagrams of
possible arrangements of the sets, tNab : a, b P Au, to which context prefer-
ences give rise. Below, figure (2.5) presents an example of preferences that
satisfy the conditions of the main theorem of this chapter when the matrix W
with rows equal to the (transpose of the) vectors tua P Rn : a P Au for the
case where |S| “ 3 and |A| “ 4. That is
W “
»
———————–
uTa
uTb
uTc
uTd
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
“
»
———————–
0 ´1 1
.9 0 ´1.1
´1 .5 .1
.3 .1 .1
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ
In figure (2.5) the number of open sets determined by tNab : a, b P Au that
correspond to strict preference holding between every pair of alternatives in
∆ is 18. Examples of preferences that satisfy weak diversity exist where the
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Nab
Nac Nbc
Nad
Nbd
Ncd
ps “ 1
pr “ 1
pt “ 1
Nabd
Nbcd
Nacd
Nabc
Figure 2.5: The sets N.. and N... for |A| “ 4, |S| “ 3
number of chambers is 16.6 However when the dimension of the context space
is two, 18 is maximal in the sense that any more chambers, given that the sets
N.. are flat, signifies a failure of condition (NT). By contrast, when |A| “ 4,
(Div.GS) implies that the number of chambers is at least 4! “ 24.
Similar figures exists for the case where |A| “ 5. The diagrams also sug-
gest that it is the combination of thinness and flatness of tNab : a, b P Au
together with (NT) that will surely fail to be observed in experiments: any
perturbation of a single set N.. immediately reveals sets where (NT) fails. The
next chapter looks at the implications of relaxing the thinness and flatness
conditions. As we shall see, diversity is no longer needed to obtain a utility
6Azrieli (2011) presents such a figure in a social choice setting.
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representation.
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Chapter 3
A topological approach to
representing context preferences
3.1 Motivation
In this chapter we consider the implications of relaxing the condition of strong
betweenness across contexts (p-SB) of chapter 2. Recall that this condition
was itself a weakening of the combination axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2003). We do so for two main reasons. The first is that it is a strong con-
dition in its own right, and to the extent that it is the condition that gives
rise to an integral or sum in the form of an expected utility or preference rep-
resentation, it is subject to similar criticisms that other models of expected
utility face. For instance, in many situations, as p varies across ∆, preferences
pA,ąpq may well vary in such a way that is non-linear, possibly exhibiting
complementarity across states. Before presenting such an example we look at
some more elementary weakening of the condition
Example 3.1 (Getting to university continued). Recall that in our “get-
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ting to university” example, the state-space S is the union of the three states
r:=“rain”, s:=“sunshine” and t:=“icy/treacherous”, and that Val presently
seeks to articulate preferences contingent upon each probability/context that
may arise when the resolution of uncertainty become imminent. Suppose that
Val is willing to allow for some decisions to be made on the day. That is, in
formulating her plan, she is not so obsessive in her plan as to say, for instance:
that whenever pt ą
1
2
, she would always choose b:=“bus” over c:=“cycle” and
vice versa whenever pt ă
1
2
, preferences that would admit an expected utility
function with threshold set
Nab :“ tp P ∆pr, s, tq : pt “ pr ` psu.
To see this, note that since pr ` ps` pt “ 1, if we solve these two equations by
substituting in for, say, pr, we obtain the solution set
tpps, ptq P R
2 : pt “
1
2
, 0 ď ps ď 1u.
Instead, suppose Val is willing to allow for a thick threshold set Nbc in ∆
that separates Bbc from Wbc. Suppose, that at the time of making the plan,
she only knows that she will choose b over c whenever pt ą
2
3
and c over b
whenever pt ă
1
3
. For pt between these values she is willing to concede that she
is indecisive, and would rather decide on the day.
In this example, since Nab has open interior in ∆, it cannot be the intersec-
tion of a hyperplane with ∆. Also, since Bbc and Wbc are both nonempty,
proposition (2.1) of chapter 2 implies that Val’s preferences can never have an
expected utility or preference representation. However, it is apparent that a
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pair of expected preference representations, one for each of the sets
tp P ∆ : pt “
1
3
u and tp P ∆ : pt “
2
3
u,
would do.
On other hand, if the alternative set is of cardinality greater than two, and Val
is willing to accept that indecisiveness is transitive in itself and is dominated
by strict preference (negative transitivity), then a utility function representa-
tion still ought to be possible. This is the question we pursue in this chapter.
It is plausible that nonlinear models of context-free preferences such as the
multiple prior models of Bewley (1987) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
may, when transposed to the context-dependent setting, be able to capture
the behaviour present in the above example. We highlight this as a direction
for future research.
Note that this example also raises the question of how we can represent con-
text preferences that fail to satisfy negative transitivity at each context, but
instead accommodate weakened versions that allow for intransitive indecisive-
ness. Examples of such representations for context-free preferences in the vNM
paradigm are the semi-order and interval order models of Fishburn (1968) and
Nakamura (1988) respectively. Whilst this was one of the original goals of the
present research, we have found that much work still had to be done on the
basic model where preferences give rise to a utility function over contexts. We
believe the model and techniques we present in this chapter provide some of
118
the preliminary but necessary steps towards more realistic and general models.
Example 3.2. Building on our flood example of chapter 1, suppose that in
addition to the future threat of a flood, there is also the future threat of a mud-
slide. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that mud-slides only happen when
there is a flood. That is the state-space S is the union of the three events
tsu:=“no flood”, F :=“flood” and tuu:=“mudslide”; where tuu Ă F . We can
write S in terms of the three states s, t and u, where ttu :“ F ztuu is the event
“flood, but no mud-slide”.
Recall that our decision-maker presently seeks to articulate preferences con-
tingent upon each probability/context that may arise when the threats become
imminent. Suppose that one course of action, such as “evacuate to site b” is
preferable to “stay at site a” when a flood is certain, and when there is no
threat a is preferable to b.
Let the data that we have on preferences be of the following incomplete form.
When there is a very low chance of a mudslide, that is pu « 0, where « means
“approximately”, the decision-maker is indecisive when 1
4
Æ pt Æ
1
2
. Whereas
when pt « 0, she is indecisive only when pu «
1
6
. Now if Nab is convex, then a
simple calculation shows that the set tppt, puq P ∆ : pu “
1
6
´ 2
6
ptu should lie in
Nab. That is, when there is approximately a one quarter chance of a flood with
an equal conditional probability of mudslide and no mudslide (pu “
1
8
“ pt),
the planner should be indecisive. However, it seems plausible that the planner
is decisive in favour of evacuating in this context given the unpredictability of a
mudslide in addition to the complimentary threat of a flood without a mudslide.
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Such preferences might well be of the following form:
Nab p
1
8
, 1
8
q
ps “ 1 pt “ 1
pu “ 1
In this example, perhaps because floods progress more predictably and have
more predictable consequences than mudslides, the decision-maker who is
presently putting together an evacuation plan in advance of the threat is will-
ing to allow for more indecisiveness when mudslides are ruled out. However
as a mudslide becomes more likely, the unpredictable nature of mudslides, not
only in terms of the consequences, but also the abruptness of its arrival forces
the planner to be decisive. There is also a degree of complementarity between
the two states, an effect which is reflected in the strict convexity of the set of
contexts such that b dominates a.
Clearly, in this example, the plan was put together with some broad rules
of thumb and there would be many possible preference contours in context
space that the above data will permit. However, what is clear is that expected
utility of the kind explored in chapter 2 will not do, for Nab is neither thin,
nor convex, nor in fact is Bab. Instead, what is called for is a basic model of
context preferences that parallels the continuous ordinal utility representation
for context-free preferences of Debreu (1954) and (1964). Once this has been
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obtained, we may impose additional conditions that impose some structure on
how preferences vary with context and which capture features of the prefer-
ences described in the above examples.
The structure of the present chapter will accord with these objectives. First,
in section (3.2) we present a continuous, ordinal utility representation of com-
plete and transitive preferences that are continuous across the context space.
Perhaps more importantly, we identify the properties that a context space
needs to have if such a representation is to hold for all possible continuous
preferences. Second, in section (3.3), we restrict the class of preferences we
seek to model on the grounds that the remaining class is more typical of what
we observe in choice under uncertainty. In this section we show that once
convexity (in the form of condition (p-SB)) is weakened, we no longer need to
consider condition (Div.) and instead may focus on obtaining a representation
of preferences that captures behaviour that seems plausible in a wide variety
of decision problems.
3.2 A continuous representation of preferences
for perfectly normal context spaces
Definition (Asymmetry (Asy.)).
For all a, b P A, x P X : if a ąx b then  pb ąx aq; equivalently,
x P Bab ñ x RWab.
Definition (Continuity (C’ty)).
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For all a, b P A, x P X : if a ąx b, then there exists an open neighbourhood O
of x in X such that for every x P O we have a ąq b.
As we discuss in the previous chapter, unlike models such as that of vNM
or others that do not define context preferences, here continuity has intuitive
appeal because it represents a stability property of strict preferences. That
is stability with respect to perturbations of the context as characterized by
p P ∆.
Definition (Negative transitivity (NT)).
For all a, b, c P A and x P X : if  pa ąx bq and  pb ąx cq, then  pa ąx cq;
equivalently, the contrapositive is
x P Bac ñ x P Bab Y Bbc
It is well known that (NT) and (Asy) of the relation ą are together equivalent
to assuming that the union of ą and „, Á is both complete and transitive–see
Fishburn (1979) ch.2 for instance. In this chapter we will work with strict
preferences ą, however where necessary we will make use of the weak prefer-
ence relation Á.
We now state and prove a very general existence theorem for context pref-
erences. It is in some sense the most general theorem we can hope for if we
seek a representation that varies continuously across contexts. This is because
of the following theorem on spaces that are perfectly normal ie. normal spaces
X for which every closed set can be written as a countable intersection of sets
that are open in X (Munkres p.229). We recall that the space X is said to
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be normal if for every pair of disjoint closed subsets of X there exist disjoint
open sets containing A and B respectively.
Theorem 3.1 (Michael’s selection theorem). A space X is perfectly normal if
and only if whenever g, h : X Ñ R are upper (resp. lower ) semi-continuous
and g ď h, there is a continuous f : X Ñ R such that g ď f ď h and
gpxq ă fpxq ă hpxq whenever gpxq ă hpxq.
This equivalence is relevant for preferences that are indexed by elements of
a context space because if the context space is not perfectly normal then
there exist g, h : X Ñ R that are upper (resp. lower ) semi-continuous and
g ď h, such that for no continuous f : X Ñ R do we have g ď f ď h
and gpxq ă fpxq ă hpxq whenever gpxq ă hpxq. This as we will see in the
proof of our theorem and subsequent discussion, would imply that there exists
context preferences tpA,ąxq : x P Xu such that there is no representation
U : AˆX Ñ R.
We will not provide a comprehensive answer to the question of how restric-
tive the condition that the context space be perfectly normal is at this point.
Though we note for countable S the simplex of probability measures ∆ on S
is a subspace of RS, which is a Hilbert space under the standard Euclidean
metric, so that by Steen and Seebach p.65, ∆ is a metric space. Then by
Munkres p. 229 every metrizable space is perfectly normal. Thus for count-
able S, ∆ is a suitable context space. This is not true for uncountable S, by
counterexample 105, p125 of Steen and Seebach.
Another example of a context space in the literature is any countable prod-
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uct of the discrete space of non-negative integers with the Cartesian product
topology as is found in the case-based decision theory of Gilboa and Schmei-
dler. By Steen and Seebach p.121, this is a complete metric space, and so this
too is a suitable space of contexts. On the other hand, uncountable products
of the nonnegative integers with the product topology are, by counterexample
103 of Steen and Seebach, not normal spaces, and so they may be unsuitable
depending on preferences.
The representation we are seeking is of the following form.
Definition 3.1. U : A ˆ X Ñ R is said to be a continuous context utility
representation of preferences tpA,ąxq : x P Xu if it is continuous and for all
a, b P A and x P X,
a ąx b ô Upa, xq ą Upb, xq.
A continuous (context) representation U is said to be ordinal if for any other
representation V of preferences, there exists a family of strictly increasing
functions tfx : RÑ RuxPX such that for each x, V p¨, xq “ fx ˝ Up¨, xq.
Remark 3.1. Note that in definition (3.1), the continuity of f. across contexts
is implied by the continuity of U and V .
We now state and prove our representation theorem for context preferences
that satisfy the aforementioned conditions.
Theorem 3.2. Let A be countable and X be a perfectly normal space of con-
texts. The following two statements are equivalent.
1) Context preferences tpA,ąxq : x P Xu satisfy (Asy.), (C’ty) and (NT).
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2) Context preferences have a continuous ordinal utility representation.
Proof. Let t1, 2, 3 . . . u be an arbitrary enumeration of A, and by rjs we will
denote the subset of A that contains the first j elements of the enumeration.
By U j : rjsˆX Ñ R we will denote the utility representation of the projection
of preferences tpA,ąxq : x P Xu onto the first j elements of the enumeration.
That is, if we recall that for each x P X , ąx is a subset of AˆA, then we see
that tąx: x P Xu Ă pAˆAq
X . Hence by the projection of preferences onto rjs
we mean
tąx: x P Xu X
`
rjs ˆ rjs
˘X
which is a well defined intersection since
`
rjs ˆ rjs
˘X
X pAˆ AqX “
ź
xPX
`
rjs ˆ rjs
˘
X pAˆ Aq
“
ź
xPX
prjs X Aq ˆ prjs X Aq
“
`
rjs ˆ rjs
˘X
.
We will use this projection to proceed by induction on A. Thus we first show
that a continuous representation for the basic case: which we take to be j “ 1.
Let U1p1, xq ” 0 for all x P X . By condition (Asy.), U1 is a representa-
tion for the projection of preferences onto r1s and it is clearly continuous.
This completes the proof for the basic case. Now suppose that for some j P N
greater than 1 there exists a representation U j´1 of the projection onto rj´1s.
We need to show that the conditions imply the existence of a representation
of the projection onto rjs.
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For a P rj ´ 1s we set U jpa, ¨q “ U j´1pa, ¨q. Then by the induction hypothesis,
for all a, b P rj ´ 1s and x P X we have,
a ąx b ô U
jpa, xq ą U jpb, xq,
and on this subset of rjs, U j is continuous.
We now need to select a continuous function U jpj, ¨q on X such that for each
x, U jp¨, xq : rjs Ñ R represents ąx Xrjsˆ rjs. We will do this by first defining
the lower and upper envelopes, U and U respectively of U jprj´ 1s, Xq relative
to alternative j. That is, informally speaking, for the lower envelope relative
to j we seek the function whose graph is the set of points tpx, U jp¨, xqq : x P Xu
that can be seen by looking down from the position of j in the preference order
at context x. (Similarly, the upper envelope relative to j, it is the set of points
that can be seen by looking up.)
We then show that these two functions are respectively upper and lower semi-
continuous and that the latter dominates the former pointwise. This, together
with the fact that X is perfectly normal implies, via Michael’s selection theo-
rem that the required function U jpj, ¨q exists.
Recalling that Wjrj´1s :“
Şj´1
k“1Wjk is the set of elements of X such that
j is strictly worse than all the elements of rj ´ 1s, and similarly for B, let us
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now define the lower and upper envelopes of U j relative to j.
Upxq :“
$’&
’%
minkPrj´1s
 
U jpk, xq
(
´ 1 if x PWjrj´1s
maxkPrj´1s
 
U jpk, xq : j Áx k
(
otherwise.
This function is well defined for the following reasons: firstly, rj´1s is compact;
secondly, for each x in
XzWjrj´1s “
j´1ď
k“1
`
Bjk YNjk
˘
there exists k P rj ´ 1s such that j Áx k; and thirdly, the fact that Áx is
complete and transitive means that if Dx is the subset of alternatives in rj´1s
that j weakly dominates at x, there is at least one element of Dx that is
maximal in Dx under Áx. Similarly, the upper envelope of U
jprj ´ 1s, Xq
relative to j is also well defined as follows:
Upxq :“
$’&
’%
maxkPrj´1s
 
U jpk, xq
(
` 1 if x P Bjrj´1s
minkPrj´1s
 
U jpk, xq : k Áx j
(
otherwise.
Claim 3.1. For all x P X, Upxq ď Upxq.
Proof. With a view to obtaining a contradiction, suppose that for some x P X ,
Upxq ă Upxq. Then by definition x cannot be in the union of Wjrj´1s and
Bjrj´1s. Thus for some k, l P rj´1s, Upxq “ U jpk, xq and Upxq “ Upl, xq. Now
once more by definition,
l Áx j Áx k,
so that by condition (NT) it follows that: l Áx k. Then since U
j is equal
to U j´1 on rj ´ 1s ˆ X , which, by the induction hypothesis, represents the
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projection of preferences onto rj ´ 1s, we have Upl, xq ě Upk, xq. This is the
required contradiction, and so we see that U is pointwise weakly dominated
by U .
Purely for expositional purposes, we introduce two fictional alternatives a and
a, such that for all x P X and k P rjs, we have a ąx k ąx a. Accordingly, we
define rj ´ 1s˚ :“ rj ´ 1s Y ta, au, and for each x P X , let
U jpa, xq ” min
kPrj´1s
tU jpk, xqu ´ 1
and
U jpa, xq ” max
kPrj´1s
tU jpk, xqu ` 1.
Now define the lower envelope of U jprj ´ 1s˚, Xq relative to j, and note that
for all x P X there exists k P rj ´ 1s˚ such that j Áx k, so that
Upxq :“ max
kPrj´1s˚
 
U jpk, xq : j Áx k
(
is well defined and similarly, so is
Upxq :“ min
kPrj´1s˚
 
U jpk, xq : k Áx j
(
.
Now, by construction, the lower and upper envelopes of U jprj´1s, Xq relative
to j are respectively identical to the lower and upper envelopes of U jprj ´
1s˚, Xq relative to j. Moreover, we can readily see that for all x P X if for
some k P rj ´ 1s˚, k „x j, then Upxq “ U jpk, xq “ Upxq; on the otherhand,
if Upxq “ Upxq for some x, then there exists k P rj ´ 1s, for it cannot be a
or a, such that k „x j. So we see that there exists Upxq “ Upxq if and only
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if there exists k P rj ´ 1s such that k „x j. Equivalently, for each x P X , if
Upxq “ U jpg, xq and Upxq “ U jpl, xq for some g, l P rj ´ 1s˚, then
Upxq ą Upxq ô l ąx g,
and for all other k P rj´1s˚, either k ąx l or g ąx k. This, together with claim
(3.1), shows that provided U is usc and U is lsc, Michael’s selection theorem
tells us that the desired continuous function exists.
We now show that U is upper semi continuous (usc). We do so by showing
that U is infact continuous everywhere except the contexts where alternative
j changes from being strictly worse to being indifferent to some other alter-
native(s) and the set of alternatives that j dominates is unchanged. At such
points, U , should, intuitively speaking, increase because the set of elements of
rj´ 1s˚ that are weakly dominated by j at x will have increased in cardinality
by at least one, and we recall that U is defined in terms of the maximum
over Dx. The fact that the alternative space is discrete and strict preference
is continuous then implies that there is a jump up in the value of U in such
contexts, a property that is satisfied by usc functions.
We now provide a formal proof of this argument.
Claim 3.2. On X, U is upper semicontinuous and U is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. For each x P X , let D˚x be the set of elements of rj´1s
˚ that are weakly
dominated by j at x. Similarly, let E˚x :“ tk P rj ´ 1s
˚ : k Áx ju. Condition
(Asy.) and the definition of „. imply that for all x P X and k P rj´1s, exactly
129
one of following relationships must hold:
j ąx k, k ąx j or k „x j.
So that for each x, we have D˚x Y E
˚
x “ rj ´ 1s
˚. Furthermore, l P D˚x, k P E
˚
x
implies that l Áx k by transitivity of Áx, and l „x k holds if and only if
D˚xXE
˚
x ‰ H, which in turn is true, if and only if x P Njk for some k P rj´1s.
When D˚x X E
˚
x is empty, therefore, the two sets form a partition of rj ´ 1s
˚.
We now prove the claim that U is upper semicontinuous.
Let x P X be such that for any open set O that contains x and is sufficiently
small, we have D˚z “ D
˚
x for all z P O. Thus for each z P O, Upzq “ U
jpk, zq
for some k P D˚x and so
O “
ď
kPD˚x
č
lPD˚x
tx P O : k Á lu “ O X
` ď
kPD˚x
∆zWkD˚x
˘
.
By condition (C’ty) and the fact that the finite intersection of open sets is
open, we see that WkD˚x is open in X and so its complement is closed. There-
fore in the subspace topology of O, O X XzWkD˚x is also closed. Now on
each of the sets O X∆zWkD˚x , U “ U
jpk, ¨q, and by the induction hypothesis,
U jpk, ¨q is continuous on X and hence continuous on each of its subsets, so
in particular the restriction of U jpk, ¨q to OX∆zWkD˚x is a continuous function.
In the intersection of any pair of sets ∆zWkD˚x , ∆zWlD˚x , k, l P D
˚
x it is clear
that by condition (Asy.) we cannot have strict preference in either direction
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between k and l. Thus for any z P O in such an intersection we have:
U jpk, ¨q “ Up¨q “ U jpl, ¨q.
In the same way, for any z P O and D Ă D˚x such
Ş
kPD∆zWkD˚x we have
U jpk, zq “ Upzq for all k P D.
Now let C be any closed subset of R. Then we have
O X U´1pCq “ O X
` ď
kPDx
U jpk, ¨q´1pCq
˘
.
Continuity of U jpk, ¨q for each k P Dx implies that U
jpk, ¨q´1pCq are closed in
X , and the fact that Dx is finite implies that the union on the right-hand-side
of this equation is closed in X . Hence, in the subspace topology, both sides
are closed in O and therefore U is continuous at x.1
By condition (C’ty), the above argument accounts for x P BkD XWkE , for
each partition D,E of rj ´ 1s˚. That is, all points x such that j x k for any
k P rj ´ 1s. On the interior of the set
Ťj´1
k“1Njk relative to X , there exists
k P rj ´ 1s and an open neighborhood O of x that is contained in IntX Njk.
As such, on O, U is equal to the continuous function U jpk, ¨q and is thereby
continuous.
It remains for us to consider x P bdX Njk for arbitrary k P rj ´ 1s. Here, in
every open neighborhood O of x, there exists y P O such that y P Bjk YWjk.
1This argument is based on what is called “The pasting lemma” (Munkres p.124).
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Let tOn : n P Nu be a sequence of open sets that contain x which satisfiesŞ8
n“1On “ txu. (Such a sequence exists precisely because X is perfectly nor-
mal.)
We will consider sequences of contexts tynu such that yn P On for each n,
so that limn yn “ x. We do so by first partitioning each set On into the three
sets
On XNjk, On XWjk and On X Bjk.
Any such sequence of contexts tynu that has infinitely many elements that lie
in more than one of the three sets that determine the partition, say Bjk and
Wjk, has convergent subsequences ty1nmu and ty
2
nm
u that lie wholly in Bjk and
Wjk respectively. So it suffices to consider sequences in each of the partitions
separately.
For each sequence tyn P On XNjku we have Upynq “ U jpk, ynq for each n P N,
and by the induction hypothesis U jpk, ¨q is continuous, so Upynq converges to
Upxq.
For the sequence of sets tOn X Wjku, we note that z P On X Wjk implies
that k ąz j, and, by condition (NT), for all l P Dz we have k ąz l, so that
U jpk, zq ą Upzq. Let us consider the following two exhaustive cases.
Case 1. There exists n P N such that for all z P Pn ”
Ť
měnpOmXWjkqYtxu :
if l P Dz, then k ąx l. That is, there exists an open neighborhood Q of x such
that for all y P pQ XWjkq Y txu, U
jpk, yq ą Upyq. Thus, for any sequence
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of contexts tym P Om XWjk : m P Nu, tymu converges to x P bdXWjk and
moreover,
lim sup
m
Upymq ă Upxq “ U
jpk, xq
Thus in this case, U is x is upper semicontinuous.
Case 2. (This is the negation of Case 1.) That is for all open neighbor-
hoods Q of x, there exists z P pQ XWjkq Y txu with U jpk, zq ď Upzq. Now
if z ‰ x, then z P Wjk and U
jpk, zq ď Upzq imply j Áz l Áz k ąz j, which
contradicts condition (NT). Thus z “ x is the only context such that for all
n P N there exists z P Pn and l P Dz such that l Áx k. Once more by condition
(NT) we see that for such l, l „x k.
Now note that for each yn P On XWjk we have U jpl, ynq ď Upynq ă U jpk, ynq;
this is equivalent to
0 ď Upynq ´ U
jpl, ynq ă U
jpk, ynq ´ U
jpl, ynq.
Then using the triangle inequality on R, the above bound, and the fact that
U jpk, xq “ Upxq “ U jpl, xq we have:
0 ď |Upynq ´ Upxq|
ď |Upynq ´ U
jpl, ynq|` |U
jpl, ynq ´ Upxq|
ď |U jpk, ynq ´ U
jpl, ynq|` |U
jpl, ynq ´ Upxq|
ď |U jpk, ynq ´ Upxq|` 2|U
jpl, ynq ´ Upxq|.
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Thus |Upynq ´ Upxq| converges to 0 by continuity of U
jpk, ¨q and U jpl, ¨q via
the induction hypothesis. This completes the proof of Case (2). Indeed, in
this case, if for instance Bjk is empty, U is in fact continuous at the boundary
of Wjk.
We now turn to the remaining sequence of sets tOn XBjkunPN. Now as above,
for each n, let Pn ”
Ť
měnpOmXBjkqYtxu. Now define the sequence of subsets
of rj ´ 1s˚
Fn :“
ď
yPPn
Dy,
then because Fn “ Fn`1 Y
Ť
yPOnXBjk Dy, Fn is a decreasing sequence of sets:
each of which contains the alternative k. Now since rj ´ 1s˚ is a finite set,
there exists n1 P N such that for all n ě n1, Fn “ Fn1 ” F .
Once more there are two cases. The first holds when there exists n1 P N
such that y, z P Pn1 implies Dy “ Dz. By the construction of tPnu, this im-
plies that the same is true for all n ě n1. In this case we may use the partition
lemma argument on Pn1 to show that the restriction of U to P
1
n is continuous.
Although, Pn1 is not a neighborhood of x, it is clear that for any sequence
tynu Ă Pn1 that is converging to x, we have Upynq converges to Upxq.
The remaining case is where for all n P N, there exists y, z P Pn such that
Dy ‰ Dz. Let us define the set
L :“
č
n
tl P F : l P DyzDz, for some y, z P Pnu.
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The fact that Pn Ă Bjk Y txu implies that k P Dy XDz for all y, z P Pn, thus
F ‰ Ln for all n.
Suppose that l P L, and l ąx j. Then by condition (C’ty) there exists an
open neighborhood Q of x such that l R Dy for all y P Q. Now for n suffi-
ciently large, the fact that
Ş
nOn “ txu implies that Pn Ă Q. Thus, either
Pn X Q “ txu (if we are considering the discrete topology on X), or, by defi-
nition of L, there exist y, z P Q such that l P DyzDz. In either case we obtain
a contradiction: in the former it is the fact that we have found n ě n1 such
that Dy “ Dz for all y, z P Pn; and in the second, it is the definition of Q.
Now suppose that j ąx l. In this case there exists an open neighborhood
Q of x such that l P Dy for all y P Q. In this case, we see that like k, l P F zL.
Thus, by default, we see that l „x j. Now let tznu, zn P Pn be such that
l P DynzDzn for some yn P Pn. Thus, for all zn we have l ązn j. Now since zn
converges to x, we know that for every open neighborhood Q of x there exists
n such that zn P Q. Thus, x P bdXWjl. This case is therefore identical to
Case (2) above with the roles of k and l reversed.
This completes the proof of the fact that U is upper semicontinuous on X .
The proof that U is lower semicontinuous is identical except for the fact that
the points of discontinuity lie on the boundary of Bj¨ rather than bdXWj¨ as
we have shown to be the case for U .
The proof of this last claim completes the proof of the theorem.
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3.3 The topological approach to uncertainty
The main strength of the representation of section (3.2) is that it is general.
That is, it allows for a very diverse class of context preferences. It clearly
encompasses the expected utility representations of chapter 2, but also the
transitive expected preference representations of that chapter. However for
some decision problems it may be too general to be of any use in applications.
That is, whilst continuity imposes some useful and realistic structure across
contexts, we may be able to find additional conditions on preferences that are
reasonable in certain decision problems.
As an example, when the context space is the set of probability distribu-
tions ∆ on S “ ts, t, uu, and preferences are such that for some a, b P A and
p “ pps, pt, puq P ∆, we have a ąp b and a ąs b where p ‰ δs. (We recall that
δv is the basis vector in R|S| corresponding to the axis that we have assigned
to each state v P S, and ąs is short hand for ąδs .)
Now consider how preferences change as the probability of state s increases
and the relative weights of each of the other states remains the same. In
other words, suppose that for λ P r0, 1s we look at preferences at contexts r in
convpp, δsq, that is
r “ λδs ` p1´ λqp
“ ps δ
s ` p1´ λqpt δ
t ` p1´ λqpu δ
u.
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Now it may seem unreasonable that there exist arbitrarily many such proba-
bility distributions r such that b Ár a. However the representation in section
(3.2) is general enough to accommodate such preferences. Indeed if the objec-
tive is to elicit preferences, the generality of that model might well prove too
costly in terms of number of decisions needed to do so.
Indeed we may often be willing to go further and commit to the following
condition.
Definition (Betweenness with respect to states (s-B)). Both
(s-Bą): for all a, b P A, p P ∆ and s P S: if a ąp b and a ąs b, then for
q “ λp` p1´ λqδs, 0 ă λ ă 1 we have a ąq b ; and,
(s-WB): condition (s-Bą) with the relation Á. replacing strict prefer-
ence.
Equivalently, both
p, δs P Bab ñ convpp, δsq Ă Bab ; and
p, δs P Bab YNab ñ convpp, δsq Ă Bab YNab.
Condition (s-Bą) is substantial weakening of condition (p-SB) (strong be-
tweenness across contexts) which was introduced in chapter 2. Condition
(p-SB) implies (s-Bą) as well as the following condition which is much more
difficult to motivate.
Definition (Thinness of no-strict preference (T)).
For all a, b P A, p P ∆ and s P S: if a „p b and a ąs b, then a ąr b for all
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r “ λp` p1´ λqδs such that 0 ă λ ă 1; equivalently,
Int∆Nab “ H.
This condition genuinely implies schizophrenic changes in preferences as con-
texts vary near what, in the presence of this condition, may justifiably be
called the threshold set Nab. This condition is closely related to the strong
part of the sure-thing principle of Savage (1972). We will only make use of
condition (T) at the end of this chapter when we relate the model proposed
here to that of chapter 2.
In chapter 2 we also introduced the following condition which appears in one
form or another in a majority of the literature on choice under uncertainty:
for instance it is the weak part of the “sure thing principle” in Savage (1972)
or “monotonicity” in Schmeidler (1989). We refer to it as weak the weak
sure-thing principle as this seems to be the most descriptive term available
whereas monotonicity is misleading and, like the “independence” condition, it
carries different meanings in different fields. The weak sure-thing principle is
akin to weak Pareto optimality as used in the literature on social choice: see
for instance Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984) or d’Aspremont and
Gevers (2002).
Definition (Weak sure-thing principle (WP)).
For all p in ∆ : if  pa ąs bq for all s P suppppq, then  pa ąp bq; equivalently,
p P Bab ñ Ds P suppppq : δs P Bab.
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An interesting example of where this condition fails to hold is provided in sec-
tion 5 of Shafir, Simonson and Tversky (1993).
If the decision maker finds conditions (s-Bą) and (WP) agreeable, then pref-
erences immediately have the property that for any given pair of alternatives
a, b P A, the sets Bab of contexts where strict preference holds for a over b are
connected. Before stating and proving this fact we recall the following notions
from topology: separation, connectedness, a path and path-connectedness.
Definition 3.2 (Munkres (2000) p164). A separation of a topological space
Z is a pair U, V of disjoint nonempty open sets of Z whose union is Z. The
space Z is said to be connected if there does not exist a separation of Z.
Definition 3.3 (Munkres (2000) p171). Given points p and q of a space Z,
a path in Z from p to q is a continuous map f : ra, bs ÝÑ Z of some closed
interval in the real line into Z, such that fpaq “ p and fpbq “ q. A space is
said to be path connected if every pair of points in Z can be joined by a path
in Z.
Proposition 3.1. If for all p P ∆, ąp is asymmetric and continuous, then
conditions (s-Bą) and (WP) together imply that for every a, b P A the set Bab
is a connected set.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary pair a, b in A. Note that if Bab ‰ H, then by condition
(WP): p P Bab implies that there exists s P suppppq such that δs P Bab. Thus
a ąs b. Then by condition (s-Bą), every p P Bab is connected to δs via a
straight-line path in ∆, rp, δss, in ∆. Finally, for every q P Bab the union of
rp, δss with rq, δss is also a path in ∆, so that Bab is path connected and hence
connected.
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In fact condition (s-Bą) in combination with (WP) implies much more than
connectedness of the sets tBabu. Indeed they imply that each of these sets is
star-shaped or, equivalently, star-convex with respect to every element of the
set
∆aąb :“ conv
`
tδs : δs P Babu
˘
“ tp P ∆ : for all s P suppppq, a ąs bu,
where this term is defined as follows.
Definition 3.4. In a vector space a set Z is called star-shaped or star-convex
if for all z P Z there exists x P Z such that convpz, xq Ă Z. The set of points
with respect to which Z is star-convex is called the convex kernel of Z.
The following theorem provides the definition of star-convexity we need.
Theorem 3.3 (Smith (1968)). In a vector space a set Z is star-shaped if and
only if the intersection of all the maximal convex sets of Z is nonempty.
The implications for strict preference of imposing conditions (s-Bą) and (WP)
in isolation of the other conditions are summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 3.2. Preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u satisfy conditions (s-Bą) and
(WP) if and only if for each a, b P A, the set Bab satisfies
(i) it is star-shaped and ∆aąb lies in its convex kernel;
(ii) Bab X∆bÁa is empty.
Remark 3.2. It is easy to see that because
∆bÁa : “ conv
`
tδs : δs P ∆zBabu
˘
“ tp P ∆ : for all s P suppppq, δs P ∆zBabu,
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condition (WP) is in fact equivalent to property (ii) in this proposition. More-
over, weakening (WP) to the condition “ p P Bab implies that there exists s P ∆
such that δs P Bab” would, in conjunction with (s-Bą), be equivalent to Bab
satisfying property (i) for all a, b P A.
As we will see in the proof to this proposition, the same argument that is
used to prove (i) shows that condition (s-WB) is equivalent to the property
that ∆zBab is star-convex with respect to ∆bÁa. This in turn implies that con-
dition (s-WB) is sufficient for condition (WP).
An alternative approach may be to define preferences only on the interior of
the simplex where all distributions assign positive probability to each and every
state. We intend to pursue this approach, which is also adopted in the model
of Hammond (1988), elsewhere.
Proof. (ñ (i)) First note that condition (WP) ensures that ∆aąb is nonempty
whenever Bab is. Second, we note that if p P ∆aąb, then conv
`
p,∆aąb
˘
is equal
to ∆aąb and has extremal points tδs : δs P Babu, and if not, then p is also
an extremal point. Thus we only prove that ∆aąb Ă Bab, as the proof of the
latter is identical, but for the additional notation to account for p not being
extremal in ∆. We do so by induction.
We appeal to the general property of simplices that for k ě 1, the k ´ 1-
simplices define the boundaries of the k-simplices. The set of extremal points
of ∆aąb, is the set of 0-subsimplices of ∆, are contained in Bab. We denote the
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1-simplices of ∆ as follows
t∆ps, tq : s, t P S, s ‰ t u.
To prove the basic case we note that for every pair of states s, t, since δs, δt P
Bab, condition (s-Bą) implies that convpδs, δtq ” ∆ps, tq is a subset of Bab .
The general case is proven by appealing to the induction hypothesis. That
is, if ∆k´1 Ă Bab for every (k-1)-face of ∆k, then the boundary of ∆k is con-
tained in Bab. Moreover, ∆k is a compact, convex subset of its affine hull, Rk,
and as a simplex, it contains an extremal point δs. We can therefore apply
claim (3.5)–stated and proved in the proof of proposition (3.3) at the end of
this section–together with condition (s-Bą) to show that every point in ∆k
is an element of Bab. The above argument implies that for every p P Bab,
convpp,∆aąb is a subset of Bab. In turn therefore, Bab is equal to
ď
pPBab
conv
`
p,∆aąb
˘
,
and so every maximal convex set in Bab is the union conv
`
p,∆aąb
˘
over p P C
for some C Ă Bab. Then since the set ∆aąb is nonempty and equal to
č
pPBab
conv
`
p,∆aąb
˘
,
We see that ∆aąb Ă C for every maximal convex set C Ă Bab. Theorem (3.3)
then completes the proof.
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(ð) If Bab is star-shaped with respect to every element of ∆aąb, then since
δs P ∆aąb for every δs P Bab, condition (s-Bą) is satisfied.
So far we have only studied the properties of Bab when preferences satisfy the
inter-context conditions (s-Bą) and (WP). If in addition preferences satisfy
(Asy.) and (C’ty), as defined in section (3.2), we arrive at the following non-
trivial property of context preferences.
Proposition 3.3. Conditions (Asy.), (C’ty), (s-Bą) and (WP) together imply
that for every a, b P A, the set Nab is a connected separator.
Although the property of connectedness may at first seem like a purely math-
ematical property of preferences that has little bearing on behaviour, it is in
fact an extremely useful and often intuitive property for context preferences
to have. Like continuity and convexity, connectedness is a property of the
way preferences vary with p; it is a minimal property of “togetherness” of the
direction of preference across contexts.
Connectedness is of course much weaker than convexity, and whilst convexity
in itself may not belong in a list of rationality conditions (Binmore 2009 p162),
it may be broken down into its intuitive and less intuitive parts. As a result
of the above results which provide a set of reasonable sufficient conditions for
connectedness of both Bab and Nab, we argue that the intuitive part is con-
nectedness and the less intuitive part is local-convexity. The latter is defined
as follows for any real or complex vector space V .
Definition 3.5 (Schoenberg 1941: local convexity (LC)). Let p P Z Ă V . The
set Z is said to be locally convex at p if there exists O in the topology of V
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containing p and Z X O is convex. The set Z is locally convex if it is locally
convex at all its points.
Convexity is implied by condition (p-SB) of chapter 2 and is obviously sufficient
for connectedness and local-convexity and the following theorem proves the
converse for the case where V is a normed vector space.
Theorem 3.4 (Schoenberg 1941, originally Tietze 1928). A closed and con-
nected set Z in V which is locally convex is also convex.
We now prove proposition (3.3).
Proof. Throughout this proof, without loss of generality, we fix a, b P A and
assume that H ‰ Bab ‰ ∆. This we can do because Wab “ Bba, and because
Nab is trivially connected whenever it is empty, and when it is equal to ∆ it is
connected because ∆ is a connected set, as indeed is any simplex.
In step (1) we show that there exists a unique maximal connected subset
(which called a component and is defined below) of ∆zBab, C 1 that contains
the set Wab 9Y∆a„b, where
∆a„b :“ conv
`
tδs : a „s bu
˘
.
We do so by considering the cases where Wab is empty and nonempty sepa-
rately. The latter is a particularly intricate step, for which we introduce some
concepts and theorems from topology.
In step (2), we show that ∆zC 1 is a subset of Bab, so that in fact Bab 9YC 1 “ ∆.
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This argument is an augmented version of the proof by induction of propo-
sition (3.2). It is significantly complicated by the fact that ∆zC 1 is not a
simplex. This step completes the proof for the case where Wab is empty, for
then C 1 “ Nab which, by construction, a connected set.
Finally, given the symmetry between Wab and Bab, we know that there ex-
ists a maximal connected subset of ∆zWab, C2 with the following properties:
by step (1) Bab 9Y∆a„b Ă C2; and by step (2), Wab 9YC2 “ ∆. This implies that
Nab :“ ∆z
`
Bab 9YWab
˘
“ C 1 X C2
contains the component subset of Nab that contains ∆a„b. The proof is then
completed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Under the conditions of proposition (3.3) suppose that Bab ‰
H ‰ Wab. If C 1 is the component of ∆zBab containing Wab and C2 is the
component of ∆zWab containing Bab, then C 1 X C2 is a connected subset of
Nab.
Proof. As Wab Ă C 1 and C 1 is closed, cl∆Wab is a subset of C 1. Since
Θ2 :“ bd∆ C2 Ă bd∆p∆zWabq “ bd∆Wab, we have Θ2 Ă C 1. We consider
the cases where Int∆ C
2 X C 1 is empty and nonempty separately.
If Int∆ C
2 X C 1 is empty, then C2 X C 1 “ bd∆ C2 X C 1 “ Θ2, and, by propo-
sition (3.6) in step (1) below, C2 X C 1 is connected. If not, then as we have
shown in step (2), ∆ “ Wab Y C2, and so Θ2 separates Wab from Int∆C2 in
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∆. Similarly, since
C 1 “ C 1 X pWab 9Y C2q
“Wab 9Y pC
1 X C2q
“Wab 9Y Θ
2
9Y pC 1 X Int∆C2q,
Θ2 separates Wab from Int∆ C2 X C 1. Then because each of C 1 and Θ2 are
connected sets, andWab is a component of C 1zΘ2, by theorem 5 of Kuratowski
p140, C 1zWab “ C 1 X C2 is connected.
Step 1. We first state the definition of a component and prove that it is
maximal and hence unique.
Definition 3.6 (cf. Munkres (2000) p175). Define an equivalence relation E
on Z, such that for all x, y in Z, x E y if and only if there does not exist a
separation U, V of Z with x P U and y P V . The equivalence classes of E
define the (connected) components of Z.
Remark 3.3. Let X Ă Z, where X is a connected set. Consider the union of
all connected subsets of Z that contain X, that is
pC :“ď
α
tCα Ă Z : X Ă Cα, Cα is connectedu.
As tCαu is a collection of connected subspaces of Z with X in common, theo-
rem 23.3 of Munkres (2000) implies that pC forms a connected set. This implies
that there exists no separation of this union, and so pC is contained in one of
the equivalence classes of the relation E in definition (3.6). Thus, there exists
a component C˚ of Z that contains pC.
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On the other hand, as C˚ is connected and it contains X, it must be a member
of the collection tCαu, so that C
˚ Ă pC. This shows that once we have identi-
fied a connected subset X of a set Z, the component containing X is uniquely
defined to be the largest set containing X. We will make much use of this
property in what follows.
We will also need the following proposition regarding the components of a
closed set.
Proposition 3.4. Let K be a closed subset of Z, and let O and P be a sepa-
ration of K. Then O and P are closed in Z. Equivalently, ZzO and ZzP are
elements of the topology TZ .
Proof of proposition 3.4. As O and P define a separation of K, O and P are
both open and closed in K with respect to the subspace topology
TK :“ tK X E : E P TZu.
Take the closure of O in Z, O¯ :“ O Y O1, where O1 is the set of limit points
of O in Z. Now since O is closed in K, O “ sO XK, and if O is not closed in
Z there exists a limit point p of O with p P sOzK. However since O Ă K and
p R K, by the definition of a limit point, every element of TZ which contains p
has nonempty intersection with K, so p is a limit point of K in the space Z:
a contradiction of the fact that K is closed in Z. Thus O is closed in Z.
Since O and P form a separation of K, neither contains any of the limit
points in Z of the other. Then as K “ OYP is closed in Z, KzO contains all
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its limit points in Z, and so P is closed.
Lemma 3.2. Under the conditions of proposition (3.3) let Wab “ H ‰ Bab ‰
∆. Then the simplex ∆a„b :“ conv
`
tδs : δs P Nabu
˘
is a nonempty connected
subset of Nab.
Proof. First note thatNab is nonempty because by assumption ∆zBab is nonempty
and a subset of Nab. Suppose by way of contradiction that Nab contains no
extremal points δ¨ of ∆. Then since Wab is empty, the set tδs : δs P Babu is
a subset of Bab. The induction proof of proposition (3.1) then implies that
∆ Ă Bab which is the desired contradiction. So the set ∆a„b is nonempty.
Now if p P ∆a„b then by definition, for all s P suppppq we have δs P Nab,
that is  pa ąs bq. Then by condition (WP), we see that  pa ąp bq, and be-
cause Wab is empty p P Nab. Moreover, as ∆a„b is a simplex in its own right,
it is connected.
Now by remark (3.3), in the case where Wab is empty, we may directly define
C 1 to be the component of ∆zBab that contains ∆a„b YWab.
Now for the case where Wab is nonempty. If both Bab and Wab are nonempty,
we first show that Bab and Wab are separated or disconnected. The following
definitions introduce some useful terminology that is used in other chapters of
this thesis.
Definition 3.7 (Kuratowski (1966) V.1 p58). X and Y , both nonempty sub-
sets of Z, are said to be separated or disconnected if
sX X Y “ H “ X X sY .
148
Definition 3.8. Let X, Y be subsets of Z. Suppose that for all separations
O,P of Z either X Ć O or Y Ć P . If, for some subset Γ of Z, there exists a
separation, O1, P 1 of ZzΓ with X Ă O1 and Y Ă P 1, then Γ is said to separate
or disconnect X from Y (as well as each Q Ă X from R Ă Y ). Equivalently,
X and Y are said to be separated by Γ.
Proposition 3.5. Let X and Y both be nonempty, disjoint, open and subsets
of the same component of Z. Then
(i) X and Y are separated sets,
(ii) ZzpX Y Y q separates X from Y .
(iii) For arbitrary x P X and y P Y , if there exists a path P px, yq in Z between
x and y, then P px, yq has nonempty intersection with ZzpX Y Y q.
Proof. (i) Since both X and Y are disjoint and open in Z, Y is a subset of
the set ZzX which, as the complement of an open subset of Z, is closed in
Z. Then since the closure of Y in Z is the smallest closed set containing Y ,
it is contained in ZzX . Thus X X clZ Y “ H. Similarly, Y X clZ X “ H.
Therefore, by definition (3.7), X and Y are separated.
(ii) The fact that X and Y are separated subsets of Z implies that neither
contains limit points of the other. This, by lemma 23.1 of Munkres (2000)
together with the fact that they are both nonempty, implies that they define
a separation of X Y Y . Then since X and Y lie in the same component of Z,
ZzpX Y Y q separates X from Y .
(iii) Suppose there exists x P X and y P Y such that a path P px, yq be-
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tween them lies in Z. Define Kx and Ky to be the components of X and Y
that contain x and y respectively. Now, contrary to part (iii) of this proposi-
tion, suppose in addition that P px, yq Ă X Y Y .
By definition 3.3, since such a path is homeomorphic to a closed interval in R,
it is connected. Then then since it contains x and Kx is a component, remark
(3.3) implies P px, yq is in fact a subset of Kx. By the same argument P px, yq
is also a subset of Ky, so that the definition of component implies that Kx is
in fact equal to Ky. If this true however, then XXY is nonempty and we have
derived a contradiction of the assumption that X and Y are disjoint.
By virtue of the asymmetry condition on preferences, Bab and Wab are both
disjoint, and by the continuity condition on preferences, they are both open.
Moreover, we are considering the case where they are both nonempty. If
we take Bab, Wab and the connected set ∆ to be X , Y and Z respectively,
then proposition (3.5) shows that Bab and Wab are separated sets, that Nab “
∆zpBab 9YWabq separates Bab from Wab.
In fact proposition (3.5) implies that Nab is nonempty whenever both Bab
and Wab are nonempty. We will now show that there exists a component of
Nab that separates Bab from Wab. We do this using a number of results and
definitions from Kuratowski (1966).
Definition 3.9. Two continuous functions f0 : X ÝÑ Y and f1 : X ÝÑ Y are
said to be homotopic (with respect to Y ), if there exists a continuous function
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of two variables h : X ˆ r0, 1s ÝÑ Y such that
hpx, 0q “ f0pxq and hpx, 1q “ f1pxq. (3.1)
Definition 3.10 (Based on Kuratowski (1966) V.2 p370). The space X is
said to be contractible with respect to the space Y if every continuous function
f : X ÝÑ Y is homotopic to a constant. That is homotopic to some function
g : X ÝÑ Y with gpxq “ c for all x P X.
A space X which is contractible with respect to itself is said to be contractible
in itself.
Definition 3.11. Let X Ă Y . If the continuous function f : X ÝÑ Y
is homotopic to the identity, i.e. if there exists a continuous function h :
X ˆ r0, 1s ÝÑ Y such that
hpx, 0q “ x and hpx, 1q “ fpxq, (3.2)
the set fpXq is said to be obtained from X by a deformation in Y (namely h is
that deformation). If fpXq “ c for some c P Y then Y is said to be deformable
to one point.
By theorem 2 of Kuratowski (1966) V.2 p374 a space is contractible in itself
if and only if it is deformable to one point. In this way, the following claim
shows that ∆ is contractible in itself.
Claim 3.3. A convex set Z is deformable to one point.
Proof. Choose an arbitrary point c in Z. Since Z is convex, for each x the
straight-line paths rc, xs are all contained in Z. Then define h : Zˆr0, 1s ÝÑ Z,
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such that hpx, tq takes values tc ` p1 ´ tqx for each px, tq P Z ˆ r0, 1s. This
function is clearly continuous in both x and t, and furthermore
hpx, 0q “ x and hpx, 1q “ c. (3.3)
By definition 3.11 therefore, Z is deformable to one point.
We are now ready to prove that every component of the complement in ∆ of
the open, connected set Bab has a connected boundary.
Proposition 3.6. Let Z be contractible in itself and Y be a connected set. If
X is a component of ZzY , then bdZ X is connected.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of theorem 6 of Ch.VIII section 57, II on
p437 together with theorem 9(i) of section 57, I on p435 both in Ch.VIII of
Kuratowski (1966) Vol.2.
Since Wab is connected, nonempty, and contained in the complement in ∆ of
the connected subset Bab, it is contained in some component of ∆zBab. Let
this component be denoted by C 1. Then by proposition (3.6), the boundary
of C 1 in ∆ is a connected set which we denote by Θ1.
Definition 3.12. Let Ξ denote the component of Nab that contains Θ1.
Claim 3.4. If Bab ‰ H ‰ Wab and Ξ is defined as in definition (3.12), then
for every t P S such that a „t b, δt lies in Ξ.
Proof. By the assumption that both Bab andWab are nonempty, open and dis-
joint we know, by proposition (3.5), that Nab is nonempty. In the case where
the set tt P S : a „t bu is empty, the claim is trivially true, so without loss of
generality, suppose this set is nonempty.
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Recall that Bab ‰ H ‰ Wab together with condition (WP) implies that both
the sets ts P S : a ąs bu and tu P S : b ąu au are nonempty. So consider any
triple s, t, u P S satisfying δs P Bab, δt P Nab and δu PWab.
Take the path P ps, t, uq :“ ∆ps, tq Y∆pt, uq that runs along the boundary of
the 2-simplex ∆ps, t, uq from δs to δu via δt. Recall that Θ :“ bd∆C separates
Int∆C from ∆zC. The fact that δs P Bab Ă ∆zC and δu P Wab Ă Int∆ C in
conjunction with part (iii) of proposition (3.5), implies that the path P ps, t, uq
has nonempty intersection with Θ.
Since Ξ is the component of Nab containing Θ, the proof will be complete if we
show thatNabXP ps, t, uq is connected, for this set will then contain both δt and
ΘXP ps, t, uq. To this end we define a homeomorphism f : r0, 1s ÝÑ P ps, t, uq
such that fp0q “ δs and fp1q “ δu, and an order ďf on P ps, t, uq such that for
all x, y P r0, 1s
x ď y ô fpxq ďf fpyq.
Define q to be the l.u.b. of Bab X∆ps, tq. Then δs ăf q by virtue of the fact
that BabX∆ps, tq contains δs and is open in ∆ps, tq. As δt P Nab and δu PWab,
condition (WP) implies that Bab X∆pt, uq is empty. Thus
Bab X P ps, t, uq “ Bab X∆ps, tq,
so that δt is an upper bound of Bab X P ps, t, uq and q ďf δt.
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Take p P Bab X ∆ps, tq arbitrarily close to q. Then since p P Bab, condition
(s-Bą) implies that all points r satisfying r ăf p lie in Bab. Thus if p ăf q
then p P Bab. Thus Bab X P ps, t, uq is a (connected) segment of ∆ps, tq.
By an identical argument to the previous paragraph conditions (WP) and (s-
Bą) together imply that Wab X P ps, t, uq is a (connected) segment of ∆pt, uq
with a g.l.b. q1 such that q1 ăf p implies p PWab. Then the definition of l.u.b.
and g.l.b. implies that every element p satisfying q ăf p ăf q
1 lies in neither
Bab nor Wab: thus p P Nab. Finally, the points q and q1 also lie in Nab because
Nab is closed, and therefore
P ps, t, uqzpBab YWabq ” P ps, t, uq XNab
is equal to the (connected) path P pq, q1q Ă P ps, t, uq.
As a result of this claim and lemma (3.2), we know that ∆a„b is a subset of
the component Ξ of Nab that contains the boundary of C 1, Θ1.
To complete step (1) of this proof it only remains to be shown that Ξ is a
subset of C 1. This follows because Θ1 lies in the intersection of Ξ and C 1, both
of which lie in the set ∆zBab. This implies, via theorem 23.3 of Munkres p.166,
that Ξ Y C 1 is a connected subset of ∆zBab, so that Ξ Ă C 1 because C 1 is a
component of ∆zBab. We summarize step (1) by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Under the conditions of proposition (3.3); for each a, b P A there
exists a component C 1 of the complement of Bab in ∆ such that
Wab 9Y∆a„b Ă C 1.
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Step (2) We recall that the purpose of step (2) is to prove that Bab 9YC
1 “ ∆,
or, equivalently, that
∆zC 1 Ă Bab.
To reduce notational clutter, in the remainder of the proof we simply refer to
the set C 1 as C.
Definition 3.13. Let C denote the component of ∆zBab that contains ∆a„bY
Wab and define D to be its complement in ∆zBab. That is
D :“ p∆zBabqzC.
Lemma 3.4. D is equal to NabzC, and if D is nonempty then Nab X C and
D form a separation of Nab.
Proof of lemma (3.4). Note that since neither C nor D contain elements of
Bab, and C contains Wab, any element of D must lie in NabzC. Conversely, if
p lies in NabzC, then since it is an element of Nab it lies in ∆zBab, and since it
does not lie in C, it must lie in D. Thus D “ NabzC.
Suppose D is nonempty. We first show that C and D form a separation
of ∆zBab. Since C and D are by definition disjoint with union equal to the
whole of ∆zBab, we only need to show that they are open in ∆zBab. Since C
is a component of ∆zBab it is both open and closed in this set. In this case,
its complement in ∆zBab, D, is also both open and closed in ∆zBab.
In the case that D is nonempty, the preceding paragraph shows that C and
D form a separation of ∆zBab. Now since ∆ is a connected set, by definition
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(3.8), Bab separates C from D. By the same definition, Bab also separates
Nab X C from Nab XD “ D. Thus Nab X C and D are separated sets whose
union is, by the first part of this lemma, equal to Nab. That is Nab X C and
D form a separation of Nab.
Lemma 3.5. If H ‰ Bab ‰ ∆, ∆aąb ” tp P ∆ : @s P suppppq, a ąs bu, and C
and D are defined as in definition 3.13, then there exists an open subset U of
∆, with the following properties:
(1) C Ă U , and
(2) rD :“ D Y∆aąb is contained in the complement of U in ∆.
Proof of lemma 3.5. By lemma (3.4), both C and D are closed. As ∆aąb is
a subsimplex of ∆, it contains its relative boundary and is a subset of ∆, so
that it is closed in ∆. By proposition (3.2) ∆aąb is also contained in Bab,
and so it is disjoint from C Ă ∆zBab. Hence, rD :“ D 9Y∆aąb, as the union of
two closed sets, is also closed and, moreover, rD has empty intersection with C.
By Theorem 32.3 of Munkres (2000) p218, every compact Hausdorff space
is normal, and thus ∆ is a normal space. This means means that there exists
a pair of disjoint open sets U, rU in ∆ such that C Ă U and rD Ă rU . Then,
since rU Ă ∆zU , rD Ă ∆zU .
Lemma 3.6. Suppose H ‰ Bab ‰ ∆; C, D are defined as in definition 3.13
and rD :“ DY∆aąb. Take U to be a set satisfying the properties of lemma 3.5,
then there exists a set, which we denote by V , with the following properties:
(1) V is open, contains C and its closure in ∆, sV , is a subset of U ;
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(2) the boundary of V in ∆, bd∆ V , is a subset of Bab, and
(3) rD is a subset of the interior of ∆zV relative to ∆.
In claim (iii), we have shown that C is closed in ∆, so that Lemma 31.1 (b)
of Munkres on p212 establishes (1). We now prove (2) and (3) for any set V
with property (1).
Proof of lemma 3.6. The complement of C in ∆zBab, which have denoted by
D, is a subset of ∆zU by lemma (3.5). By the same lemma, and the fact
that Wab is contained in C, UzC is a subset of Bab. This implies that sV , as
a subset of U , contains only elements of C and Bab. Then by part (1) of this
claim V is open in ∆, so that bd∆ V is a subset of ∆zV . Finally, as C Ă V ,
the intersection of C and bd∆ V is empty, and (2) is proven.
To prove (3) we first note that by lemma (3.5) rD is a subset of ∆zU , and by
part (1) of this lemma sV is a subset of the open set U , thus ∆zsV “ Intp∆zV q
contains ∆zU and the proof is complete.
We will now show that Q :“ ∆zV is a subset of Bab. Similar to the proof
of proposition (3.2), we do this by induction on the intersection of the unit
subsimplices of ∆ with Q. That is, we take ∆k to be an arbitrary k-subsimplex
of ∆, and we define
Qk :“ QX∆k ” ∆kzV, (3.4)
then the basis of the argument is that once we know that the relative boundary
of Qk is contained in Bab then we can apply condition (s-Bą) together with
claim (3.6) in the appendix to show that the whole of Qk lies in Bab. To
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this end, the following lemma provides a useful decomposition of the relative
boundary.
Lemma 3.7. If X Ă Y Ă Z and Y is closed in Z, then the closure of X in
Y is equal to the closure of X in Z, and furthermore
bdZ X “ bdY X Y
`
X X bdZ Y
˘
. (3.5)
Proof of lemma 3.7. To see that clY pXq “ clZpXq, we first note that clY pXq Ă
clZpXq simply because Y is a subset of Z. For the reverse inclusion, we note
that all the limit points of X in Z are contained in clY pXq because Y is closed
in Z and it contains X .
To show that equation (3.5) holds, we first note that by the definition of the
boundary and basic set theory we have
bdZ X :“ X X clZpZzXq
“ X X clZpY Y ZzY qzXq
“ X X clZpY zX Y pZzY qzXq
where pZzY qzX “ ZzY as X Ă Y . Then since the closure of a finite union is
equal to the finite union of the closures,
bdZ X “
`
X X clZpY zXq
˘
Y
`
X X clZpZzY q
˘
(3.6)
Then since Y zX Ă Y we may apply the result of the first part of this lemma
to the first term of the union in equation 3.6, and use the fact that X “ XXY
158
to complete the proof. That is
bdZ X “
`
X X clY pY zXq
˘
Y
`
X X pY X clZpZzY q
˘
,
where the first term in the union is equal to bdY X and the second term is
equal to bdZ
`
X X bdZ Y
˘
.
Part (3) of lemma (3.6) shows that Q has nonempty interior relative to ∆,
so that the affine hull of ∆ and Q are the same. A similar statement can be
made for all the k-subsimplices of ∆ that have nonempty intersection with the
interior of Q. These are precisely the subsimplices that are either subsets of
∆aąb, or that have at least one extremal element δs in Bab and at least one
other δt in ∆zBab “ NabYWab. All other subsimplices lie in ∆a„bY∆bąa, and
are therefore wholly contained in C, so that they do not intersect Q. Let ∆k
be an arbitrary k-subsimplex of ∆ and endow ∆k with the subspace topology,
then Qk :“ Q X ∆k has the same affine hull as ∆k whenever H ‰ Qk. We
denote this space by K, for in this case the relative interiors of both Qk and
∆k are homeomorphic to a k-dimensional open subset of Rk.
Since Qk Ă ∆k Ă K, lemma (3.7) shows that the boundary of Qk in K
can be decomposed into the following union where bdk denotes the boundary
of a set with respect to K:
bdK Qk “ bd∆k Qk Y
`
Qk X bdK ∆k
˘
. (3.7)
The next lemma shows that the first term in the above union lies in Bab.
Lemma 3.8. Let Qk be defined as in equation (3.4). Then bd∆k Qk is a subset
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of Bab.
Proof. Recall that Qk :“ Q X ∆k. By part (1) of lemma (3.6) Q :“ ∆zV is
the complement of an open set in ∆, and as such it is closed in ∆. Then since
∆k is endowed with the subspace topology, QX∆k is closed in ∆k. Thus
bd∆kpQkq :“
`
QX∆k
˘
X cl∆k
`
∆kzpQX∆kq
˘
“
`
QX∆k
˘
X cl∆k
`
p∆kzQq YH
˘
(3.8)
Then since ∆kXQ Ă ∆k Ă ∆ and ∆k is closed in ∆, lemma (3.7) implies that
cl∆kp∆kzQq “ cl∆p∆kzQq.
Then substituting ∆ for ∆k in equation (3.8), we obtain the following inclusion:
bd∆kpQkq Ă
`
QX∆
˘
X cl∆
`
∆zQ
˘
,
where the right-hand-side is of course the definition of bd∆Q. Then by lemma
(3.6), this set is contained in Bab.
It remains to be shown that the second term of the union in equation (3.7),
QkXbdk∆k, lies in Bab. First we note that because ∆k is closed in K, bdk∆k
is a subset of ∆k, and so
Qk X bdk∆k :“ pQX∆kq X bdk∆k “ Q X bdk∆k.
We will show this by an induction argument on the subsimplices of ∆.
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We note that because the boundary of a k-dimensional unit simplex is the
union of its (k–1)-dimensional faces, we have
Qk X bdk∆k “
ď
l
 
QX∆l : l “ k ´ 1, ∆l Ă ∆k
(
.
As all the 0-simplices in Q are contained in Bab, if Q X ∆k “ ∆k, then
Qk X bdk∆k contains all its extremal measures, and by condition (s-Bą) on
preferences it is a subset of Bab. If on the other hand Q X∆k ‰ ∆k, then ∆k
has at least one 0-simplex in Bab and at least one other in ∆zBab.
Consider an arbitrary 1-subsimplex, ∆ps, tq, of ∆ with δs P Bab and δt P ∆zBab.
∆ps, tq is a compact convex subset of its 1-dimensional affine hull, and δs is an
extremal point of ∆ps, tq, which we treat as the point u of claims (3.5), (3.6)
and (3.7) in the appendix to this chapter. Under the induced order ďf on
∆ps, tq, δs and δt are defined to be the g.l.b and l.u.b. of ∆ps, tq, respectively.
Moreover, as Q is closed, QX∆ps, tq is a closed subset of ∆ps, tq, and the l.u.b.
Q X∆ps, tq, which we denote by p satisfies p ăf δt as δt P V . Thus, by claim
3.7 of the appendix to this chapter, p P bd∆Q Ă Bab. So that in fact every
point of QX∆ps, tq is an element of Bab.
The proof of the general case is completed via the induction hypothesis. That
is, suppose the intersection of every (k-1)-subsimplex of ∆ with Q lies in Bab.
Then for every k-subsimplex of ∆, ∆k, Qk X bdk∆k Ă Bab, so that the whole
of the relative boundary of Q X∆k is contained in Bab. Then by claim (3.6)
of the appendix to this chapter and condition (s-Bą), the whole of QX∆k is
a subset of Bab.
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We have therefore shown that Q X ∆ “ Q Ă Bab, so that D has empty
intersection with Q “ ∆zV . Recalling that V XD is also empty, we see that
D is in fact empty, so that C Y Bab “ ∆ and the only component of ∆zBab is
C.
3.4 Summary of results
The following theorem summarizes the results of this chapter in the form of
an equivalence between conditions on preferences and properties of the repre-
sentation of preferences.
Theorem 3.5. The following two statements are equivalent.
1) Context preferences tpA,ąpq : p P ∆u satisfy the conditions (Asy.),
(C’ty), (s-B) and (NT) .
2) Context preferences have a continuous, ordinal utility representation with
the following properties: for all a, b in A
i) tp : Upa, pq “ Upb, pqu is a connected separator containing ∆a„b ;
ii) tp : Upa, pq ą Upb, pqu is star-convex w.r.t. ∆aąb, and its comple-
ment is star-convex w.r.t ∆bÁa .
Imposing conditions (T) and (LC) (thinness and local convexity of the no-
strict-preference relation) would give rise to a choice of representation type.
The first being the expected preference representation of chapter (2) and the
second being a utility function of the form presented in this chapter which is
non-linear in contexts. Going further, and imposing the diversity conditions
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(Div.) of that chapter would give rise to an expected utility representation as
an alternative to that of the present chapter.
Finally we note that although the results of this and the last section hold
for probability simplices of countable dimension, we have not assumed that ∆
is a metric space. Instead we have used a more general approach and relied
upon results that are contained in the following appendix.
3.5 Appendix
If E is a topological vector space over R (with the Hausdorff property). Then
the affine hull P of any two distinct points v1, w1 of E is a well defined 1-
dimensional subset of E. Indeed we can define a homeomorphism between P
and R in the following way: for all x P R, let fpxq “ xw1 ` p1´ xqv1, so that
the image of f is indeed the affine hull of v and w, and it is clearly one-to-one
with fp0q “ v1 and fp1q “ w1. Moreover, if we define the order ďf such that
for all x, y P R we have
x ď y ô fpxq ďf fpyq
then f is an order isomorphism between pR;ďq andpP ;ďfq, and as such every
subset of P has a least upper bound (lub) and a greatest lower bound (glb)
under ďf .
Let Z be a compact, convex subset of E with cardinality greater than two.
Define Qu :“ tPα :“ txα ` p1 ´ xqu : x P Ru : α P Zu to be the collection of
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affine hulls through pairs of points of Z, such that for every pair, one element
of the pair is the point u. We define u to be an extremal point of Z if for
every Pα in Qu, u is the glb of Pα X Z. Thus, by definition, if u is an ex-
tremal point of Z, then for an arbitrary element Pα of Qu with f : R ÝÑ Pα,
fpxq :“ xα ` p1´ xqu, then u ďf v for all v in Pα X Z.
Claim 3.5. If u is an extremal point of the compact, convex set with cardinality
greater than two, Z, then it lies in the boundary of Z relative to its affine hull
(henceforth we refer to this as its relative boundary). Moreover, for every
P P Qu, the lub of P XZ lies in the relative boundary of Z, and P XZ is order
homeomorphic to a compact interval in R.
Proof. Suppose not. Take an arbitrary element P of Qu generated by u and
α. Then either u P P zZ or u P W :“ P X ripZq, where rip¨q denotes the
interior of a set relative to its affine hull (its relative interior). Since both P
and Z are closed subsets of E, P X Z is a closed subset of Z. This implies
that P XZ is compact (Munkres 2000 p181). Then by the extreme value the-
orem (Munkres 2000 p190) there exists a points v1 and w1 in P X Z such that
f´1pv1q ď f´1pu1q ď f´1pw1q for every u1 P P X Z. This implies that v1 ďf u1
for every u1 P P X Z, so that v1 “ u and u is therefore an element of P X Z.
Therefore u is an element of W .
The extreme value theorem also implies that P X Z contains its lub which
we denote by v. Since both P and Z are convex, so is P X Z. Thus P X Z
is a compact convex set, and it therefore contains every point u1 such that
u ďf u
1 ďf v lies in P X Z. This implies that 1 “ f´1pαq ď f´1pvq “: y, and
by compactness there exists w P P such that v ďf w so that y ă 8. Thus
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for all u1 P P X Z, 0 “ f´1puq ă f´1pu1q ď f´1pvq “ y. In other words, there
exists a compact interval r0, ys that is homeomorphic to P X Z.
If v P W :“ ripZq X P , since ripZq is open in Z and P X Z is a subspace
of P , W is open in P and strictly contained in P X Z. Thus f´1pW q is
open in R and strictly contained in r0, ys. If z is the supremum of f´1pW q,
then z cannot be contained in f´1pW q, for there would exist ǫ ą 0 such that
z ` ǫ P f´1pW q and z ă z ` ǫ. Thus z R f´1pW q, so that x ă z for every
x P f´1pW q; however if this true y ă z so that z R P X Z. The same proof
shows that u lies in the relative boundary of Z.
We now make a suitable extension of this result to arbitrary closed subsets of
Z.
Claim 3.6. Let E, Z, Qu and u be defined as above. If K is a closed subset
of Z then every element α of K lies in a set P X Z for some P P Qu, and
the extremal point u is a lower bound for the set P XK. Moreover, the lub of
P XK is contained in the relative boundary of K.
Proof. The definition of Qu is such that every point in Z and therefore a
fortiriori K, is contained in the intersection of Z with some affine hull P P Q.
Fix a point α P K. As K is a closed subset of Z, and the latter is compact,
K is also compact. Similarly, P X K is compact and by the extreme value
theorem, it contains both its glb and its lub, and we denote these by v and w,
respectively. Since v P P XK Ă P X Z, u ďf v and thus u is a lower bound
for P XK. Then by an identical argument to the preceding claim, we see that
w is an element of the relative boundary of K.
We will need a slightly stronger result in what follows.
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Claim 3.7. If suppP XKq ‰ suppP XZq, then the least upper bound of P XK
is an element of bdZ K, the boundary of K relative to Z.
The intuition behind this claim is that the relative boundary of K is not in
general equal to the boundary of K relative to Z. The case where they are
not equal is where K intersects the relative boundary of Z, so that part of the
relative boundary of K is contained in the interior of K in the topology of Z.
Proof. If k :“ suppP XKq ‰ z :“ suppP X Zq, then k ăf z as K is a subset
of Z. By claims (3.5) and (3.6), k is an element of the closed set P XK and
z P pP zKq X Z “ pP X ZqzKq. Since P X Z is isomorphic to r0, ys for some
0 ă y ă 8, with f´1pzq “ y, if we define x :“ f´1pkq, then px, ys is open in
r0, ys and contained inW :“ f´1ppPXZqzKq. Moreover, since x P f´1pPXKq,
x separates px, ys from W zpx, ys. Then by continuity of f´1 and the fact that
connectedness is a topological property, fprx, ysq “ clP fppx, ysq and it is a
closed component of clP ppP X ZqzKq. Thus k is an element of the set
`
pP X Zq XK
˘
X clP ppP X ZqzKqq Ă
`
Z XK
˘
X clZpZzKqq (3.9)
” bdZ K
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Chapter 4
Extending preferences to
contexts
4.1 Introduction
When a decision-maker sees no benefit to fooling her opponent in a game,
she presumably sees no reason to define her preferences over her own mixed
strategies. Yet if the decision-maker is to be modeled using a von Neumann–
Morgenstern (1944) (henceforth [vNM]) expected utility function, or one of the
generalizations we discuss in more detail below, this is what she is required to
do.
There are models, such as that of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) [GS] and
chapter 2 of this thesis, which address this concern by reducing the domain
of preferences to be the set of alternatives (pure actions) that are available to
the decision-maker. In this case, preferences are indexed by the set of possi-
ble beliefs the decision-maker has regarding her opponent’s move. Whilst this
167
approach certainly addresses the issue concerning preferences over own mixed
strategies, it also introduces new difficulties.
In particular, if preferences are to be represented by an expected utility func-
tion, they must satisfy a diversity condition. In [GS], this condition says that
for every set of four alternatives available to the decision-maker, and each
possible strict ordering of the four alternatives (there are 4! “ 24 of these),
there exists a context such that preferences agree with that ranking. These
diversity conditions are not only unnecessary for an expected utility repre-
sentation, they are also strong enough to exclude the majority of possible
decision-makers. Even the improvements we have made in chapter 2 exclude
all possible preferences when |S| “ 2 and |A| ě 3, as well as very reasonable
preferences that are not quite diverse enough.
Moreover, there appears to be no intuitive conditions on preferences that will
resolve this issue unless, as in Chapter 3, we are willing to forego the integral
representation and settle for an ordinal representation with connectedness and
star-convexity replacing convexity. In this case, conditions such as diversity are
superfluous. Whilst such representations are much more general and thereby
capture a far wider variety of behavior, they face two drawbacks. The first
is that the mathematical tools available for sums and integrals are sometimes
indispensable for the application at hand. The second is that convexity gives
us global properties of the utility function over context space, and this means
we can elicit a utility function precisely with a relatively small amount of data.
It seems natural therefore to seek to identify a minimal extension of pref-
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erences that allows us to obtain an expected utility function without recourse
to a diversity condition on preferences. I show that it suffices to define pref-
erences over alternative-context pairs. The results are obtained in the setting
where, for each alternative, the contexts are a mixture space. This latter con-
cept was introduced in the classic paper of Herstein and Milnor (1953) [HM].
This added level of generality provides a common theoretical framework with
which to model a variety of decision problems that are not special cases of the
canonical example studied throughout this thesis. Two of these are discussed
at the end of the chapter: state-dependent preferences and the model of Karni
and Safra (2000) and the Allais paradox. For the latter, the set of mixture
spaces need not be exogenously defined. Indeed, perhaps the main contribu-
tion of this chapter is to make progress toward removing this extra-behavioural
condition that is present in all the models of which I am aware.
4.1.1 Two motivating examples
The first class of problems that is well suited to the model I present in this
chapter is where the decision-maker’s “opponent” is nature. Moreover,
(i) she knows she will face a choice in the presence of uncertainty about the
future state of nature;
(ii) she knows, that when the situation arises, she will have knowledge of the
context she is in (for instance, she will know the likelihood of any given
state of nature);
(iii) given a context, she knows her preference for one alternative over an-
other;
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(iv) given a particular course of action, she knows which context she would
rather be in;
(v) building upon (iii) and (iv), she is willing to go further and make state-
ments of the form “I prefer to choose alternative a when in context p,
than to choose alternative b when in context q”.1
Although (ii) of this list is arguably a strong assumption for the class of ex-
amples of this chapter, I will simply take it as given and accept it as a topic
for future research without further discussion.
Example 4.1. Consider a planner who is devising a complete, contingent plan
of how to respond to the future threat of a flood. There are two states (flood and
no-flood) and there are two alternatives: do nothing or evacuate. Crucially,
the contingencies are defined to be the set of possible probability distributions
over states, not the states that may subsequently obtain. The idea being that,
when the time comes, the action should be carried out without question.
In this example, the planner should have no reason to consider mixtures over
her set of alternatives: there is no obvious benefit to doing so. The situation is
different from a game against a strategic opponent, such as rock-paper-scissors,
where being predictable carries a cost. As Rubinstein (2000) and [GS] high-
light, data on players’ preferences over mixed strategies may be unreliable as it
is not clear whether observable, pure actions of the player are part of a grand
mixed strategy. If this hypothesis is true in games against other players, it is
1In this chapter we take this statement to be equivalent to “I prefer to be in context p
when choosing alternative a, than to be in context q when choosing alternative b”. Also,
note that the above statement is a preference over verbs or actions each coupled with a
context and seems both closer to our standard use of language and more accurate in its
meaning than “I prefer alternative a in context p over alternative b in context q”.
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even more true in games that are “against nature”.
On the other hand, there is good reason for the planner to consider each
possible contingency (context) and, given this, say whether she would evacu-
ate or not. It is not too much more to ask her to state her preferences over
contingencies given a choice of alternative. This suggests that (iii) and (iv)
are reasonable assumptions in the flood example.
This leaves (v). Now the planner needs to be willing to make statements
of the form “I prefer to announce evacuate when the probability of flooding
is 1
2
than to make no announcement when the probability of flooding is 1
4
”.
Whilst there is no doubt that this is more demanding, it is worthwhile putting
it into perspective by considering the following class of statements “I prefer
to announce evacuate with probability 1
2
when the probability of flooding is
1
2
than to evacuate with probability 1
4
when the probability of flooding is 1
4
”.
The latter type of statement is necessary if we wish to apply the benchmark
[vNM] model of expected utility.
In fact the [vNM] model requires quite a bit more than this. It requires that
the decision-maker is willing to make preference statements about any pair
of probability distributions over the set of four outcomes defined by taking
the product of the set of alternatives with the product of the set of states:
(d,n)”(do nothing, no flood), (d,f)”(do nothing, flood), (e,n)”(evacuate, no
flood) and (e,f)”(evacuate, flood).
This space of lotteries contains probability distributions where the (joint)
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probability of the outcome (evacuate, flood) is not equal to the product of
the marginal probabilities. Let δx denote the probability measure assigning
probability one to outcome x and consider the following lottery:
1
2
δpd,nq ` 14 δpd,fq `
1
4
δpe,nq.
For outcome pd, nq to occur with probability 1
2
, it seems reasonable to as-
sume, that in the absence of mischievous deities, there is a positive probability
that the central planner chooses “do nothing” and a positive probability that
“flood” occurs. Similarly, for pe, nq to occur with probability 1
4
, the planner
ought to be choosing “evacuate” with positive probability. However, by taking
the product of the marginal probabilities of evacuate and flood, outcome (e,f)
occurs with positive probability. Now this can’t be because the sum of 1
2
, 1
4
and 1
4
is 1.
Even so, suppose the planner was willing to entertain the possibility of her
strategies somehow being correlated with those of nature’s; would she be will-
ing to say whether she preferred the above lottery to
7
16
δpd,nq ` 316 δpd,fq `
1
16
δpe,nq ` 516 δpe,fq ?
It seems that a simple but challenging decision problem has been turned into
a complicated problem that is even more challenging. The difficulty is that
to define preferences over the space of lotteries on A ˆ S, where A is the set
of alternatives and S is the set of states, is to define preferences over the 3-
dimensional unit simplex ∆pAˆ Sq in R4. This adds considerable complexity
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to the decision problem.
One solution to this latter difficulty is to use the multilinear expected util-
ity model of Fishburn (1980). This model allows us to define preferences on
the product of unit-simplices ∆pAqˆ∆pSq “ r0, 1sˆ r0, 1s. It therefore allows
the decision-maker to avoid defining her preferences on the strange lotteries
described above. However, it still requires that the decision-maker define her
preferences over her own mixed strategies. As a result, the conditions on pref-
erences that Fishburn imposes are more numerous and more complicated than
the model of this chapter.
Instead, I propose to define a simple model of preferences over the product
Aˆ∆pSq. In the above example this amounts to two copies of the unit inter-
val. Aside from the intuitive appeal in decision problems like the flood example
above, the advantage to defining preferences on a smaller space, in terms of the
complexity of eliciting a utility function may be significant in real-life complex
decision problems such as those studied by computer scientists like Braziunas
and Boutilier (2010).
In order to show that the present model is not restricted to choice under
risk/ uncertainty, I now present a second example where the space of contexts
need not be the set of probability distributions over states. It serves to moti-
vate the concept of a mixture space which is defined formally below. For now
it suffices to think of it as a suitable generalization of a convex space in which
the operation of taking mixtures is defined.
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Example 4.2. Consider a customer in a restaurant choosing a meal with the
assistance of a waiter. The menu defines a finite set of alternatives, and there
are a continuum of possibilities for each dish: how well the flavors of the main
ingredients combine, the degree to which the food will be cooked, the quantity of
salt it will contain, etc. Suppose that the waiter is able to describe the context
space as precisely as the customer wishes.
Given the choice of a particular item on the menu, the customer may well be
willing to state her preferences over the possible contexts, thus (iv) may be
reasonable enough here. She may also be willing to make statements of the
form: “I prefer the carrot soup with a table spoon and a half of cream, to the
tomato salad with one quarter of an onion in it.”
On the other hand, it is unclear that the decision-maker would be comfortable
defining her preferences over mixtures of “soup” and “salad”, even if by mix-
ture we did mean probability mixtures. Presumably the only situation where
she might even consider such alternatives is when she is unsure of what to do
and flips a coin to break the tie. (So Fishburn’s multilinear model, which also
holds for mixture spaces, is arguably inappropriate here.) As above, to define
preferences on a single mixture space, we must go even further: either assume
the decision-maker considers lotteries over the product of the alternative space
with the space of contexts; or allow for a continuum of portion sizes for all
items, and expand the menu to include mixtures of all possible ingredients,
cooking styles etc.
At this point it is natural to question the need for introducing any of the
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above strange considerations to the decision problem. The answer is that
we are often interested in representing preferences with a utility function for
which numerical values have meaning in same sense that temperature values
do. That is given a choice of scale and origin, say, Celsius, we can speak of
temperature as a number. Moreover, if someone else uses another scale and
origin, such as Fahrenheit, their statements are meaningful to us because we
know the affine transformation that converts one to the other.2
In game theory for instance the starting point is to specify a given player’s
“pay-offs” as numbers. [vNM] showed that this is a reasonable starting point
provided preferences are defined on the set of probability distributions (or
lotteries) over the outcomes of the game, and provided certain conditions on
preferences apply. In this case, the player’s payoffs are unique up to a common
scale and origin (a positive affine transformation).
For the customer in the restaurant example, where lotteries may play no part,
if we seek such a utility representation, we must appeal to the generalization
of [vNM] by [HM]. They define preferences over a mixture space and impose
very similar conditions on preferences to those of [vNM]. Their representation
is also unique up to a positive affine transformation, and so utility units in
their model are meaningful.
4.1.2 Synopsis and outline
The main purpose of the present chapter is to pin down the minimal conditions
on preferences that extend [HM] (and hence [vNM]) to the setting where there
2The analogy is not so good if we consider Kelvin as this has a fixed origin.
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is more than one mixture space and provide a precise characterization of the
utility function.
The model of Karni and Safra (2000) (henceforth [KS]) comes closest to the
present class of problems. There are two reasons why I choose to build a
new model. The first is that they introduce additional structure on the space
on which preferences are defined. This structure is not needed to make the
extension of [vNM] and [HM] to the general setting where mixtures are not
everywhere defined. I apply the model of the present chapter to the space
they define in section (4.4.1). Second, they impose conditions on preferences
that are have no counterpart in the original models of [vNM] and [HM], and
are specific to the space on which they define preferences. This means that
the representation in this chapter is therefore both simpler and more general
than [KS] and the related paper of Karni (2009). Correspondingly, it is less
straightforward to obtain, and the length of the derivation in section (4.3)
testifies to this.3
What distinguishes the utility function of this chapter from that of [vNM],
[HM], Fishburn (1980), [KS], but also the “state-dependent” utility models, is
the extent to which utility is numerically comparable over the domain of pref-
erences. (In “state-dependent” utility models (eg. Dre´ze (1961)), comparing
utility numbers across states is meaningless, for there is an independent scale
and origin to utility for each state. It is the polar opposite of [vNM] and the
3Moreover, the relevant result in that paper contains two mistakes. The first is their
claim that the utility function is unique up to a common scale but not a common origin.
As Karni (2009) points out and amends, it is in fact unique up to a positive affine transfor-
mation. The second mistake is also present in Karni (2009) and a counterexample to their
claim is presented in section (4.4.1) below.
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other models we have discussed.)
In the model of this chapter there is a spectrum of possibilities. For some
decision-makers, utility is numerically comparable across mixture spaces in
the sense that the utility function is, to use the terminology of Karni (2009),
unique up to a positive affine transformation that applies uniformly across
the domain (i.e. utility is cardinally measurable and fully comparable across
the domain (CFC)). For others, the utility function will only be CFC within
certain subsets of its domain. If such a subset is maximal, in the sense that it
is the largest subset for which numerical utility comparisons are possible, we
will call it a quasi-component of preferences.4 Across quasi-components, only
ordinal utility comparisons are meaningful.
Such concepts may at first sight seem irrelevant to decision-making. How-
ever the essential idea is that when, regardless of context, one alternative is
obviously better than another, it may be that the decision-maker has no need
for the high resolution measurement scale that [vNM] require. For other pairs
of alternatives, the [vNM] model may be natural. The issue bears resemblance
to the way that one does not typically need scales to decide whether the typical
toddler is lighter than the typical adult, but periodically, we do need precise
scales to measure whether our own weight has increased or decreased.
An application of such reasoning may help to explain the Allais Paradox.
is provided in section (4.4.2), the final section of this chapter, where I will
4This terminology is related to the concept of a component in topology. These sets
resemble components in some ways, but since they may contain limit points of other quasi-
components, we have chosen this terminology.
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argue that, when preferences are incompletely defined on the space of lotteries
over monetary outcomes, preferences that accord to the Allais paradox are
straightforwardly captured by a mixture-preserving utility function that is not
defined over the entire simplex of lotteries. This application also highlights
the fact that in general the set A need not index alternatives, it may index
the members of a union of subsets of a single simplex.
The next section presents the conditions we impose upon preferences, the
mixture space as well as the space of alternatives. Following this, in section
(4.3) the two main representations are derived, the first generalizes the model
of [HM], and the second the model of [vNM].5
The chapter then concludes with two applications of the model. The first,
in section (4.4.1) makes precise the differences between our model and that of
[KS] and shows how state-dependent preference can hold despite utility being
CFC across states. I then conclude in section (4.4.2) with the application to
the Allais Paradox.
4.2 Limitations of the model
To keep the notation as simple as possible, I assume that the space of contexts,
M, is the same for all the elements of A, which we will refer to simply as
alternatives. MoreoverM is a mixture space, which is defined in the following
way:
5Although great care has been taken to define every new concept and explain each step
in the proofs, the derivation is rather technical. Hence, I suggest that non-specialists first
read the following section, which makes precise the limitations of the model, and continue
reading near the end of section (4.3) where the representations are to be found.
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Definition 4.1 (Mixture set ). A set M is said to be a mixture set (or space)
if for any x, y P M and any λ, we can associate another element, which we
write as either λx` p1´ λqy or xλ y, which is again in M, and where
(1) xλx “ x
(2) xλy “ yp1´ λqx
(3) pxλyqµy “ xpλµqy .
A mixture space is more general than a simplex. As Mongin (2001) shows, a
mixture space needn’t even be isomorphic to convex subset of a vector space.
Even so, the following pair of examples shows that it is not general enough to
include spaces such as A ˆM, where A is a general set of alternatives. The
issue is of course that the mixture operation need not be defined on the whole
of AˆM.
Example. Let A “ ta, bu. Let pa, pq be an element of tau ˆM and y “ pb, pq
an element of tbu ˆM. Clearly, there is no λ P r0, 1s other than 0 and 1 such
that xλy lies in A ˆM.
Example. If A is the set of rational numbers the set A ˆM is neither a
mixture space, nor a product of mixture spaces. For if we are to take the
interval r0, 1s, then 0 ă 1?
2
ă 1 is not rational. Neither therefore is p 1?
2
, pq P
AˆM for any p PM.
Note that the set we study can also be written as a union as follows
AˆM ”
ď
aPA
`
tau ˆM
˘
.
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Unlike [HM], I will assume that the mixture space M is endowed with a
topology, and that, under this topology, it is compact. This, together with
the conditions I impose on preferences, as I show below, is sufficient for the
existence of a greatest lower bound (glb) and least upper bound (lub) of M
under the order that preferences define for each alternative b P A.
This is an important simplification that makes the proofs more straightfor-
ward. Further research is required to prove that this condition can be weak-
ened so as to have a representation for a union of general mixture spaces.6
Nonetheless, it still allows for a wide range of context spaces as the following
example highlights.
Example 4.3. For an arbitrary set S, r0, 1sS is, by the Tychonov theorem,
compact in the product topology. Now since ∆pSq, is a closed subset of r0, 1sS,
by theorem 26.2 of Munkres p.181 ∆pSq is also compact, and since it is convex,
it is a mixture space and thus a valid space of contexts for the results that follow.
Unless otherwise stated, the space of alternatives will be assumed to be finite.
Where possible my proofs are written so that they would also apply to the
countably infinite case. Preliminary research into the latter shows that it is
somewhat more complicated, and that to progress we will need to make slight
alterations to some of the concepts we introduce. For the case where A is un-
countable, it is clear that further conditions on preferences will be needed. The
reason being that there can only be countably many disjoint intervals (with
nonempty interior) in R, whereas in general preferences may lexicographically
order elements of A ˆM in the sense that for each a, b P A, either pa, pq is
6Although these results are not presented here, my current efforts appear to show that,
for a topological mixture space at least, this should be possible.
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strictly better than pb, qq for all p, q P M, or the reverse strict preference for
all p, q PM, so that any representation of such preferences will need to map
into the same number of disjoint intervals as the cardinality of A.
For any given x, y P A ˆM, we take the statement “y is weakly preferred
to x” to be equivalent to x À y.7 The conditions on the relation À that will
be needed are defined as follows.
Definition (Complete pre-order (O)).
For all x, y, z P AˆM, both the following hold:
(i) (Completeness) x À y or y À x, and
(ii) (Transitivity) if x À y and y À z, then x À z.
Definition (Continuity (C’ty)).
For all x, y P A ˆM, the following sets are closed:
ty P AˆM : y À xu, and ty P AˆM : x À yu
When the decision-maker makes a preference statement comparing different
contexts p, q PM, given that she is choosing a particular alternative b P A, I
will use the shorthand p Àb q and understand it to be the same statement as
pb, pq À pb, qq.
Definition ([vNM). Independence on each mixture space (I)]
For any b P A, and any p, q, r PM if p „b q, then
p1
2
r „b q
1
2
r.
7This notation is used by Fishburn (1979) and Binmore (2009). I believe it to be easier
to read in the present setting due to the fact that our proof often deals with “intervals”
defined by preferences.
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Condition (I) is stated in the form that [HM] introduced in their paper. The
first part of that paper is dedicated to showing that this implies the more
familiar form that [vNM] introduced, where the condition in (I) holds not only
for λ “ 1
2
, but for all λ P r0, 1s. The following condition is to my knowledge
new, and it is the condition that as I now show generalizes condition (I).
Definition (Congruent betweenness (CB)).
For any b, c P A, p, q, p1, q1 PM, if both pb, pq „ pc, qq and pb, p1q „ pc, q1q then
pb, p1
2
p1q „ pc, q 1
2
q1q.
Clearly if the cardinality of A is one, then condition (CB) is implied by con-
dition (I) and transitivity; since (I) implies that whenever p „b q and p
1 „b q1
we have
p1
2
p1 „b q 12p
1 „b q 12q
1,
and transitivity ensures that that indecisiveness propagates. In fact, by taking
p “ q and b “ c in the definition of (CB), we see that, because p “ q implies
p „b q, (CB) implies (I). Thus, when the cardinality of A is one, the two
conditions are equivalent in the presence of (O), but when A contains two or
more elements, (CB) implies (I), but not vice versa.
This justifies my claim that (CB) is a natural generalization of [vNM] indepen-
dence to unions of mixture spaces, or equivalently, spaces for which the mixture
operation is not everywhere defined. Note that if for two mixture spaces each
element of the first is strictly better than all elements of the second, then con-
dition (CB) is silent for such comparisons, but it still has implications within
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each mixture space.
Note that [KS] provide an example that shows why their version of the (CB)
is not implied by the combination of (O), (C’ty) and (I). The intuition is that
whenever there are at least two distinct indifference sets, both of which con-
tain elements from two particular mixture spaces, it is possible to find utility
functions that are mixture preserving on each of the mixture spaces, together
satisfy (O), (C’ty) and (I), but which fail to satisfy (CB).
If |A| “ 1, then A ˆM is in fact a mixture space, and if it satisfies con-
ditions (O), (C’ty) and (CB), then we say that it is a vNM ordered space.
More generally, we have the following definition.
Definition 4.2. [Extended vNM ordered space]
Let M be a mixture space and A a discrete set, and let À be a binary relation
on AˆM. Then pAˆM,Àq will be referred to as an extended vNM ordered
space if it satisfies conditions (O), (C’ty), and (CB).
Any representation of preferences over a mixture set will involve a function
that is, first and foremost, mixture preserving.
Definition 4.3 (A generalization of [HM] and Moulin (2001)8). For any set
D, a function f : D Ñ R is said to be mixture preserving (MP) if for all
p, q P D, and all λ P r0, 1s such that pλq P D
fppλqq “ λfppq ` p1´ λqfpqq.
8I thank Peter Hammond for recommending this form of the definition.
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A special case of a mixture preserving function is of course an expected utility
function such as that of [vNM].
4.3 Mixture preserving utility
The next lemma ensures that for each a P A, the vNM ordered space tauˆM,
has a mixture preserving representation.
Lemma 4.1. Let |A| “ 1. Then pAˆM,Àq ” ptauˆM,Àq is a vNM ordered
space if and only if there exists a mixture preserving function U : tauˆMÑ R
such that for every p, q PM,
pa, pq À pa, qq ô Upa, pq ď Upa, qq (4.1)
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that when A ˆM is a vNM ordered
space it satisfies the conditions of [HM]. The only part that is not immediate, is
the observation that condition (C’ty) is stronger than the continuity condition
of [HM]. Their condition is stated as follows.
For any p, q, r P ∆, the following sets are closed:
tλ P r0, 1s : pλq Àa ru and tλ P r0, 1s : r Àa pλru.
We prove the contrapositive. That is, we prove that if [HM]’s condition fails
to hold, then so does (C’ty). Suppose there exists a sequence tλn : n P Nu in
r0, 1s that converges to λ1 with the property that, for all n, pλnq Àa r, whilst
at λ1 we have r ăa pλ1q. In the presence of complete preferences, this is the
only possibility. Now, this implies that (C’ty) indeed fails to hold.
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Lemma (4.1) also provides justification for the following identity
ptau ˆM,Àq ” pM,Àaq
and we will use the latter as shorthand for the former, thus pa, pq „ pa, qq if
and only if p „a q for example.
The first result that arises from the assumption of compactness is the fol-
lowing.
Lemma 4.2. Let rα, γs be a closed interval in R such that α ă γ and let
pM,Àq be a vNM ordered space with ă‰ H. Then given any mixture preserv-
ing representation rU of pM,Àq, there exists unique θ, κ P R with θ ą 0 such
that the function
U : C Ñ rα, γs, p ÞÑ θrUppq ` κ,
satisfies
p À. q ô Uppq ď Upqq
for each p, q PM.
Proof of lemma (4.2). Since pM,Àq is a vNM ordered space, by lemma (4.1)
there exists a mixture preserving function rU :MÑ R that represents prefer-
ences on M. The existence of mixture preserving representation is sufficient
for condition (C’ty), and so rU is continuous. Then since M is compact, by
theorem 26.4 of Munkres p182, the image of M under rU is compact.
By the extreme value theorem (theorem 27.4 of Munkres 190), this implies
that there exists a greatest lower bound g and a least upper bound l, both in
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M such that
rUpgq ď rUppq ď rUplq
for every p PM. Let rα “ rUpgq and rγ “ rUplq. By the fact that rU is a repre-
sentation, we know that for all p PM, g À p À l.
By condition (2) of the definition of mixture spaces, for every λ P r0, 1s gλl is
an element of M. Then since rU is mixture preserving, for all λ P r0, 1s
rUpgλlq “ λrα ` p1´ λqrγ,
so that the image of rU is equal to the interval rrα, rγs. The fact that ă is
nonempty, and implies that l ă g and hence rα ă rγ.
Now let θ satisfy the equation θprγ´ rαq “ γ´α. Then θ ą 0 and it is uniquely
identified. Next, let κ satisfy θrα ` κ “ α; it too is uniquely identified. Then
since
θrγ ` κ “ θrγ ` α ´ θrα “ γ,
we see that U :“ θrU ` κ is a candidate for the required function.
The fact that U is mixture preserving follows readily from the fact that rU
is mixture preserving and the fact that for each p, q PM, 0 ď λ ď 1
Uppλqq :“θ rUppλqq ` κ
“λ pθ rUppq ` κq ` p1´ λqpθ rUpqq ` κq
“λUppq ` p1´ λqUpqq;
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whilst the fact that it is order preserving is similarly easy to show.
Remark 4.1. If ă is empty, then for all p, q PM, p „ q and so rUppq “ rα for
all p PM. Clearly if α is any other element of R, then there exists an infinity
of solutions to the equation θrα ` κ “ α.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that there exist a ‰ b in A and p, q, p1 P M such that
preferences satisfy pa, pq À pb, qq À pa, p1q and pa, pq ă pa, p1q. Then there
exists a unique λ P r0, 1s such that pa, pλp1q „ pb, qq.
Proof. Existence: This argument parallels the proof of Theorem 1 of [HM].
Consider the the set
T :“ tλ P r0, 1s : pb, qq À pa, pλp1qu.
By condition (C’ty) and the proof of lemma (4.1), T is a closed subset of
r0, 1s. Since pb, qq À pa, p1q, 1 P T ; so T is nonempty. By the same argument,
W :“ tλ P r0, 1s : pa, pλp1q À qu is also closed in r0, 1s; it is nonempty as
0 P W . Now since M is a completely preordered mixture set, T YW “ r0, 1s;
the fact that r0, 1s is a connected set, implies that no pair of its subsets define
a separation thereof, and so T XW is nonempty. Let λ0 P T XW ; by construc-
tion of these sets I have pa, pλ0p
1q À pb, qq À pa, pλ0p1q. So that by asymmetry
of ă I have pa, pλ0p
1q „ pb, qq.
Uniqueness: Clearly if pa, pq ă pb, qq ă pa, p1q, then 0 ă λ0 ă 1. Now
take any r P M such that pa, rq „ pb, qq. Transitivity of „ implies that
pa, rq „ pa, pλ0p
1q. Moreover, theorem 6 of [HM] together with the fact that I
have assumed pa, pq ă pa, p1q implies that λ0 is unique.
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Definition 4.4. Let x and y be elements of A ˆM. Then the pair px, yq is
called a gap if both the following conditions hold:
(i) x ă y; and
(ii) the set sx, yr :“ tz : x ă z ă yu is empty.
Remark 4.2. Note that more generally the set sx, yr :“ tz : x ă z ă yu can,
by de Morgan’s laws and the fact that À is complete and transitive, be rewritten
as tz :  pz À xqu Y tz :  py À zqu. Then condition (C’ty) implies that each
of the sets in this union is open; therefore sx, yr is open.
Definition 4.5. Let x “ pa, pq and y “ pb, qq be elements of A ˆM. Then
the pair px, yq is called a quasi-gap (or alternatively a q-gap) if it is either a
gap or if both the following conditions hold:
(i) x „ y; and
(ii) the sets
Dx “ tc P A : for some r PM, pc, rq ă xu; and
Ey “ tc P A : for some r PM, y ă pc, rqu
are disjoint with a P Dx and b P Ey.
Definition 4.6. In what follows I will denote any element that is a greatest
lower bound for a set tcuˆM by gc. Similarly, lc will refer the the least upper
bound.
Lemma 4.4. If px, yq is a q-gap, then for all c P A, either pc, rq À x for all
r PM, or y À pc, rq for all r PM.
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Proof. If x „ y, so that px, yq is a q-gap but not a gap, then in property (ii)
of the definition of a q-gap, the fact that the sets Dx and Ey are disjoint is
sufficient for the conclusion of this lemma to hold.
If x ă y, then the conclusion of this lemma is equivalent to the following:
@c P A  px ă lc and gc ă yq
which in turn, by the fact that sx, yr“ H, is equivalent to:
@c P A  pgc À x ă y À lcq.
So by way of contradiction, suppose not. If gc „ x ă y „ lc, then the fact that
tcu ˆM is a vNM ordered set together with theorem 2b of [HM] implies that
there exists z P tcu ˆM such that gc ă z ă lc. Transitivity then implies that
x ă z ă y, so that the pair px, yq cannot be a gap; therefore, either gc ă x or
y ă lc must hold.
Suppose that gc ă x, then the fact that gc ă x ă lc together with by lemma
(4.3) there exists v P tcuˆM such that v „ x. Repeating the argument of the
previous paragraph leads us to the same contradiction. The case where y ă lc
is identical.
Lemma 4.5. Every q-gap px, yq of pA ˆM,Àq has the property that x „ la
and y „ gb for some a ‰ b in A.
Proof. Suppose that px, yq is a gap, and suppose that x  lc for all c P A. Then
there exists d P A, p, q P M such that x “ pd, pq ă ld “ pd, qq. Now since
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(M,Àd) is a vNM ordered space, by theorem 2b of [HM] I have p ăd p
1
2
q ăd q,
so that because sx, yr“ H, and Àd is complete, y À
`
d, p1
2
q
˘
. Now the same
theorem implies that y À
`
d, p1
2
pp1
2
qq
˘
which, by conditions (2) and (3) of the
definition of a mixture space
p1
2
pp1
2
qq “ p1
2
pq 1
2
pq “ pq 1
2
pq1
2
p “ q 1
4
p “ pp1´ 1
4
qq.
Thus y À
`
d, pp1´ 1
4
qq
˘
. Indeed by the induction hypothesis, and an identical
argument I see that for all j P N y À
`
d, pp1 ´ 2´jqq
˘
, so that by condition
(C’ty) and the fact that pd, pp1 ´ 2´jqqq converges to x “ pd, pq, we see that
x „ y. This implies that px, yq cannot be a gap; this contradiction implies
that there exists a P A such that x „ la. An identical argument shows that
y „ gb for some b P A whenever px, yq is a gap. Moreover, by the definition of
a gap, a ‰ b.
Now suppose that x „ y, that is px, yq is a q-gap, but not a gap. By property
(ii) of q-gaps, there exists d P EyzDx with y “ pd, pq for some p P M. The
fact that d lies outside Dx implies, by condition (O), that x À pd, rq for all
r PM, so that y „ gd. Finally, by the same property of q-gaps, there exists
pc1, p1q P AˆM such that pc1, p1q “ x and c1 P DxzEy. Now the fact that c lies
outside Ey implies that for all r PM, pc, rq À y, so that by pc, rq À pc, p
1q for
all r PM. This implies that x „ lc; moreover, I can see that d ‰ c.
I will now use the quasi-gaps of pAˆM,Àq to define quasi-components. These
are subsets of A ˆM upon which my eventual representation will have a
common scale and origin. That is, on a given quasi-component, in the language
of measurability and comparability, preferences are cardinally measurable and
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fully comparable.
Definition 4.7 (Quasi-component). Let px, yq be a quasi-gap in pAˆM,Àq.
(i) If for all other q-gaps pw, zq, x À w, then the (nonempty) set
rÐ, xs :“ tt P AˆM : x À tu
is called a quasi-component or q-component of pAˆM,Àq.
(ii) If for all other q-gaps pw, zq, z À y, then the (nonempty) set
ry,Ñs :“ tt P A ˆM : y À pa, pqu
is called a quasi-component of pAˆM,Àq.
(iii) If pu, vq is another q-gap, distinct from px, yq with y ă v, and for all
other q-gaps pw, zq, z À y or u À w, then the (nonempty) set
ry, us :“ tt P A ˆM : y À t À uu
is called a quasi-component or q-component of pAˆM,Àq.
(iv) If there are no q-gaps in pA ˆM,Àq, then the set A ˆM is itself a
quasi-component.
Definition 4.8 (Component). If the quasi-gap(s) that identify a quasi-component
ru, vs are gap(s), then ru, vs is also called a component.
Definition 4.9. A quasi-gap pw, zq is said to be distinct from another quasi-
gap px, yq if either w ă x or y ă z. One quasi-component is said to be distinct
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from another if at least one of the quasi-gaps that define it is distinct from
each of the quasi-gaps of the other. A collection of distinct quasi-components
is such that every pair in the collection is mutually distinct.
The following lemma together with the fact that for every q-gap px, yq the set
sx, yr is empty shows that the definition of q-components is such that for all
x P A ˆM, x belongs to some q-component.
Lemma 4.6. For every q-gap px, yq in pAˆM,Àq, there exists w, z P AˆM
such that rw, xs and ry, zs are q-components.
Proof. If for every q-gap pw1, wq in pAˆM,Àq, x À w1, then by (i) of the defi-
nition of q-components, rÐ, xs is a q-component. The fact that rÐ, xs “ rw, xs
for some w P AˆM follows from the fact that A is finite and M is compact.
The same is true of ry,Ñs if w À y for every q-gap pw1, wq.
Now suppose that there exists a q-gap pv1, vq with v1 ă x. I will first show
that there exists a q-gap pw1, wq with the property that every q-gap pu1, uq
with v1 À u1 À x satisfies u1 À w1.
Suppose not. That is, for every q-gap pw1, wq such that w1 ă x, there ex-
ists another pu1, uq with w1 ă u1 ă x. Starting with v1, I may, using the first
element in the pair that defines each of these q-gaps, construct a sequence
tv1i : i P Nu with the property that v
1
1
“ v1 and for all i ě 2, v1i´1 ă v
1
i ă x. By
assumption this sequence is infinite. However, by lemma (4.5) I know that for
all i, v1i „ lapiq for some apiq P A; now the fact that v
1
i´1 ă v
1
i for each i im-
plies that A is an infinite set, a contradiction of my assumption that it is finite.
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Thus there exists a q-gap pw1, wq such that every other q-gap lies outside the set
rw, xs; part (iii) of definition (4.7) then states that this is a q-component.
Lemma 4.7. For all a P A, tau ˆM is a subset of some q-component ru, vs.
Moreover, if ăa‰ H, then tau ˆ M belongs to at most one (distinct) q-
component, otherwise it belongs to at most two.
Proof. Lemma (4.6) implies that x “ pa, pq P AˆM lies in some q-component
ru, vs. In turn, lemma (4.4) implies that the q-gaps that define ru, vs must lie
outside tau ˆM, and this is sufficient for the first part of lemma.
It is also sufficient for the the fact that tau ˆM belongs to ru, vs alone when-
ever ăa is nonempty. For in this case, even if for instance ga „ u, there exists
q PM such that ga ă pa, qq, so that pa, qq cannot belong to any q-component
in the set rÐ, us. In the same way, we know that la À v, so that pa, qq R rv,Ñs.
To see that when ăa“ H, the set tau ˆM can belong to more than one
q-component, note that if ga „ u and ry, us is also a q-component for some
y P A ˆM, then the fact that la „ u implies that tau ˆM belongs to both
q-components. For any other q-component rw, zs that is distinct from both
ry, us and ru, vs, either w ă y or v ă z, in either of these cases, one cannot
have u P rw, zs.
Remark 4.3. By this last lemma, denote any q-component ru, vs as B ˆM
for some B Ă A such that there are no q-gaps in B ˆM. Moreover, also by
this lemma, for some Q P N I may write
AˆM “
Qď
i“1
Bi ˆM,
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where for each i, Bi ˆM is a quasi-component.
Lemma 4.8. For any q-component ru, vs :“ B ˆM, if u ă v, then there
exists b P B such that ăb‰ H and u „ gb. If on the other hand u „ v, then
ru, vs is a component.
Proof. Suppose that despite the fact that u ă v, it holds that for all b P B,
the set ăb is empty. By this assumption, together with lemma (4.5), we know
that u „ la „ ga and v „ gc „ lc for some a, c P A. Now since ru, vs contains
no q-gaps, there exists d P Bzta, cu such that ga ă gd „ ld ă gc. In turn, there
exists e P Bzta, c, du such that ga ă ge „ le ă gd. A finite iteration of this ar-
gument exhausts the elements of the finite set B, so that we contradict the fact
that there are no gaps in ru, vs; I conclude that there exists b P B with ăb‰ H.
An identical argument to the preceding paragraph shows that it is not the
case that for all b P B with ăb‰ H we have u ă gb; thus u „ gb for some such
b.
Suppose that u „ v and ru, vs is a q-component but not a component, that is
the q-gaps that identify ru, vs are not gaps. Then let px, uq pv, yq be quasi-gaps
with x „ u and v „ y. Transitivity, via condition (O), then implies that these
two quasi-gaps are not distinct and so ru, vs is not a q-component.
Lemma 4.9. The number Q of (distinct) quasi-components in pAˆM,Àq is
less than or equal to the cardinality of A. The number of (distinct) quasi-gaps
is one less than the number of quasi-components.
Proof. By lemma (4.7) we know that every q-component ru, vs “ BˆM con-
tains at least one set tbuˆM. If if u ă v then by lemma (4.8) gb ă lb for some
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b P B and by lemma (4.7) therefore, ru, vs is the only q-component to which
the set belongs. If u „ v, then gb „ lb for all b P B, and ru, v, s is a component,
and in this case every b in the nonempty set B satisfies the property that ru, vs
is the only q-component to which tbu ˆM belongs.
This in itself is sufficient for the proof of the first part of this lemma. For the
second part, I proceed by induction. First consider the “lowest” q-component
in the order À which is denoted by rÐ, v1s. Either there are no q-gaps in
pA ˆM,Àq, so that A ˆM is the only q-component, or there exists y1 such
that pv1, y1q is a q-gap. In the former case the statement of this lemma is
true, and in the latter there are once more two possibilities. By lemma (4.6),
there exists v2 such that ry1, v2s is a q-component, either ry1, v2s “ ry1,Ñs is
a q-component, or there exists y2 such that pv2, y2q is a q-gap. Once again, in
the former case, the statement of the lemma is true, and in the latter there
are two similar possibilities. It is clear that for each 2 ď j ď |A| the inductive
step is identical to the above and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.10. If ru, vs “ B ˆM is a q-component, then either u „ v or
there exists a minimal sequence ta1, . . . ahu in A such that for all j “ 1, . . . , h,
taju ˆM is a subset of ru, vs, and
g1 ă g2 ă l1 À g3 ă l2 À g4 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă gh´1 ă lh´2 À gh ă lh´1 ă lh.
Definition 4.10. The set ta1, . . . , ahu ˆM is called a strict cover of ru, vs.
Proof. Let u ă v, then by lemma (4.8) we may suppose that gb ă lb for some
b P B and take gb to be the glb of ru, vs. By the fact that B is finite together
with condition (O), choose b such that for every c with gc „ u, lc À lb. Consider
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the set
Lb :“ ta P A : ga ă lb ă lau.
First observe that Lb Ă B, for I know that lb À v. If Lb is empty, then for
every a P AzLb, either lb À ga or la À lb. The former of these two relationships
implies that if for some p PM, lb ă pa, pq then lb À ga, whilst together they
imply for all a P B, la À lb. Thus whenever Lb is empty ru, vs “ rgb, lbs and
the sequence I seek is simply tgb, lbu with h “ 1.
If Lb is nonempty, then let a1 :“ b, g1 :“ gb and L1 :“ Lb. Then take
a2 P Lb and l2 :“ la2 to satisfy lc À l2 for all c P L1. Such an element exists
because of condition (O) and the fact that L1 is nonempty and finite. Now
consider the set
L2 :“ ta P A : ga ă l2 ă lau.
By the same argument as for L1 above, I see that L2 Ă Bzta1u. If it is empty
I have found a strict cover:
u „ g1 ă g2 ă l1 ă l2.
If not, then let a3 be the element of L2 satisfying la À l3 for all a P L2. If L3,
defined recursively as for L1 and L2 is empty then I claim my sequence is
g1 ă g2 ă l1 À g3 ă l2 ă l3.
The only relationship that needs further explanation is l1 À g3. This holds
because otherwise a3 P L1 and the fact that l2 ă l3 would contradict the fact
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that l2 was maximal. The general case follows by induction, the argument of
which is identical to the one just given and is hence omitted.
The fact that the strict cover is minimal follows immediately from the con-
struction.
Lemma 4.11. If pa, pq „ pb, qq and pa, p1q „ pb, q1q, then, for all 0 ă λ ă 1,
pa, pλp1q „ pb, qλq1q.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let pa, pq ă pa, p1q, so that, by transi-
tivity, pb, qq ă pb, q1q. By condition (CB), pa, p1
2
p1q „ pb, q 1
2
q1q. Succes-
sive applications of this condition show that for all dyadic rational numbers,
0 ă π “
řnppiq
i“1 ζi{2
i ă 1, where ζi “ 0 or 1, we have pa, pπp
1q „ pb, qπq1q.
For the remainder of this proof, π will refer to the binary expansion of some
dyadic rational number. Recall the fact that the set of such numbers is dense
in the real numbers and so every 0 ă λ ă 1 is the limit of some such sequence
tπj : j P Nu.
For 0 ă λ ă 1 consider the set Tb :“ tx P A ˆM : x À pb, qλq1qu. If tπju is
such that πj ă λ for each j and limj πj “ λ, then pb, qπjq
1q ă pb, qλq1q for all j
by theorem 4 of [HM]. By condition (BC) and transitivity, pa, pπjp
1q ă pb, qλq1q
for each j and so tpa, pπjp
1qu Ă Tb. By condition (C’ty) Tb is closed, and be-
cause limj pπjp
1 “ pλp1 this implies that pa, pλp1q À pb, qλq1q.
By the same argument Ta :“ tx P AˆM : x À pa, pλp1qu is closed and contains
the set tpb, qπjq
1qu which converges to pb, qλq1q. Thus pb, qλq1q À pa, pλp1q, so
that by asymmetry of ă the proof is complete.
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Theorem 4.1 (Mixture preserving representation on q-components). BˆM
is a quasi-component of the extended vNM ordered space pA ˆM,Àq if and
only if both the following conditions hold.
(i) There exists a mixture preserving function U : B ˆM Ñ R such that
for all x, y P B ˆM
x À y ô Upxq ď Upyq.
(ii) If V is any other function with the same properties as U , then, for some
θ, κ P R with θ ą 0, V “ θU ` κ.
Proof. If for all x, y P B ˆM, x „ y, then take U to satisfy Up¨q ” 1 and
remark (4.1) ensures that every other representation V is the form V “ θU`κ
for a one-dimensional set of suitable θ, κ combinations. In the opposite direc-
tion, suppose that B ˆM is not a quasi-component. Then by lemma (4.7)
BˆM is a union of q-components and so it contains at least one q-gap which,
by lemma (4.5), which I denote by pla, gbq for some a, b P B. Now by the defi-
nition of q-gap, a and b belong to different q-gaps, indeed there exists p, q PM
such that pa, pq ă pb, qq. Of course this contradicts the assumption that on
B ˆM, ă is empty.
To prove the theorem, suppose that the set of pairs of elements in B ˆM
for which strict preference holds is nonempty. By lemma (4.10) there exists
a subset Bh of B with |Bh| “ h ď |A| and an enumeration of its elements
ta1, . . . , ahu such that if gj :“ gaj and lj :“ laj , then
g1 ă g2 ă l1 À g3 ă l2 À g4 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă gh´1 ă lh´2 À gh ă lh´1 ă lh.
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I first show that the conditions that constitute a vNM space imply part (i) of
the present theorem. By lemma (4.1) the exists a mixture preserving function
U1 : ta1u ˆMÑ R such that for all p, q PM
pa1, pq À pa1, qq ô U1pa1, pq ď U1pa1, qq
By compactness of M, for some β1, γ1 P R I have U1pa1,Mq “ rβ1, γ1s with
U1pg1q “ U1pa1, pq and U1pl1q “ U1pa1, pq for some p, p PM.
Since g1 ă g2 ă l1, lemma (4.3) implies that there exists unique 0 ă λ ă 1,
and ppλq :“ pλp such that pa1, ppλqq „ g2. Similarly, let g2 “ pa2, qq and
l2 “ pa2, qq, then there exists unique 0 ă ν ă 1 such that l1 „ pa2, qpνqq,
where qpνq :“ qνq.
By lemma (4.1), the vNM ordered set defined by projecting preferences onto
the set ta2uˆM, has a mixture preserving representation U 12 : ta2uˆMÑ R.
Thus, with a view to leaving the image of U1 unchanged in my construction
of a mixture preserving representation on the projection of preferences onto
ta1, a2u ˆM, I recall lemma (4.2) states that: for any interval rβ2, γ2s in R,
there exists unique θ2, κ2 P R, θ2 ą 0 such that
rθ2U
1
2
pg2q ` κ2, θ2U
1
2
pl2q ` κ2s “ rβ2, γ2s.
The content of two preceding paragraphs suggests that I should choose β2 and
γ2 to satisfy β2 “ λβ1 ` p1 ´ λqγ1 and γ1 “ νβ2 ` p1 ´ νqγ2. Substituting
for β2 in the second of these two equations, I obtain γ2 “
1
1´ν pγ1 ´ νβ2q. Let
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U2 : ta1, a2u ˆMÑ R be defined as
U2pxq “
$’&
’%
U1pxq if x P ta1u ˆM
θ2U
1
2
pxq ` κ2 if x P ta2u ˆM
U2 is clearly mixture preserving and its image is the interval rβ1, γ2s. In order
to show that it is also a representation, it suffices to check pairs x and y where
x :“ pa1, p
1q and y :“ pa2, q1q for some p1, q1 PM.
First consider the more straightforward cases, that is where x ă g2 À y and
x À l1 ă y. For the former, since
U2pg2q “ β2 “ λβ1 ` p1´ λqγ1 “ U2pa1, ppλqq,
the fact that x “ pa1, p
1q ă g2 „ pa1, ppλqq together with theorem 4 and 6 of
[HM] imply that there is a unique λx ă λ such that x „ pa1, ppλxq. In this
case,
U2pxq “ U2pa1, ppλxqq “ λxβ1 ` p1´ λxqγ1 ă β2 ď U2pyq,
and so I conclude that whenever x ă g2 À y
x À y ô U2pxq ď U2pyq,
as required. (Note that in making this statement I have made use of the fact
that in this case there are no pairs x, y such that y À x.) For the set of pairs
x, y where x À l1 ă y the proof that U2 is a representation on such pairs is
the same.
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Now consider the remaining case where x “ pa1, p
1q and y “ pa2, q1q for some
p1, q1 PM and g2 À x, y À l1. I recall that
pa2, qq “ g2 „ pa1, ppλqq and pa1, pq “ l1 „ pa2, qpνqq,
and once again by theorem 6 of [HM], there exists a unique 0 ď µ ď 1 with
p1 „a1 ppλqµp such that x „
`
a1, ppλqµpq. By lemma (4.11) therefore
x „
`
a1, ppλqµp
˘
„
`
a2, qµqpνq
˘
.
Now suppose that x „ y. In this case, transitivity implies that y „`
a2, qµqpνq
˘
. Then since U2pa1, ppλqq “ β2 “ U2pa2, qq and U2p1, pq “ γ1 “
U2pa2, qpνqq and U2 is mixture preserving (whenever the mixture operation is
defined) I have
U2pa1, p
1q “ U2pa1, ppλqµpq “ µβ2 ` p1´ µqγ1
and
U2pa2, q
1q “ U2pa1, qµqpνqq “ µβ2 ` p1´ µqγ1
as required.
The remaining cases, where x ă y and y ă x follow by virtue of the following
facts: by theorem 6 of [HM], I may find two unique values 0 ă µx, µy ă 1
such that p1 „a1 ppλqµxp and q
1 „a2 qµyqpνq; by lemma (4.11) I know that
pa, ppλqµpq „ pa2, qµqpνqq for all 0 ď µ ď 1; and by theorem 4 of [HM] I have
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µx ă µy if and only if both
qµxqpνq ăa2 qµyqpνq and ppλqµxp ăa1 ppλqµyp.
Thus far we’ve seen that U2 is a mixture preserving representation of the pro-
jection of preferences À onto the subset ta1, a2uˆM of the strict cover BhˆM.
In order to extend U2 to the rest of this strict cover, I proceed by induction
and the proof follows by precisely the same argument as above. The resulting
representation is a function Uh : Bh ˆM Ñ rβ1, γhs that is a standard mix-
ture preserving representation on each of the sets taju ˆM and an extended
mixture preserving representation on the whole set.
In order to extend Uh to the rest of the quasi-component B ˆM, note that
for all b P BzBh, g1 À gb À lb À lh. In fact, because a strict cover is minimal,
I conclude that gj À gb À lb À lj`1 for some j P t1, . . . , j ´ 1u. (See the
proof of lemma (4.10) for the construction of a strict cover.) Thus for some
x, y P taj , aj`1u ˆM I have x „ gb and y „ lb.
Now by the proof that U2 is a representation of the projection of preferences
onto ta1, a2u ˆM, and the fact that my construction of Uh is recursive in j, I
know that for each j, Uh restricted to taj , aj`1uˆM will have image rβj, γj`1s
where βj ă γj`1. If I choose βb “ Uhpxq and γb “ Uhpyq then by lemma (4.2)
or remark (4.1) given any representation Ub of the projection of preferences
onto tbu ˆM there exists a positive affine transformation θb ą 0, κb P R that
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is geometrically unique and satisfies
rβb, γbs “ rθbUbpgbq ` κb, θbUbplbq ` κbs.
Indeed because this is true for all b P BzBh, the proof that
UBpxq :“
$’&
’%
Uhpxq if x P Bh ˆM
θbUbpxq ` κb if x P tbu ˆM, b P BzBh
is a representation for the projection of preferences onto the quasi-component
B ˆM follows by the same techniques that I have used in showing that U2 is
a representation.
It remains to be shown that the fact that pAˆM,Àq is a vNM ordered space
implies part (ii) of the present theorem. That is, if V is any other mixture
preserving representation of there exists a single positive affine transformation
θ ą 0, κ P R such that V “ θU ` κ. If V pB ˆMq “ rπ, ρs for some π ă ρ in
R, then by the proof of lemma (4.2), I let θ satisfy θpγh´β1q “ ρ and κ satisfy
θβ1`κ “ π. I recall that in the construction of the image of Uh, the represen-
tation of the strict cover of B ˆM, only β1 and γ1 were free variables. The
degrees of freedom associated with every other representation rUj of taju ˆM
were used to obtain the unique transformation θj rU ` κj with image rβj, γjs,
where for each j, βj “ λjβj´1 ` p1 ´ λjqγj´1 and γj “ 11´νj pγj´1 ´ νjβjq and
where the λj and νj are uniquely determined by preferences. As such it suffices
to check that U and V agree on ta1u ˆM. This of course directly follows by
lemma (4.2).
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This complete the proof that the conditions that constitute an extended vNM
ordered space imply (i) and (ii) of the present theorem. In the opposite direc-
tion, conditions (O), (C’ty) and (I) are standard and therefore omitted. The
necessity of (CB) is seen by noting that if it fails, that is there exists a, b P B,
p, q, p1, q1 PM with pa, pq „ pb, qq and pa, p1q „ pb, q1q but
pa, p1
2
p1q  pb, q 1
2
q1q.
Without loss of generality, suppose that pa, pq ă pb, qq, then for any mixture
preserving representation U of such preferences β “ Upa, pq “ Upb, qq and
γ “ Upa, p1q “ Upb, q1q for some β ă γ in R. However, the fact that U is
mixture preserving on each of tau ˆM and tbu ˆM implies
Uppµp1q “ µβ ` p1´ µqγ
“ Upb, qµq1q
for all 0 ă µ ă 1; which clearly implies the desired contradiction.
The necessity of the assumption that BˆM is a quasi-component of pAˆM,À
q follows from the fact that if it is not then there exists at least two quasi-
components B1 ˆM and B2 ˆM whose union is B ˆM. I will obtain a
contradiction for the case where there are only two q-components. Let g1, g2, l1
and l2 be the respective glbs and lubs of B1 and B2. It will suffice to consider
the cases where they are components, that is g1 ă l1 ă g2 ă l2, and where they
are quasi-components but not components, that is where g1 ă l1 „ g2 ă l2.
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First consider the case where l1 ă g2. Let U be a mixture preserving represen-
tation of BˆM with Upg1q “ β 1, Upl1q “ γ1, Upg2q “ β2 and Upl2q “ γ2. Now
let rπ1, ρ1s and rπ2, ρ2s be any pair of intervals such that π1 ă ρ1 ă π2 ă ρ2. It
is clear that in general I will need two different positive affine transformations
θ1, θ2 ą 0 and κ1, κ2 P R are needed to shift and rescale the intervals rβ 1, γ1s and
rβ2, γ2s so that rθ1β 1`κ1, θ1γ1`κ1s “ rπ1, ρ1s and rθ2β2`κ2, θ2γ2`κ2s “ rπ2, ρ2s.
However it is also clear that any mixture preserving function that maps B1ˆM
into rπ1, ρ1s and B2 ˆM into rπ2, ρ2s and which is representation on each of
these quasi-components is also a representation on B ˆM. This implies that
(ii) is violated. So that in this case, the fact that BˆM is a quasi-component
is necessary.
The case where g1 ă l1 „ g2 ă l2 follows by an identical argument and is
therefore omitted. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 4.2 (Mixture preserving representation).
Let M be a compact mixture space and A a finite set. Then pAˆM,Àq is an
extended vNM ordered space if and only if both the following conditions hold.
(1) There exists a mixture preserving function U : A ˆM Ñ R such that
for all x, y P AˆM
x À y ô Upxq ď Upyq.
(2) the number Q of quasi-components9 has the property that if V is any
9For those who have not read the construction of quasi-components above, these should
be interpreted as corresponding to maximal intervals in the image of the utility function inR
that are non-overlapping except, possibly, at the endpoints. It is this slightly messy property
that leads the construction to be involved even though the concept is straightforward.
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other function satisfying (1), then for each a P A
V pa, ¨q “ θiUpa, ¨q ` κi
for some i “ 1, . . . , Q, κi P R and θi ą 0.
Proof. (ñ p1q) Since AˆM can be written as the union of an arbitrary enu-
meration of its q-components AiˆM, i “ 1, . . . , Q ď |A|. (Recall that we are
implicitly referring to distinct q-components.) Each q-component, by theorem
(4.1), has a mixture preserving representation rU i : taiu ˆM Ñ rβ 1i, γ1is for
some β 1i ď γ
1
i in R. I proceed by rearranging the intervals rβ
1
i, γ
1
is, to match
the order À.10
The proof then follows by lemma (4.2) as we are free to take the necessary
positive affine transformations of the representations rU i such that the trans-
formed representation U i has image equal to the desired interval rβi, γis. My
mixture preserving representation will be the function that coincides with each
of the functions U i for each q-component Ai ˆM.
Let rβ1, γ1s “ r0, 1s if β
1
1 ă γ
1
1 and t0u otherwise. By induction, for the
ith interval in the enumeration, consider the following cases:
• li ă gm for all m ď i´ 1: if so let rβi, γis “ r´2i ´ 1,´2is if β 1i ă γ
1
i and
t´2iu otherwise;
• lm ă gi for all m ď i´ 1: if so let rβi, γis “ r2i, 2i` 1s if β 1i ă γ
1
i and t2
iu
otherwise;
10This method of proof allows for a countable set A, although my construction of q-
components precludes the theorem from applying to that case.
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• lh ă gi À li ă gk for some 1 ď h, k ď i ´ 1 and for every m ď i ´ 1 I
have either lm À lh or gk À gm.
If the last of these is true and β 1i ă γ
1
i, then let βi “
1
2
pγh ` βk ´
βk´γh
2i
q and
γi “
1
2
pγh ` βk `
βk´γh
2i
q and let them both equal 1
2
pγh ` βkq otherwise.
In the first of these cases, for each i ě 2, then γi “ ´2
i ă ´2i´1 ´ 1 where
´2i´1 ´ 1 is a lower bound for βm for every m ď i ´ 1. The second case is
similar. For the third case, it is also clear that for all i ě 2 γh ă βi ď γi ă βk.
Now consider the remaining cases where the q-component rgi, lis shares an
indifference set with either one or two q-components with respect to which it
is distinct. Recall, that by lemma (4.8) in this case, we cannot have gi „ li.
• li „ gh, where gh À gm for all m ď i´ 1: if so let rβi, γis “ rβh ´ 1, βhs;
• lk „ gi, where lm À lk for all m ď i´ 1: if so let rβi, γis “ rγk, γk ` 1s;
• lh À gi ă li À gk for some 1 ď h, k ď i ´ 1 and for every m ď i ´ 1 we
have either lm À lh or gk À gm.
If the last of these is true, then there are three sub-cases to consider. If
lh „ gi ă li „ gk, then I simply set rβi, γis “ rγh, βks. If lh ă gi ă li „ gk,
then let γi “ βk and βi “ βk ´
βk´γh
2i
. Similarly, if lh „ gi ă li ă gk, then I let
βi “ γh and γi “ γh `
βk´γh
2i
.
For the special case, where ∆ is the set of probability distributions over fixed
finite set, I obtain the following representation.
Theorem 4.3 (vNM for Aˆ∆).
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Let A and S be finite sets and let ∆ be the set of probability measures on S.
Then pA ˆ ∆,Àq is an extended vNM ordered space if and only if both the
following conditions hold.
(1) There exists a function U : Aˆ∆Ñ R, pa, pq ÞÑ Upa, pq “
ř
sPS psupa, sq
such that for all x, y P Aˆ∆
x À y ô Upxq ď Upyq.
(2) The number Q of quasi-components11 satisfies the property that if V is
any other function satisfying (1), then for each a P A
V pa, ¨q “ θiUpa, ¨q ` κi
for some i “ 1, . . . , Q, κi P R and θi ą 0.
4.4 Applications
We will first discuss the relationship between the present work and that of
[KS] and in the following two subsections, present applications of the above
results to study the issue of state-dependence and the paradox of Allais (1953).
The following remark describes the relationship between condition (CB) and
the corresponding condition of [KS].
Remark 4.4. The following is the constrained independence condition of [KS].
11We recall that these should be interpreted as corresponding to maximal intervals in
the image of the utility function in R that are non-overlapping except, possibly, at the
endpoints.
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I emphasize that this is not assumed anywhere in this chapter, and is only
presented so as to show that it is somewhat stronger than (CB).
Definition 4.11 (Constrained independence). For any b, c P A, p, q, p1, q1 P
M, and λ P r0, 1s if pb, pq „ pc, qq then pb, p1q À pc, q1q if and only if
pb, pλp1q À pc, qλq1q.
The fact that constrained independence implies condition (CB) follows imme-
diately if we take λ “ 1
2
, consider the fact that „ĂÀ and use the “only if”
part of the statement. Moreover, it is clear that in the absence of condition
(O), (CB) does not imply the “if” part of constrained independence, for pb, p1q
and pc, q1q may be incomparable. We claim without proof, that in the presence
of (O) and (C’ty) the conditions are equivalent.
The remaining conditions of [KS] serve only to ensure that the representation
is state-independent and is particular to the relationship between the the set
A and the mixture space M that they consider. That is to say, their paper is
a special case, with additional conditions on preferences and structure on the
space on which preferences are defined. Thus to my knowledge, this chapter
constitutes the most general in its class, and is the natural generalization of
vNM and [HM] to the setting where there are is more than one mixture space,
or where the mixture operation is not everywhere defined.
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4.4.1 Separating comparability from state-dependence
Consider the following change in interpretation of the space A ˆM of the
above theorems. Take A to be the product space
ź
sPS
As
for some finite set of states S and, for each s P S a finite set of state-outcomes
As. Then take M to be the set of probability distributions ∆pSq on S. Now
as an element of Aˆ∆pSq is of the form pa, pq :“
`
pa1, . . . , a|S|q, pp1, . . . , p|S|q
˘
which, in the case where the elements of A are also vectors in R|S|, may be
rewritten as an inner product
xa, py “
ÿ
sPS
ps as.
Or, in the usual lottery form where δpasq is the lottery assigning probability
one to the state-outcome as ÿ
sPS
δpasq ps.
Now for each a in the finite set A, a ˆ ∆pSq is a mixture space, and so by
theorem (4.3) preferences satisfy (O), (C’ty) and (CB), if and only if there
exists a function U : A ˆ ∆pSq Ñ R, pa, pq ÞÑ Upa, pq “
ř
sPS psuspasq such
that for all pb, qq, pc, rq P A ˆ∆
pb, qq À pc, rq ô
ÿ
sPS
uspbsq qs ď
ÿ
sPS
uspcsq rs .
Note that the means to which we obtain this may be easier to see if we write
uspasq “ upas, δsq, but it is standard in the literature to make this small abuse
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of notation. Now this is clearly a state dependent utility function. That is,
for any pair of states s, t P S, it may well be that bs “ bt “ b., cs “ ct “ c.,
uspb.q ă uspc.q and utpc.q ă utpb.q simultaneously hold. By contrast, the-
orem (4.3) implies that the uniqueness properties of the representation de-
pend entirely upon preferences. Suppose that the extended vNM ordered set
pAˆ∆pSq,Àq defines a single component. In this case, any other representa-
tion of preferences can be rewritten as a positive affine transformation of U .
Thus, in the presence of condition (CB), full comparability across states and
state-dependence of preferences is possible.
Indeed, this is the property that ensures the representation of [KS] and Karni
(2009) has the uniqueness form that it does. They obtain this by assuming a
condition called “coordinate essentiality”. This states that, for each state s,
there exists b, c P A such that pb, δsq ă pc, δsq. Whilst this condition is suf-
ficient for the representation to be unique in the sense I have just described,
contrary to what [KS] and Karni (2009) claim, it is certainly not necessary.
The following example highlights this fact.
Example 4.4. Suppose there are two states. Take A1 to be a singleton.
12
Then preferences do not satisfy the condition in question. Now take A2 to
be of cardinality 2 and note that the cardinality of A is therefore also two.
Now suppose that pc, δ1q ” pb, δ1q ă pb, δ2q ă pc, δ2q. Then by lemma (4.3)
we know that there exists a unique 0 ă λ ă 1 such that pb, δ2q „ pc, δ1λδ2q.
Since pb, δ1q ă pb, δ2q. We conclude that there are two distinct indifference
sets each containing elements from both the mixture spaces tbu ˆ r0, 1s and
tcu ˆ r0, 1s, and so, in the language of the present chapter, preferences give
12We could also suppose that pb, δ1q „ pc, δ1q for all b, c P A.
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rise to a single component. That is, any representation of preferences is unique
up to a single positive affine transformation. Thus, there exist preferences that
satisfy part (b) of theorem 2 in [KS], but not part (a) of the same theorem.
The condition in question is, however, needed for the uniqueness of the rep-
resentation, for without it, there is no guarantee that preferences are of the
form pc, δ2q ă pc, δ1q ” pb, δ1q ă pb, δ2q: in this case, preferences give rise to
two quasi-components and, by the main theorem of this chapter, two positive
affine transformations characterize the uniqueness of the representation, not
one. Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra (2010) present the correct form of the
theorem in a different setting.
The “certainty principle” of [KS] states that for all states s, when the decision-
maker is certain of being in state s, what might happen in other states doesn’t
matter, that is, she reduces the comparison of pa, δsq and pb, δsq to the com-
parison of as and bs. Whilst this is not necessary for the uniqueness discussion
above, it is necessary and sufficient for there to be a state-independent utility
representation of the form
U : A ˆ∆pSq Ñ R, pa, pq ÞÑ Upa, pq “
ÿ
sPS
psupasq,
where now, since upas, δsq “ upasq for all s, we see that the function u depends
only on the state through the state-outcome as.
The main message to take away from the present subsection is that, contrary
to the common perception, state-dependence and uniqueness are independent
concepts, the confusion seems to have arisen due to the almost universal use
of a single mixture space.
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4.4.2 Incompletely defined preferences and the Allais
Paradox
By preferences that are incompletely defined we mean that there exist entire
sets of lotteries, say, that the decision-maker has not even considered, but
wherever preferences are defined they are complete. This is a special case of
incomplete preferences which holds when there exists at least one pair of al-
ternatives for which preferences have nothing to say, perhaps as a result of the
decision-maker genuinely being unable to state preference in either direction.
For instance, for incomplete preferences in general, it may be the case that x
is worse than both y and z, whilst y and z are incomparable as in some ways
y dominates z and in others z dominates y. The following diagram presents
such a scenario for a standard (element by element) ordering of vectors in R2.
✻
✲
r
z
r
x
r
y
Instead, by incompletely defined preferences we suppose that comparability is
transitive. When two lotteries, x and y, are comparable, we mean that either
x is preferred to y or y is preferred to x. By transitivity of the relation of of
being comparable that if x is comparable to both y and z, then y is comparable
with z. If we denote “comparable” by “Ø” then this condition is summarized
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thus: for all x, y and z
if xØ y and y Ø z then xØ z.
This assumption ensures that the sets where preferences are complete are dis-
tinct from those where they are complete. By itself it is stronger than the usual
transitivity of preference condition, but it is not strong enough to partition X
into two sets, one containing comparable elements and the other elements for
which preferences are not defined. There may be two or more sets within each
of which all elements are comparable, but across which elements are not, or at
least not comparable in the same way.
The concept at play is closely related to the approach of Schmeidler (1989).
On p.576 he concedes that completeness is the most restrictive and imposing
assumption of expected utility theory, but notes that “One can view the weak-
ening of the completeness assumption as a main contribution of all the other
axioms.” Indeed he then goes on to weaken the independence condition so that
it applies only for a particular subclass of lotteries. The present application
pertains to the same viewpoint.
Specifically, suppose that, for a fixed set of prizes such as t$0, $10, $50u, a
given decision-maker has been offered the choice between two pairs of lotteries
over the prizes such as the pair p “ 0.01 ¨ δ0 ` 0.99 ¨ δ10 (win nothing with
probability 0.01 and win $10 with probability 0.99) and
q “ 0.17 ¨ δ0 ` 0.83 ¨ δ50,
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and the pair
r “ 0.9 ¨ δ0 ` 0.1 ¨ δ50 and u “ 0.11 ¨ δ0 ` 0.89 ¨ δ10,
where, once again, δx is the measure assigning probability one to outcome x.
Now the chances are she will not have given much thought to the vast number
of other possible lotteries over the set of prizes. However, she would almost
certainly agree that both of p and q are strictly better than either r or u.
In fact this may be so apparent that, when making such comparisons, the
decision-maker may have no need for the high resolution scale of measurement
the vNM model implies. After all, is it not the case that a person who is asked
to state which of two rather different weights is heavier would have no need
to ask if they could use scales before providing an answer?
By contrast, her decisions between p and q, on the one hand, and r and u
on the other, are likely to require a good deal more consideration. More-
over, whilst for a given pair, such as p and q, mixtures nearby or in between
may give rise to similar judgements, and be approximated by the vNM con-
ditions, this need not hold globally. Unless more lotteries are placed before
the decision-maker, thus allowing her to explore her own attitude to risk, her
preferences may not even be defined globally. Near r and u, for instance, there
may be another region where the model of vNM is a good approximation, but
across the two regions, other than ordinal statements of the form “anything
in the region near p and q dominates anything in the region near r and u, the
decision-maker may be agnostic.
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It seems reasonable that the utility function that characterizes such a decision-
maker’s preferences should reflect this reflect this asymmetry in the decision-
making task across and within regions of the simplex. Furthermore, without
further probing by the experimenter, say, the decision-maker may have no
cause whatsoever to compare mixtures of elements in one region with those of
the other, and if preferences are not defined there, then why should the utility
function be?
In the example we have been considering we have so far left the preferences of
the decision-maker unspecified. If however they took the form we see in figure
(4.4.2) (see final page) we obtain an example of preferences that satisfy the
Allais paradox, and which are also well described by the discussion above. If,
as in the shaded regions of the diagram, we assume that each of these sets are
convex, then they are mixture spaces and the model of this chapter provides
a simple way of representing preferences with a family of mixture preserving
utility functions (a simple generalization of an expected utility function that is
defined below). Each member of this family being defined on one of the regions
for which preferences are well defined. Moreover, these functions combine to
define a single mixture preserving utility function on the union of the given
regions.
On the complement of this union, preferences and hence the above utility
function is simply not defined. However, if we extend each of the mixture
preserving utility functions from their domain of definition to the whole sim-
plex, each will take the form of a vNM expected utility function (also defined
below). Together, over the entire simplex, these combine to form a multi-
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expected utility function that resembles that of Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok
(2001).
The resulting representation may well fail to characterize preferences in the
sense that, for some pair of lotteries p, q each of the vNM expected utility func-
tions may happen to agree that p assigns greater utility than q, even though
they both lie outside the regions where preferences are defined. Nonetheless,
further research into finding appropriate conditions may provide a way of com-
pleting preferences for such pairs.
Another important difference between the representations is in the uniqueness
properties the multi-expected utility functions possess. In the present model
preferences may be such that each member of the family of utilities is numeri-
cally fully comparable with one or more of the others. That is, there may even
be a single (multi-)utility scale. This may well be useful in applications.
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$10 $0
‚
p
‚
q
‚
r
‚
u
Figure 4.1: The Allais paradox and incomplete preferences. The decision-
maker’s preferences are such that the slope of the indifference curves in the
triangular region containing δ0 are shallower than those in the rectangular
region containing p and q. If preferences satisfy the conditions for the main
theorem of this paper over the union of these two regions, then the decision
maker has a mixture preserving utility representation on this union. The
representation is the restriction of two distinct expected utility functions to
the respective regions. Since every element in the rectangle dominates every
element in the triangle, preferences are lexicographic across regions and so
comparing the utility value of an element in the rectangle with that of an
element in the triangle is meaningless. Only ordinal statements are meaningful.
By contrast, within each region, the representation is numerically meaningful
in the sense of vNM and HM53.
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Chapter 5
Summary and future research
In this thesis I have presented three approaches to dealing with preferences
that vary with context. Whilst most of the results were presented in the canon-
ical setup, where the space of contexts consists of probability distributions over
some set of states, the task of transposing these results to different spaces is
certainly feasible.
The first and most obvious transposition is to case-based decision theory, where
the context space is the set of possible databases (memories), which is repre-
sented by Nn: the product of n copies of the natural numbers. Clearly, there
is an natural embedding in Rně0 of this space, and indeed, it is this property
that Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) employ in the proof of their representa-
tion theorem. When the context space is Nn, the conditions on preferences
that are analogous to the betweenness conditions of chapters 2 and 3, will be
reminiscent of operations on cones as opposed to convex spaces. Thus, with
the understanding that A is as usual the set of alternatives, condition (s-B) of
chapter 3 would translate as follows.
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Definition 5.1 (Additivity w.r.t. cases). Let δs be an element of N
n with sth
entry equal to 1 and all others equal to zero. For all j, δs in N
n and a, b P A,
if both a ąj b and a ąδs b, then a ąj`δs b. The same condition holds for the
relation Á. .
The intuition for this kind of condition is similar to that of (s-B). Indeed in
this setting, it is perhaps best to call it ‘case monotonicity’ due to the fact
that j ď j ` δs for any j and any δs. This would be a weakening of the
Gilboa and Schmeidler model since their ‘combination’ condition, addition is
assumed to hold not only with respect to cases, but also any other database.
That is, the decision-maker is assumed to be able to imagine what it would
be like to concatenate any two databases, clearly this is a much more difficult
exercise than simply imagining that another instance of the basic ingredients
of memories were to occur: that is another case.
An additional condition that would substitute for the Archimedean one of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) would be the following.
Definition 5.2. For every j, δs P N
n and every a, b P A, if a ąδs b, then there
exists a natural number l, such that a ąj`lδs b.
If context (strict) preferences are also asymmetric and negatively transitive,
then, in context space, preferences will resemble those in the following figure
and preferences the objective is to show, using the techniques developed in
chapter 3, that there is an ordinal representation with connected sets where
no-strict preference holds between two alternatives and where star-convexity
holds with respect to the elements δs as opposed to all databases j in N
n.
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For the model of chapter 2, where a cardinal representation characterizes pref-
erences, the next step to weaken the diversity condition further. The way I
propose to do this is to introduce conditional diversity. Roughly speaking it
says that for any triple of alternatives, if there is a certain degree of diversity,
then there is full diversity, but a lack of diversity is also allowed. This condition
is a more substantial weakening Gilboa and Schmeidler’s diversity condition,
for it would allow, amongst other things, alternatives that are dominant for all
contexts; thus allowing the model to encompass dominant strategy problems
in games for instance.
For the model of chapter 4, where preferences were extended to contexts and
the context space was a mixture space, the application to the Allais paradox
needs to be expanded and formalized. In particular, to allow for collection of
mixture spaces each of which is endogenously defined by preferences.
Finally, all of the above need to be extended to the multi-stage/decision-
tree setting as well as the game-theoretic setting where the opponent may
be strategic and it pays to be unpredictable.
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